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THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT
FOR THE YEAR 1948
STATISTICAL SURVEY
ROBERT LEE SMITH*

This survey is based upon the opinions handed down by the supreme
court in 1948. Of the 254 majority opinions,' three dealt with two separate
cases, one with three separate cases, and one opinion disposed of five separate
cases, thus making a total of 263 cases decided during the year. Eight of the
opinions were originally written as divisional opinions and later adopted
by the court en banc. There were three separate concurring opinions, three
dissenting opinions, and one supplemental opinion. In addition, there were
nine separate opinions on motions for rehearings or to transfer to the court en
banc.
There were no changes in the personnel of the court during the year.
Table I indicates the distribution of the majority opinions among the
divisions of the court.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY EACH DIVISION

En. Ban.c ............................................................................................... 45
Division Number One -----------------------------------------------116
Division Number Two ........................................................................ 93

Total --------------------------------------------------------254
Table II is a classification of the majority opinions into categories
indicating, as nearly as possible, the dominant issue involved. Because of its
nature, this table is only an approximation, since many cases involved
more than one such issue and, therefore, an arbitrary choice was frequently
necessary.
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. Total majority opinions for the preceding five years are as follows: 1943,
306; 1944, 251; 1945, 197; 1946, 181; 1947, 244.
(327)
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TABLE II
ToPicAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Administrative Law and Procedure ..............................................
A ppeal and Error ............................................................................
A ttorney and Client ..........................................................................
Constitutional L aw .........................................................................
Contem pt .........................................................................................
C ontracts ...........................................................................................
Corporations ...................................

[Vol. 14

2
13
2
7
2
7
3

Counties ................................................................................................
1
Courts .................................................................................................
7
Creditor's Rights ..............................................................................
3
Crim inal Law ...................................................................................
40
D am ages ..............................................................................................
2
D edication ..........................................................................................
1
D ivorce ................................................................................................
2
Elections ............................................................................................
2
E minent Dom ain ..............................................................................
3
E quity ...............................................................................................
5
E scheat ..............................................................................................
2
E stoppel .............................................................................................
1
Evidence .................................................
10
G ifts ......................................................................................................
1
G uardian and Ward ............................................................................
1
Highw ays ..........................................................................................
3
Insurance .................................................
.
5
Judgm ents ..........................................................................................
3
L andlord and T enant ......................................................................
1
Lim itation of Actions .......................................................................
2
M andam us ...........................................................................................
1
M aster and Servant ........................................................................
8
M ortgages ..........................................................................................
3
M unicipal Corporations .................................................................
11
N egligence (A uto) .........................................................................
11
Other N egligence ...........................................................................
13
Pleading .............................................................................................
2
Practice and Procedure .................................................................
5
Principal and Agent ..........................................................................
3
Prohibition .......................................................................................
2
Real Property .................................................................................
10
R ailroads ..............................................................................................
8
Schools and School D istricts ............................................................
1
Searches and Seizures ......................................................................
2
Specific Performance ...............................
6
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Statutes ....................................................
2
Taxation ................................................................................................ 6
Torts (other than Negligence) .....................................................
9
Trusts .................................................................................................
5
Unions ..............................................................................................
3
W ills and Administration ..................................................................
8
Workmen's Compensation ..............................................................
4
Total ............................................................................................

254

Table III shows the disposition of the cases decided in 1948. The
wording, so far as practical, is that of the judges and commissioners in their
opinions. For this reason, some of the categories, separated because of
differences in phraseology, indicate identical final dispositions.
TABLE III
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATI6'N

Appeal Dismissed ..............................................................................
Appeal Dismissed and Cause Remanded

3

...................................

1

Alternative Writ of Mandamus made Preemptory ........................
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Permanent as
M odified ......................................................................................

1
.

1

Cause Transferred to Court of Appeals ............................................ 7
Contempt Proceedings Dismissed .........----...................................... 1
Decree Affirmed .............................................................................
6
Decree Affirmed and Cause Remanded for Further
Proceedings in Accordance with It ................................................ 1
Decree Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part and
Rem anded .....................................................................................
1
Decree and Judgment Affirmed .......................................................

4

Decree and Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded
For any Necessary Further Proceedings .................................... 1
Judgment Affirmed .............................................................................. 127
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded ...................................
1
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded With

Directions -------------------------------.......................
.
.
......
1

Judgment Affirmed as Modified ........................................................
Judgment Affirmed as to Reinstatement and Payment
of Salary, but Reversed as to Award of Damages ............................
Judgment Affirmed in Part and in Part Reversed
and Remanded with Directions ...................................................
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur,
Otherwise Reversed and Remanded ............................................
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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Judgment and Decree Affirmed in Part and Reversed
and Remanded with Directions in Part ........................................
1
Judgment and Sentence Affirmed ..................................................
1
Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Petition Reversed
and Cause Remanded with Directions ......................................
2
Judgment Modified and Respondent Disbarred ...........................
1
Judgment of Disbarment in Accordance with Opinion ................ 1
Judgment of Dismissal Affirmed ..................................................
4
Judgment Reversed .....................................................................
16
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded ................................
22
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded for New Trial ........... 5
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with
D irections .......................................................................................
8
Judgment Reversed and Defendant Discharged .........................
2
Judgment Reversed as to One and Affirmed as to One
D efendant ...............................................
1
Judgment Reversed with Directions to Enter a
Judgment for Defendant .............................................................
1
Judgment set Aside with Directions ................................................
1
Opinion of Court of Appeals Quashed, Judgment
Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........................
1
Order and Judgment of Dismissal Affirmed ..............................
1
Order and Judgment of Trial Court Affirmed ................................
1
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed ................................................
1
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed and Cause
Rem anded .....................................................................................
3
Order Granting New Trial Reversed and Cause
Remanded with Directions ..........................................................
2
Order Granting New Trial Sustained but Cause
Remanded for Entry of Decree in Conformity with
Opinion .........................................................................................
1
Orders Affirm ed ................................................................................
1
Petitioner Ordered Discharged ..........................................................
1
Preemptory Writ of Mandamus Awarded ...................................
3
Preliminary Rules in Prohibition Previously Issued
Discharged ......................................................................................
2
Preliminary Writ of Prohibition Made Absolute ..........................
2
Records of Circuit Court Quashed, Except insofar as
the Judgment Denied Petitioner's Prayer for Discharge from Custody of the Warden ............................................
1
Writ of Certiorari Quashed ...................................................
1
JL.

............................................................................................
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Table IV shows the disposition of motions subsequent to decision so far
as records are now available. The instances in which rehearings were
granted, or the cause transferred to the court en banc represent the main
categories necessarily omitted.
TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DECISION

Motion for Rehearing and to Modify Opinion and
1
Judgm ent Denied ............................................................................
77
Motion for Rehearing Denied -----------------------------------------Motion for Rehearing Denied and Opinion Modified --------------- 1
Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En
38
Banc D enied ....................................................................................
Motion for Rehearing, to Modify Opinion, or to
1
Transfer to Court En Bane Denied ............................................
Motion to Modify Opinion Sustained .......... ---............................. 1
2
Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied ---------------------------Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc, or for
Judgment on the Pleadings, or for a New Trial
1
Denied ...................................
Total ............................................................................................

122

.APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V. GARNErT*
THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

While the provisions of the new constitution of Missouri, adopted in
1945, make no material changes in the law, under the old constitution, with
respect to appellate jurisdiction: the changes in other laws required by
the new constitution are creating new questions with reference to the jurisdiction of the supreme court. In the year under review seven cases were
transferred to the appropriate court of appeals for lack of jurisdiction in the
supreme court. Two of these cases involve questions arising under the Unemployment Compensation Law.

In Parker v. Unemployment Compensation Commission,2 an appeal
from a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission denying
compensation to plaintiff, the court points out that, in accordance with the
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. Mo. CoNsr. Art V, § 3.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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directions contained in the new constitution, the reorganization of the executive department of the government substituted the Division of Employment Security for the Unemployment Compensation Commission and resulted in clothing that branch of the government with power as a public
quasi corporation. Consequently, it is there held that the director of the
Division of Employment Security is not a proper party and that the division itself will be regarded as a public corporation. Prior to these changes
the court, as is shown in the Parker opinion, had consistently held that exclusive appellate jurisdiction of such cases was in the supreme court because
the individual members of the Commission were necessary parties and were
state officers; but the effect of the change in the law transferring the administration of the Act to the newly created Division of Employment Security was to eliminate the necessity for making the director of that division
a party and consequently the suit did not involve a state officer within the
jurisdictional sense. Accordingly, the case was transferred to the court of
appeals.
In Howell v. Division of E.mploymeWnt SecUrity,3 another action to review a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Commission, the court
followed the ruling in the Parker case on the point that the division itself
as a legal entity was the proper party to the proceeding and that the court
did not have jurisdiction on the ground that a state officer was a party.
The opinion then takes up the question of whether or not the fact that the
issue below involved the liability of appellant for the payment of taxes as
employers under the Compensation Act, conferred jurisdiction upon the
supreme court on the ground that the construction of the Revenue Law of
the state was involved. The conclusion reached is that the contributions required to be paid by the employer under the Act do not constitute revenue
of the state, and that the construction of revenue laws was not directly and
primarily involved in the decision. Accordingly it was held that the court
did not have jurisdiction of such cases as cases involving construction of the
revenue laws and transferred the cause to the court of appeals.
Analogous in principle to the Parker and Howell cases is the decision
of the court in Trokey v. United States CartridgeCo.,4 an appeal in an equity
suit brought against the Workmen's Compensation Commission and against
plaintiff's employer and its insurance carrier to set aside a compromise com2. 214 S.W. 2d 529 (Mo. 1948).

3. 215 S.W. 2d 467 (Mo. 1948).
4. 214 S.W. 2d 526 (Mo. 1948).
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pensation settlement and compel the commission to hear a claim for additional compensation. It was contended that the supreme court has jurisdiction because the Division of Workmen's Compensation is a party to the
action, but the court points out that it looks beyond mere formal allegations to determine its jurisdiction and that the three individual commissioners are wholly unnecessary parties to the action, the commission itself
was not a state officer, the necessary jurisdictional amount was not involved, and ordered the case transferred to the court of appeals.
In Hydesburg Common School District v. Rensselaer Common School
District,' the court held that the constitution of 1945 makes no material
change in the provisions of the previous constitution with respect to its jurisdiction, and adhered to the rule previously announced that a school district
is not a political subdivision of the state in the jurisdictional sense. Since
no other possible ground for its jurisdiction appeared, the cause was transferred to the court of appeals.
In City of St. Louis v. Friedman, the court retained jurisdiction on the
ground that a constitutional question was involved and, in doing so, relaxed
somewhat the harshness of the former rule that the constitutional question
must be raised at the first opportunity and the particular provision of the
constitution alleged to have been violated must be pointed out, by holding
that the failure to point out by section and article the particular constitutional provision is not fatal where the constitutional right claimed is stated
with sufficient clearness to apprise the trial court and the appellate courts
of the right claimed, stating, "that is substantial compliance with our requirements in this respect."
In Lynn v. Stricker,7 an appeal from a decree construing a will was
transferred to the court of appeals because the calculations of the court disclosed the fact that the amount in dispute was not within the monetary
jurisdiction of the court even though the inventory of the estate, after deductions for debts and costs of administration, was in excess of the jurisdictional limitation. The court pointed out that certain items were not in dispute on the appeal and that these items, when deducted from the total, reduced the amount in dispute below the jurisdiction of the court.
In Cherry v. Cherry," an appeal in an action for partition, the case was
transferred to the court of appeals under the well established rule that
5. 214 S.W. 2d 4 (Mo. 1948).
6. 216 S.W. 2d 475 (Mo. 1948).
7. 207 S.W. 2d 290 (Mo. 1948).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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partition actions do not ordinarily involve title to real estate, the court
pointing out that there was no issue as to the dower rights of the widow
such as had been the case in Ferguson v. Long. The court also declined to
retain jurisdiction in Pursley v. Pursley, 10 where the appeal was from a
decree giving plaintiff an equitable lien upon defendant's real estate and
ordering the property sold to satisfy the lien. The court again applied the
rule that title to real estate must be directly, and not merely incidentally,
involved in order to confer appellate jurisdiction upon the supreme court.
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

In the November 1948 issue of the Missouri Law Review,"' the decision ofthe court in'In re Duren'2 was reviewed in connection with the
power of an appellate court to base its decision of an appeal upon a question
or principle of law not presentedby the litigants either to the trial court or
to the appellate court. It was pointed out that the decision of a question
upon which the court has not been aided by the arguments and contentions
of the parties offends the fundamental principles of due process of law; and
it was suggested that, when a reviewing court discovers what it regards as
controlling issues which have not been made the subject of appellate presentation, the better practice would be for the court to set aside its order of
submission and direct the parties to appear and present their views upon the
discovered issue. That course was followed by the United States Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in the case of United States v. Payne, 8 thus affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard upon the issue upon which the
decision was finally based. In the case of Kindred v. Anderson, 4 however,
the court has again announced its view that it has the right to consider issues
not raised by the parties, and to base its decision upon such issues, because
of the provision of Supreme Court Rule 3.27 relating to plain errors. It
will be noted that the court does not consider whether or not such a decision
is a denial of due process of law, nor does the opinion undertake to analyze
the so-called plain error rule. The rule itself was designed to afford relief
from oversights occurring in the trial courts, and gives the litigant the right,
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

210 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo. 1948).
341 Mo. 182, 107 S.W. 2d 7 (1937).
213 S.W. 2d 291 (Mo. 1948).
13 Mo. L. REV. 351 to 353 (1948).
355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W. 2d 343 (1947).
72 F. 2d 593 (C.C.A. 9th 1934).
357 Mo. 564, 209 S.W. 2d 912, 921 (1948).
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on appeal, to join appellate issues even though the basis therefor has not
been preserved for review in the record. The extension of that rule to the
appellate field is contrary to the principles of due process of law and appears
to do violence to the language of the rule itself. However, notwithstanding
the decision in the Kindred case, it is to be noted that the court, in Benhzm
v. McCoy,1 respected a stipulation of the parties as to the appellate issues
and refused to consider alleged instruction errors not covered by the stipulation.
In Baerveldt & Honig Construction Co. v. Dye Candy Co.,16 the court
reviewed at length the question of whether or not the report of the referee
confirmed by the court which, under Section 1159, Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann., has
effect as a special verdict, precludes the court from reviewing both the law
and the evidence as in other suits of an equitable nature, as is provided by
Section 114 (d) of the code. The opinion holds that the seeming conflict
between the two sections must be resolved in favor of the latter section in
order to avoid an unconstitutional classification, and the rule is announced
that, in all court cases, whether the facts have been found by the court or
by a referee, the appellate court can and should review the case both upon
the law and the evidence.

THE RIGHT OF APPEAL
In Jones v. Williams17 the court held that an order sustaining a motion
to dismiss a petition constitutes a final order from which an appeal can be
taken; and, in the course of the opinion, the court points to the difference
between a demurrer under the old practice and the motion to dismiss under
the new code, calling attention to the fact that the sustaining of a demurrer
did not have the effect of dismissing the cause of action because of the right
to file an amended petition, while, under the code, a dismissal with prejudice
operates as a final adjudication. In the Jones case the plaintiff had followed
the trial court's order dismissing the petition with a motion for a new trial
which was overruled before the appeal was taken. The court has not yet
definitely ruled that a motion for a new trial is necessary for proper appellate review of an order sustaining a motion to dismiss a petition, but it would
seem that a motion for a new trial in such a case would have no function
to perform. There never having been a trial upon the merits, no new trial
15. 213 S.W. 2d 914, 917 (Mo. 1948).
16. 357 Mo. 1072, 212 S.W. 2d 65 (1948).
17. 357 Mo. 531, 209 S.W. 2d 907 (1948).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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could be granted. However, a-somewhat analogous situation was before the
court in Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co.18 where, after a jury
verdict for plaintiff, the defendant filed both a motion for a new trial and a
motion for directed verdict. The latter motion was sustained but the court
made no order on the motion for new trial. It was held that the order sustaining the motion f6r a directed verdict and the record entry of a judgment
made according to that motion was a final judgment from which an appeal
would lie and that the failure of the trial court to overrule the motion for new
trial did not render the appeal premature. The opinion contains much of
interest with respect to the preservation of points for review by the rulings
of the court upon after judgment motions.
In Bruun v. Katz Drug Co.,"9 where the original suit was against a corporation whose corporate charter was forfeited after it had become a party
to the litigation and thereafter plaintiff attempted, by motion, to have the
directors and a new corporation substituted as parties, it was held that an
order overruling such motion was not a final judgment and not an appealable
order. Similarly, in Koplar v. Rosset,20 where the trial court, after a remand, denied leave to file a supplemental petition, it was held that the order
denying leave was not an appealable order because there still remained issues
not determined and there was no final judgment in the case. Also, in Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,21 where the suit was
against two defendants and the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the
petition as to one defendant, it was held that such dismissal did not affect
the cause as to the other defendant and that an appeal therefrom was premature.
In State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland,22 it was decided that appeals in divorce
cases are now governed by Section 129 of the new code, prescribing the time
and manner of taking appeals, and not by Section 1524, Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
which provides that appeals in divorce matters must be taken during the
term at which the judgment appealed from was rendered. The holding i's
based upon the court's construction of its Rule 3.02 (a) and 3.02 (c).
In Holt v. McLaugldin2 8 appellant had been adjudged guilty of contempt of court and appealed. Noting the difference between civil and crim18. 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).

19. 211 S.W. 2d 918 (Mo. 1948).

20. 214 S.W. 2d 417 (Mo. 1948).

21. 215 S.W. 2d 444 (Mo. 1948).
22. 357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W. 2d 31 (1948).
23. 357 Mo. 844, 210 S.W. 2d 1006 (1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1
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inal contempt the court held that the appeal was from an adjudication of
criminal contempt and that there is no statutory provision for the right of
appeal in such cases, the method of review being by habeas corpus. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed. However, in the case of In re Conner,24 where
the informant in a disbarment proceeding had appealed from a judgment
suspending respondent for ninety days from the practice of law, the court, in
a well reasoned opinion, declined to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
there was no statutory provision for appeal in such cases and, resorting to
its Rule 5.11 by which the court, in the exercise of its inherent power to
discipline the Bar, provided for a review of disbarment proceedings, held
that any appropriate proceeding to accomplish the purpose of review is entirely proper, and refused to give to the word "appeal" a narrow technical
construction as referring only to a statutory right. The proceedings were
reviewed by the court in that case and the order suspending the respondent
was modified to provide for his absolute disbarment.
RECORDS AND BRIEFS

In DeMayo v. Lyons2' the court refused to dismiss an appeal on the
ground that appellant's statement was not a fair and concise statement of the
facts without argument, holding that dismissal of an appeal is a drastic
penalty and that such penalty will not be applied unless fully warranted by
the violation complained of. The same result was reached by the court in
Kirkpatrick v. Wabash. R. R., 26 where it had been contended that appellant's brief was intermingled with argument and with conclusions. Because
the court was able to glean from the statement the facts determinative of
the sole issue on appeal it was again stated that the harsh remedy of dismissal would not be applied.
In Donati v. Gualdoni,27 an appeal from an order granting a new trial
after a jury verdict, respondents, after service of their brief, moved the
court for an order correcting the transcript of the record to include a memorandum which had been prepared and filed by the trial judge. The court
ruled that, absent consent of the parties, the motion to correct the transcript
was too late and, under Rule 1.03, overruled the motion.

24.
25.
26.
27.

357
216
357
216

Mo. 270, 207 S.W. 2d 492 (1948).
S.W. 2d 436 (Mo. 1948).
Mo. 1246, 212 S.W. 2d 764 (1948).
S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1948).
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EFFECT OF DECISIONS

In Abrams v.

Scott

28

the appeal was from a judgment entered upon the

court's mandate on a prior appeal. The second appeal was for the purpose
of determining whether or not the new judgment entered by the trial court
was in conformity with the mandate. In a clarifying opinion, the court ruled
that the words "for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion," or
words of similar import, add nothing which would not have necessarily been
implied had the mandate merely remanded the cause. It was pointed out
that every mandate is in the nature of a special or limited power of attorney
authorizing the lower courts to take such steps as are directed by the mandate. The conclusion of the court is that, whenever the appellate court reverses and remands the judgment of a trial court the remand is with directions, the specific directions to be determined from the mandate and the
opinion of the appellate court. It can never be assumed, when a case has
been remanded, that all the issues are open for a new trial. That may be the
effect of the opinion, but it is not a necessary effect unless the language of
the opinion so indicates.
CRIMINAL LAW
HOWARD B. LANG, JR.*
During the year 1948 the Supreme Court of Missouri did not pass on
any cases of first impression in the field of criminal law, but, rather, was
called on primarily to apply already well established principles.
I. PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL

A. Searck and seizure
There were two interesting cases involving the admissibility of evidence
obtained by search and seizure conducted by an officer. In State v. Carenza'
the court sustained the lower court in connection with the taking of fingerprints and affirmed the lower court which had ruled that the search and
seizure of a pistol was lawfully made. The evidence showed that the

defendant on one occasion had not objected to the taking of fingerprints
which were used in evidence against him, but on the second occasion had
28. 357 Mo. 937, 211 S.W. 2d 718 (1948).
*Former Prosecuting Attorney, Boone County, Columbia. A.B., University of
Missouri, 1934, LL.B. 1936, M.A. 1937.
1. 357 Mo. 1172, 212 S.W. 2d 743 (1948), noted 14 Mo. L. REV. 111 (1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1
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objected to the taking of his fingerprints. The court ruled that the defendant's motion to suppress the fingerprint evidence was properly sustained
as to those which were taken over his objection and was properly overruled as to those that were taken without his objection.
In the same case the officers, at the time the defendant was arrested
at his home, made a search for the pistol used in the offense but failed to
find it during the twenty-five minutes that they were at the home of the
defendant and before the defendant was taken to the station. An officer
was left at the house and some seven or eight hours later an officer returned
to the place and continued to search it for several hours, at which time
the defendant's wife came to the place and the search was continued. After
the arrival of the wife the pistol was found. The court held that the
pistol found was admissible in evidence and reaffirmed the established
principle that search of the place of the defendant's arrest was lawful
and search of the premises where the arrest was made could be made without
a search warrant where incident to the arrest.
The court in another instance remanded the case because of error by
the trial court in admitting evidence which was held to have been improperly seized. After the defendant's arrest the defendant gave the keys
to his car to a highway patrolman with instructions to take the car to the
farm of defendant's wife. Defendant was apparently not in the car when
arrested. The officer held the car for three days. No search warrant was
ever issued, but the car was searched without it and stolen narcotics
found therein. The trial court properly sustained a motion to suppress
this evidence. After the defendant gave bond, he asked that the patrolman
give him his car. The patrolman went to the garage to get the car but could
not get in, and in trying to enter the car through the trunk found a jimmy
bar which fit the mark made at the scene of the break in. The trial court
refused to suppress this evidence. The supreme court in remanding the case
ruled that the trial court had erred and that the seizure was unlawful
2
because no search warrant had been issued.
B. Inzdictment and informatio,.
The supreme court in affirming the judgment of the lower court in a
case involving the sale of intoxicating liquor without a license recognized the
general tendency of getting away from common law technicalities and upheld
the conviction under the information, even though the word "feloniously"
2. State v. Jones, 214 S.W. 2d 705 (Mo. 1948).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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was omitted. The court ruled that "feloniously" and words of similar import
are only necessary "when without the magic words the acts describe a misdemeanor rather than a felony as in many instances of felonious assault.' ' a
In another case the court ruled that designating the fish and game statute as a "code" instead of an "act" was a defect in the information, but
that the action of the defendant in failing to attack the information until
4
after verdict waived the defect.
In the case of State v. Wlipkey0 the defendant was charged under the
habitual criminal act and the indictment failed to allege the date of the
discharge of the defendant on the prior offense. The indictment did charge
that he was discharged from the penitentiary upon lawful compliance with
the sentence and the court ruled that it was not necessary to allege the
date of such discharge in the indictment.
The court continued to show a tendency to get away from the old common law technical wording in indictments and informations in the case of
State v. Stringer." The court had before it a charge of infanticide, wherein
the information failed to allege that the deceased "was given a mortal
wound by the defendant," as would be required under the common law
charge of manslaughter. The court's ruling was that the information was not
defective because the defendant had been properly informed of the charge
aainst her, finding that the defendant would not have obtained information
of any substance by the additional allegation. The court held that the
common law must be complied with as to substance, but that the ancient
forms need not be followed where there is no prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
In the case of State v. Frisby7 the court had before it the sufficiency
of an information charging the keeping of a gambling device. The charge
involved a crap or dice table and the information described the table and
the way it was used. The court ruled that this was a sufficient description
of the gambling device. The court did say, however, that it is necessary
where the statute does not specifically make the possession of the specific
gambling device an offense, that it be described in the information sufficiently
for the court and the defendant to know the nature of the accusation.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Updegraff, 214 S.W. 2d 22, 24 (Mo. 1948).
State v. Taylor, 214 S.W. 2d 34 (Mo. 1948).
215 S.W. 2d 492 (Mo. 1948).
357 Mo. 978, 211 S.W. 2d 925 (1948).
214 S.W. 2d 552 (Mo. 1948).
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C. Extradition

An unverified information from a sister state, even though such information was permitted under the law of the sister state, was held to be
insufficient to permit extradition. The court found that it is necessary in
order to honor an extradition request from another state that the requesting
state furnish a copy of the indictment found or an affidavit made before
a magistrate of the requesting state. The only substitution permitted for
an indictment is an affidavit before the magistrate upon which the information is based, and an information is not sufficient even though the local
state law does not require the verification of an information. 8
II. VENUE

The trial court in the case of State v. Bird,9 after all the evidence was
in and the defendant's attorney was arguing the motion for a directed verdict, suggested to the prosecuting attorney the reopening of the case in
order to prove venue. This action of the trial court was complained of on
appeal and the supreme court ruled that the court's action was proper in
holding that the proof of the case had shown that the offense took place
in the forum and that it was not only the court's right but the court's duty
to follow the course taken.
III. TRIAL
A. Voir dire
In one case the defendant had challenged the prospective juror who
stated that if he were convinced of the defendant's guilt he would not vote
for anything but the death penalty. The record, however, showed that this
particular juror did not sit on the jury but did not disclose whether the
juror's name was stricken by the defendant or the state. The court held
that there was no error preserved for review under these circumstances.1O
This particular case is important in the defense of criminal cases and indicates the value of a complete record, even showing the persons whose names
were stricken and by what party.
There was only one other case involving the qualifications of a juror
to sit in a case, and again the supreme court ruled that the conviction could
not be reversed on the state of the record before the court. After the voir
8. State ex rel. Taylor V.Blair, 214 S.W. 2d 555 (Mo. 1948).
9. 214 S.W. 2d 38 (Mo. 1948).,
10. State v. Battles, 357 Mo. 1223; 212 S.W. 2d 753 (1948).
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dire examination and the challenges had been made and the twelve jurors
accepted and sworn to try the case, one of the accepted jurors spoke up
and stated that, having seen the prosecutrix in a rape case and knowing
the family of the girl, he would like to be excused. The defense did not
attempt to further question the juror, nor request that the juror be excused
or indicate any dissatisfaction with the court's ruling that the juror should
serve, and the supreme court ruled that under the record the trial court
did not err in causing the juror to continue in the case.-1
B.Evidence
Admissibility of evidence in criminal cases is oftentimes governed by a
different rule than that ordinarily applied in civil actions. A great many
of the questions which are raised on criminal appeals involve the admissibility of evidence and for that reason it is felt that such cases on evidence
should be here reviewed.
1. Confessions and admissions
In State v. Hwmprey1 2 a unique question was presented as to whether
or not an acquittal at a previous trial for burglary, wherein the defendant's
confession had been introduced, was res judicata in a second trial as to the
voluntariness of the confession. The court indicated that under a proper
set of facts such would be the case. However, in the case at bar there was
no instruction in the first case as to the issue of voluntariness and no showing of adjudication of that issue in the first trial.
In State v. Battles' 3 the always perplexing problem of silence as an
admission was before the court. The arresting officer at the trial was asked,
"Did the defendant make any statement there?" and the officer's answer was
that he had asked the defendant as to whether the defendant would lie still
and the defendant had said yes, he would lie still, and that was the only
statement made by the defendant. In this case the court held that the
question and answer involved did not actually involve any admission by
silence because there was nothing to indicate that the defendant was asked
anything about the crime or-that anything about the crime was stated in
his presence. The court by way of dictum, however, made the following
statement as to the silence of the accused:
11. State v. Coones, 357 Mo. 1124,-212 S.W. 2d 429 (1948).
12. 357 Mo. 824, 210 S.W. 2d 1002 (1948).
13. 357 Mo. 1223, 212 S.W. 2d 7S3, 757 (1948).
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"The law in this state is that 'Silence of the accused when ;not
under arrest, and in circumstances such that only a guilty person
would have remained silent, may be shown. After arrest or while
in custody the evidence is inadmissible because he is under no
duty to speak."
In a kindred situation the court had before it a question of admission by
conduct. In the case of State v. Stringer- the defendant after the death of
her newly born child, which she was accused of having killed, failed to notify
the coroner of the death of the child. The state contended in the trial court
that this testimony was admissible, apparently on the theory that it was
an admission by conduct. The trial court permitted the coroner to testify
that he never did receive notice of the death of the child. The supreme
court ruled that there is no duty on the general public, and particularly upon
an accused, to report the death to the coroner. The court further ruled
that the failure of the defendant to report the child's death to the coroner
was not necessarily inconsistent with her innocence, and in a circumstantial evidence case did not have any probative value.
The court reaffirmed the well established principle that a confession
or admission cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti and is not even
admissible in evidence until the corpus delicti has been established.25
2. Proof of other crimes
In two different cases the supreme court permitted proof of other crimes
in the case in which the defendant was then being tried. In both cases the
proof of the other crime was incidental to and very directly connected with
the offense with which the defendant was being charged. In one case the
defendant was charged with robbery with a deadly weapon and .during the
course of the robbery committed an act of sodomy. The court ruled that
the state was not required to separate this evidence and exclude the testimony as to the offense of sodomy where the act took place as a part of and
in connection with the same offense, ruling that the act formed a part of
the res gestae of the crime charged.'6 In the other case the defendant was
charged with leaving the scene of an accident and on appeal complained of
the fact that the state was permitted to introduce in evidence the fact that
the persons struck by the automobile were fatally injured and died before

14. 357 Mo. 978, 211 S.W. 2d 925 (1948).
15. State v. Cooper, 214 S.W. 2d 19 (Mo. 1948).
16. State v. Gentry, 212 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. 1948).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1949], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

they could be taken to the hospital. The court, in overruling the defendant's
contention, ruled that the facts of the fatality were so closely associated
with the proof of the injury that such proof could hardly have been made
without showing the fatal connection thereof, and that it was part of the
offense of leaving the scene of an accident for the state to prove that there
had been injury to a person or damage to property.1
3. Reputation of the victim
In one case the court had before it the admissibility of testimony as
to the general reputation of the deceased as to turbulence or violence and
reaffirmed the well established principle that where a plea of self-defense is
interposed, evidence of the deceased's reputation for turbulence and violence
is admissible.,
4. Prior threats
In the case of State v. Whipkey,1" a murder prosecution, the state was
permitted to prove that the defendant while in California some time before
the offense had been committed, stated that he would kill the deceased if
he found her with another man. The court permitted this evidence as proof
of motive, even though remote.
5. Unavailability of witnesses
In one case the prosecuting witness testified at the preliminary hearing
but died before the time of the trial. The record showed that the defendant
was present at the preliminary hearing and accorded the right of examining
all witnesses. The court, following a well established principle, ruled that the
transcript of this witness' testimony was properly admissible in evidence.20
C. Impeachment
In two different cases the court again reaffirmed the rule that a defendant when a witness can be impeached by a proof of other crimes which he
has committed and that the state can go so far as to prove, either by crossexamination or by the record, the offenses for which the defendant has been
convicted and the number of times he has been convicted.21
D. Instructions
Instructions are always troublesome for both the litigants and the
court, and in the field of criminal law we do not find any exception to this
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
2d-558

State v. Harris, 357 Mo. 1119, 212 S.W. 2d 426 (1948).
State v. Parker, 214 S.W. 2d 25 (Mo. 1948).
215 S.W. 2d 492 (Mo. 1948).
State v. Parrish, 214 S.W. 2d 558 (Mo. 1948).
State v. Gentry, 212 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. 1948); State v. Parrish, 214 S.W.
(Mo. 1948).
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principle. In the case of State v. Whipkey 22 the supreme court reversed and
remanded the cause on an instruction by the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses. The court had instructed that "if you believe that any witness
has knowingly and wilfully swore falsely to any material fact, you should
reject all or any portion of such witness' testimony." (Emphasis the writer's.)
The court held that the emphasized portion of the instruction was erroneous
and that the word "may" should have been used instead of the word "should"
in the instruction. The court ruled "It is within the province of the jury
and not the court to determine whether any or all of a witness' evidence is
to be believed."
In several different cases the question of the necessity of instructions
on a certain issue was before the court. It is, of course, well established that
the court, whether requested or not, must instruct on all issues of the case
in a criminal action and, of necessity, the instructions which must be given
are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In one case
the defendant had raised the defense of accident in a murder charge. The
court ruled that the lower court must instruct on this particular issue. 23
In the same case the trial court was found to have erred in assuming in an
instruction that the defendant shot and killed the deceased where the evidence on the part of the defendant was that he and the deceased were
scuffling for the possession of the gun at the time of its discharge. In another
case the court ruled that a common assault instruction should have been
given in a case in which the defendant was charged with rape,24 and in
another case on a different set of facts the court ruled that it was not
necessary in a charge of assault with intent to kill to instruct on common
assault because the facts did not justify submission of the charge on any
offense other than either assault with intent to kill, which is a felonious
assault, or self-defense. 2 In another case the court ruled that a manslaughter instruction was not justified under the circumstances, holding that
under the particular facts of the case there was a sufficient cooling off period
26
so as to remove the question of manslaughter.
In connection with preserving alleged errors in instructions, it is important to note that the motion for new trial must specifically point out the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

215 S.W. 2d 492, 494 (Mo. 1948).
State v. O'Kelly, 213 S.W. 2d 963 (Mo. 1948).
State v. Famber, 214 S.W. 2d 40 (Mo. 1948).
State v. Parrish, 214 S.W. 2d 558 (Mo. 1948).
State v. Parker, 214 S.W. 2d 25 (Mo. 1948).
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portion of the instruction complained of, and that in the absence of such
specification of error nothing is preserved on appeal.2T
E. Verdict
In two different cases the jury failed to state that the confinement
should be "in the penitentiary." The supreme court in both cases held that
this was not a sufficient error to justify reversal of the cases. 28
IV. SPECIFIC OFFENSES

In the case of State v. Harris, 9' defendant was charged with leaving the
scene of an accident. One of the defenses interposed was that the defendant
an hour and a half later, after having gone home and told his wife about it,
went to the police department and reported the accident. The court ruled
that where the motorist knew that he had struck a pedestrian and drove on
without stopping and giving the information required by statute he was
guilty even under the circumstances herein set forth. In the same case the
court had before it an instruction in which complaint was made of the use
of the word "immediately" in the main instruction, whereby it was hypothesized that if the motorist, immediately after striking a person, left the place
of injury without stopping and giving the necessary information, the jury
should return a verdict of guilty. The defendant contended that the information should have been given within a reasonable time, rather than immediately, but the defendant's objection was overruled.
Sections 4408 and 4409, Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939), which define two types
of felonious assault, have always been troublesome. These two sections were
before the court in the case of State v. Hacker.80 The defendant was charged
with assault with intent to kill with malice with a deadly weapon, and the
defendant was convicted of assault with intent to kill without malice. The
charge was laid under Section 4408 and the conviction was under Section
4409. The contention was made that the weapon used was not a deadly
weapon. The court found that under the circumstances the whiskey bottle
which was used was a deadly weapon, this in view of the fact that the temple
artery had been severed and bled profusely, and the medical testimony was
that an uncontrolled bleeding in this manner could have caused death.
27. State v. Tolson, 215 S.W. 2d 438 (Mo. 1948).
28. State v. Famber, 214 S.W. 2d 40 (Mo. 1948); State v. Parrish, 214 S.W.
2d 558 (Mo. 1948).
29. 357 Mo. 1119, 212 S.W. 2d 426 (1948).
30. 214 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. 1948).
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For those who enjoy their leisure time with a fishing rod, the supreme

court has ruled that the dynamiting of fish in a pond which is privately
owned is a violation of the law, in spite of the contention by the defendant
that title to the fish has been relinquished by the state to the private owner.
The court found that the defendant, who was a trespasser who dynamited
and killed fish in a private pond stocked solely by private parties and which
was not connected in any way with water of the state, could still be convicted
under the statute prohibiting placing explosives in the waters of the state.
The court ruled that the regulatory powers of the state in this connection
would extend to such a pond.,1
V. SECOND OFFENDERS

There have been more and more cases each year where the court has
been called upon to construe the so-called habitual criminal statute. 82 In
one case the court reaffirmed its prior position that a conviction, sentence and
discharge for a graded felony, even though the punishment be no more than
a jail sentence, subjects the second offender to the provisions of the habitual
criminal act.3 3 Also a sentence to the intermediate reformatory at Algoa
and a discharge from the sentence makes the offender amenable to the act.3 4
In the latter case the court again ruled that where the defendant admits
the prior convictions it is not necessary to instruct the jury in the alternative as to a finding of guilt and sentence under the habitual criminal section
and as to the punishment without the application of the habitual criminal
act.

EVIDENCE
JACKSON

A.

WRIGHT*

During 1948, the Supreme Court of Missouri in twenty-four cases

passed upon or discussed questions of evidence which are deemed worthy
of note. Most of the decisions, however, are in accordance with well established rules.
31. State v. Taylor, 214 S.W. 2d 34 (Mo. 1948).

32. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 4854, 4855 (1939).
33. State v. Updegraff, 214 S.W. 2d 22 (Mo. 1948), see Comment, 14 Mo. L.
Rnv. 172 (1949).
34. State v. Hacker, 214 S.W. 2d 413 (Mo. 1948).
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S., University of Missouri, 1940, LL.B., 1944.
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JUDICIAL NoTIcE

The supreme court took judicial notice of certain facts within the
common knowledge of people in a number of cases. In Nemours v. Hickey,'
the court took judicial knowledge of the fact that parking on public streets
in cities is commonly limited or forbidden at places where traffic needs make
it advisable. Likewise, they took judicial notice that standard gauge railroad tracks are 4 feet 81/2 inches apart, and that locomotives are wider than
the tracks, in Taylor v. Missouri K. & T. R. R. 2 However, the court refused
to take judicial knowledge as to how much locomotives are wider than the
tracks.
In Bindley v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co.,3 the supreme court held that
it could not take judicial notice of the rules of the circuit court. In this
instance, the action had been dismissed under the Kansas City Circuit
Court rules for failure to prosecute. It is interesting to note, however, that
the court considered the rule, without taking judicial notice of it, since it was
set forth in the briefs and had been treated by the parties to be in full force
and effect. This should bring to our attention that local rules of circuit
courts, where applicable in cases, should be introduced in evidence or agreed
upon in the record by the parties.
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Cave,4 judicial notice was taken of the
fact that lights on automobiles are ordinarily set about three feet above the
ground.
In Kansas City v. Reed,' the court took judicial notice of an original
quo warranto proceeding pending before it between the same parties on the
same set of facts.
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPETENCY

(a) Competency in General
In a condemnation proceeding reviewed in Kansas City v. Thompson,6
the supreme court again held that evidence of purchase by the condemnor of
other property is not competent on the question of value and damages in a
condemnation proceeding. They held, however, that testimony of only one

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

357 Mo. 731, 210 S.W. 2d 94 (1948).
357 Mo. 1086, 212 S.W. 2d 412 (1948).
213 S.W. 2d 387 (Mo. 1948).
215 S.W. 2d 435 (Mo. 1948).
216 S.W. 2d 514 (Mo. 1948).
208 S.W. 2d 216 (Mo. 1948).
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expert as to value would constitute substantial evidence to sustain a verdict
and could not be rejected or disregarded.
In State v. Walker,7 a prosecution for statutory rape of a female of
previously chaste character between the age of sixteen and eighteen years,
the prosecution introduced evidence of a promise to marry made by the defendant subsequent to the alleged act and on the same evening. This was
alleged to be error by the defendant, but the court held that the general
rule "is that acts, conduct, and declarations of the accused occurring after
the commission of an alleged offense which are relevant and tend to. show a
consciousness of guilt, or a desire or disposition to conceal the crime, are admissible in evidence."
In the same case, the court held properly excluded evidence which only
tended to corroborate the witness on an immaterial issue.
Rone v. Ward8 was an action to set aside certain deeds on the grounds
of forgery and failure of delivery. The grantor in the deeds was dead at the
time of the trial. The plaintiff introduced the deeds, relying upon the presumption of delivery, and on cross examination the defendant's attorney
developed from one of the plaintiff's witnesses that the deed had been delivered by the deceased grantor. This witness was one of the grantees in the
deed, and the defendant objected to the evidence on appeal on the ground
that it was incompetent, and that the witness could not testify thereto.
The court overruled the objection on the grounds that the evidence had
been brought out by the defendant on cross examination, and that there
was no timely objection or request to strike made. The fact that the other
party to the deed was dead had been waived by such procedure. Likewise,
the memorandum of a lawyer regarding the delivery was hearsay and incompetent to show non-delivery when it was shown that the lawyer could
not identify the source of his information.
In Lance v. Van Winkle,9 the court discusses the question of evidence
of experiments made outside of the court. Such experiments are admissible
if it is shown that they were conducted under conditions substantially similar to those existing at the time of the occurrence in question. In the absence of such a showing, however, the evidence of the experiments should be
rejected as incompetent.
7. 357 Mo. 394, 208 S.W. 2d 233 (1948).
8. 357 Mo. 1010, 212 S.W. 2d 404 (1948).
9. 213 S.W. 2d 401 (Mo. 1948).
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(b) Cross Examination
1°

In State v. Walker, the question of cross examination was presented.
As mentioned above, this was a prosecution for statutory rape. In the course
of the trial, one of the witnesses for the defense failed to give evidence expected of him, but did not testify favorably to the prosecution. The court
held that the trial court correctly refused to allow the defense to prove what
the witness had told the defendant's attorney prior to the trial. In discussing
the rule for cross examination of a party's own witness, the court stated:
"The evidence given by the witness at the trial was not of such an affirmative character as to be favorable to the adverse party, nor was it sufficient to
make the witness, in effect, a witness for the state and to thereby authorize
proof of previous inconsistent and contradictory statements." The court
quoted from State v. Drumomins,11 "We held in the case of State v. Bowen,
263 Mo. (279), loc. cit. 280, 172 S.W. 367, that it is not sufficient to warrant
a party who puts a witness on the stand, in impeaching such witness (by
showing extrajudicial statements contradictory of the testimony of the
witness upon the stand), that the witness merely fails or refuses to tell the
facts which he had heretofore related extrajudicially or fails to tell all such
facts, but, in order to warrant impeachment in the mode stated, the witness
must go further, and by relating wholly contradictory facts become in effect
a witness for the adverse side. In the latter event, the party calling the witness is entitled to show that he was misled and entrapped by the witness'
former words and attitude into calling the adverse witness. He is not so
entitled; however, when the witness merely fails to relate facts which the
party offering him had been led to believe he would relate."
In State v. Gentry,"2 the supreme court set forth the rule regarding cross
examination of a defendant in a criminal prosecution with regard to his
previous record. It was held that it is proper to cross examine such a defendant upon (1) whether he has been convicted of a crime, (2) how many
times he has been convicted, and (3) of what crime he has been convicted.
Such is not prejudicial, and may be asked for the purpose of testing his
credibility, since Section 1916, Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939), allows such testimony to be used to impeach such witness' testimony.13

10. 357 Mo. 394, 208 S.W. 2d 233 (1948).
11. 274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271 (1918).
12. 212 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. 1948).
13. See also Mo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 4081 (1939).
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(c) Reputation and Character
In the statutory rape prosecution, State v. Walker,' 4 the court held that
the question of character and reputation were not synonymous, but that
reputation is some evidence from which character may be inferred, and
therefore evidence of reputation is material and admissible.
ADMIsSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

In State v. Hutsel,- which was a prosecution for murder, a written
confession of the defendant and testimony at an inquest were held properly
admitted against the defendant. The court noted that at the inquest the
accused had been advised of his rights, and that his testimony at such inquest is admissible not as a judicial admission, but upon the theory that
it is a voluntary admission against him. There was conflicting testimony
in the trial with regard to the written confession. This testimony was heard
outside the hearing of the jury by the trial judge, and later before the jury,
and a determination made against its being involuntary, both by the trial
judge and by the jury under the proper instruction. However, in Hall Motor
Freight v. Montgomery, 6 evidence was refused that a defendant in a civil
action, arising from an auto-truck collision, refused to testify in a reckless
and careless charge in a justice of the peace court, relying on his constitutional rights. The court held that it could not be commented upon or shown
in the civil case. In so holding, the court stated that he was within his rights
in refusing to testify; and that showing this refusal was not competent to
impeach him or to discredit his testimony, since to so allow it to be used
would grossly impair the value of the constitutional right.
PRIVILEGE

It is interesting to note that only one case dealing with privilege was
presented to the court during 1948. In Hemminghaus v. Ferguson,- the defendant in his argument to the jury commented on the fact that the plaintiff's family physician had not been called as a witness by the plaintiff, and
that the defendant could not call him due to the confidential relationship
existing between the physician and the plaintiff. The counsel for the plaintiff objected on the grounds that the defendant could have called him; and
14.
15.
16.
17.

357 Mo. 394, 208 S.W. 2d 233 (1948).
357 Mo. 386, 208 S.W. 2d 227 (1948).
357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W. 2d 748 (1948).
215 S.W. 2d 481 (Mo. 1948).
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that the plaintiff by introducing other testimony and by bringing the suit
for damages, had waived the confidential privilege between the plaintiff and
his family physician. The court held that by bringing the damage suit, the
plaintiff did not waive the privilege of confidential communication to such
family physician, since it was shown that the physician in question had not
been consulted for some time prior to the injury in question, nor during nor
since the injury. The court discussed fully privilege and what action waives
such privilege. However, it did hold that testimony regarding treatment
by a physician, which is brought out on cross examination, does not waive
the privilege, since it was not voluntarily given. Nevertheless, the court
states that the plaintiff was not relieved of the unfavorable inference of not
calling the personal physician, and that the defendant could comment thereon.
PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES

The well established rule of failure to testify raising an inference against
the party was again brought out in Weir v. Baker.18 This was a suii to set
aside a conveyance as a fraud upon the creditors. In the course of the trial,
there was testimony by the grantee in the conveyance to the effect that the
grantor held title as a straw party for the grantee. The grantor, who was also
a defendant in the action, did not take the stand. Commenting thereon, the
court stated: "We have held in a similar case that the failure of defendants to
testify as to facts well within their knowledge which, unexplained, amount
to badges of fraud or suspicious circumstances, may be regarded as corroboration of such inferences as would naturally flow from such suspicious circumstances. McDonald v. Rumer, 320 Mo. 605, 8 S.W. 2d 592." This is in
accord with the holding mentioned in Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, stpra.
PAROL EvIDENCE RULE
In two cases, Frey v. Onstott,19 and Allabei. v. Stkelboure,20 the court
held that the recited consideration of One Dollar in a deed may be questioned, and parol evidence admitted to show the actual consideration. In
the Frey case the court pointed out that the recited consideration cannot
be attacked to determine sufficiency of consideration to make the deed a
valid conveyance, but may be questioned to determine whether or not fraud
exists. In the Allaben case, the court again states that outside evidence can
18. 357 Mo. 507, 209 S.W. 2d 253 (1948).
19. 357 Mo. 721, 210 S.W. 2d 87 (1948).
20. 357 Mo. 1205, 212 S.W. 2d 719 (1948).
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be introduced to show whether or not a valuable consideration was given
for the purpose of establishing whether or not the grantee in such deed is a
bona fide purchaser for value.
EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE

There were a number of cases concerning the use of expert testimony
decided by the supreme court. In State v. Miller,2 1 the qualifications of an
expert were examined and under the facts as shown, a chemist for the highway patrol was held to be an expert for the purpose of testifying that the
scrapings from shoes and particles adhering to a chisel were °similar to the
mortar debris found under the hole in a wall of a burglarized warehouse. In
Hamre v. Conger,22 the court held that highway patrolmen could not give
their opinion in testifying as to the point of an impact from the location of
debris. The court stated that this was not a proper subject for expert testimony, and that the patrolman could only testify as to the location of such
debris, which then could be used by the jury in determination of the exact
2
point of collision. The court cites Baker v. Kansas City Public Service Co., '
for a definition of expert testimony, and says, "Whatever value the location
of the debris or the center of the debris falling from two motor vehicles upon
impact may have upon determining the point of impact is not, in our opinion, a proper subject for expert or opinion evidence. In this age of motor
vehicles, knowledge upon such subject is not something not possessed by
the ordinary person, hence the opinion evidence of Patrolman Harrison was
incompetent, since it invaded the province of the jury."
In further considering the proper use of opinion evidence by experts,
however, the court held in MetropolitanIce Cream Co. v. Union Mutual Fire
Ins. Co.,2 ' that a case involving the collapse of a tower was a valid occasion
for the use of expert testimony, stating that the court is unable to say that
the opinion of experts on such a subject would not be of value to the jury.
In State ex rel. Spears v. McCullen,2' the court held that it has long
been the rule that an owner of an automobile, without further qualification,
may testify as to its reasonable value. This is not on the theory that he
is an expert, but that he is nevertheless qualified to so testify, and the jury
should determine the weight and value of his testimony.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

357
357
353
216
357

Mo. 353, 208 S.W. 2d 194 (1948).
Mo. 497, 209 S.W. 2d 242, 248 (1948).
Mo. 625, 183 S.W. 2d 873, 875 (1944).
S.W. 2d 464 (Mo. 1949).
Mo. 686, 210 S.W. 2d 68 (1948).
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In Kennedy v. Union Electric Co. of Missour, 2 6 which was an action
for flooding a farm alleged to be due to construction of a dam, error was
alleged in allowing farmers, who had had much practical experience in observing floods and flooding, but who were not experts, to testify to their
opinion as to the cause of the flooding. The court held that nonexperts can
testify as to their opinion when it is impossible or impracticable to place
before the jury all of the primary or necessary facts so that the jury can
make an intelligent decision. A true test was stated to be: "Does the jury
need any inferences from the witness because his observed data cannot be
adequately reproduced by him?" The court, however, points out that the
witness must show sufficient facts and circumstances to amount to substantial evidence in support of his opinion. Likewise, in such situations, these
witnesses are not qualified to testify to hypothetical situations, but only to
testify to situations observed by them.
HEARSAY
7

In Snider v. Wimberly,- which was an action for damages for false
arrest, the evidence included admission of a police report made by a police
officer and found in the police files. This report was objected to by the defendant on the grounds that it was hearsay. The court held that while the
general rule is, "There is a well-established exception to the hearsay rule
admitting official reports made by an officer on the basis of his own personal
investigation and knowledge, at least when required by statute, ordinance,
rule or regulation," there was no showing in this particular case that the
report was required by rules of the police department. In Caldwell v. Anderso, 28 testimony as to a threat of a secondary boycott by a chauffeur's union
unless the company discontinued supplying building materials for the plaintiff's construction project was hearsay and inadmissible for the purpose of
proving conspiracy in restraint of trade by officers and agents of the building and construction trade council, in the absence of evidence that the person who allegedly made the threat had authority to speak for the union.
Steffen v. Ritter,29 was an action for damages for death of the plaintiff's
husband. In an effort to show how the accident occurred, the plaintiff offered a statement of the deceased made two days after the accident to the
plaintiff while the deceased was in the hospital. This was excluded on the
26.
27.
28.
29.

216 S.W. 2d 756 (Mo. 1948).
357 Mo. 491, 209 S.W. 2d 239, 241 (1948).
357 Mo. 1199, 212 S.W. 2d 784 (1948).
214 S.W. 2d 28 (Mo. 1948).
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ground that it was hearsay and that there was not sufficient showing of
spontaneity to make it a part of the res gestae. The plaintiff did not introduce in evidence the hospital record, and the only evidence to support a
showing of res gestae was the testimony by the wife that the deceased was
conscious for the first time to her knowledge when he made the statement
about the accident. Other evidence showed that the wife had seen the
deceased only at intervals during the two day period, and this was not
considered sufficient to prove the fact of continuance of unconsciousness for
the entire period.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLiAm H. BEcKER, JR.*
The term "humanitarian doctrine" has been loosely used by the Bench
and Bar to comprehend the common law last clear chance rule as well as the
unique Missouri rule that a negligently inattentive plaintiff may recover
damages for personal injuries from a negligently inattentive defendant under
circumstances where either might, in the exercise of care, have discovered
the peril or risk of injury in time, by the exercise of care to have avoided
the injury. Since it seems inevitable that the Missouri Supreme Court will
be confronted with the necessity of reexamining the nature, extent and future
application of the humanitarian rule, it seems appropriate to review the current cases by separating the cases involving the last clear chance rule from
those involving the humanitarian rule.
And since the decisions of the supreme court in 1948 indicate that the
court, as a whole, is not satisfied with the use and treatment of the humanitarian rule, and may do something about it, a definition of the humanitarian
rule by certain hypothetical cases seems in order. There is nothing new in
such a definition, but reiteration may be necessary to aid in the proper use
of the "humanitarian doctrine." Of course the fact combinations are so
varied that a statement of all the possible hypothetical cases would be
unending.
Four principal hypothetical cases can be stated nevertheless. They are
as follows:
Case 1. The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from physical helplessness caused by plaintiff's lack of care.
Defendant actually discovers the peril in time, thereafter, with safe*Attomey, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
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ty to himself, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care.
This is a simple last clear chance case. The plaintiff may recover
for personal injury and property damage despite his negligence in
practically all common law jurisdictions. This result is well settled
in Missouri and not expected to be challenged; but this is not a
humanitarian negligence case.
Case 2. The facts are the same as in Case 1, except that the defendant does not actually discover the peril, but in the exercise of
care he should have discovered it in time to avoid damage, by the
exercise of care and with safety to himself. As in Case 1, a majority of courts permit plaintiff to recover for personal injury or property damage under the last clear chance rule. This is not a humanitarian negligence case, and the rule is not expected to be challenged.
Case 3. The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results
from plaintiff's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri
judicial parlance). Defendant (as in Case 1) actually discovers the
peril, in time, thereafter to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not a humanitarian case. The rule that plaintiff may recover seems settled in
Missouri and elsewhere.
Case 4. This case is a true humanitarian case. As in Case 3
the peril to plaintiff's person, property or both results from plaintiff's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). But defendant does
not actually discover the peril of plaintiff. Nevertheless, the defendant in the exercise of care should have discovered the peril in
time thereafter with safety to himself, by the use of care to avoid
damage to plaintiff. Missouri seems practically alone in permitting
plaintiff to recover in this case.
It is the holding in Case 4 which is under attack in Missouri, and which
is causing so much difficulty in judicial administration. With the general
use of the automobile the doctrine has become logically embarrassing. These
questions among others are arising:
Both plaintiff and defendant are injured personally, and each
can make a submissible case against the other under the humanitarian rule. May each recover damages against the other simultaneously? (Some members of the bar believe this to be the rule.) Or
does the first to file a claim have the right to recover, while the last
to file does not? (Some members of the bar are under this impression.) Does the rule apply to permit recovery of property damage?
(It frequently is so used; particularly where the plaintiff sustains
personal and property damage.) Can humanitarian negligence of
plaintiff be used to defeat plaintiff's recovery (a) if defendant is
personally injured as a result; (b) if defendant is not so injured?
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1
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In Crews v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,1 Judge Hyde (then Commissioner) commented upon the difficulties which had arisen from application of the humanitarian rule to automobile traffic problems. He described
the problem as "the new strain placed upon the fair and just operation of
our humanitarian doctrine by modern fast-moving motor traffic. . . ." The
"strain" has not been decreased as time passes. Again one of the judges, and
significantly a newer one, Judge Conkling, took occasion to state, concerning the humanitarian doctrine, that "the case made law of Missouri has
widely extended the rule, far beyond its original concept. "2
This follows the earlier significant statement in an opinion by Judge
Ellison that "the whole humanitarian doctrine is case law." Such expressions seem to imply that the court which devised the doctrine has the right
and the duty to revise or restate it when necessary or desirable. And since
revision or restatement is so obviously desirable, if the court is to avoid
untold embarrassment, the Bar should give some serious work and thought
to aid the court in solving the problem.
In 1948 no decision presented to the court the necessity of immediate
reexamination and restatement of the rule. But it was clear at the close of
1948 that any day might bring before the court one of the cases where two
persons seek simultaneous recovery, each against the other, under the humanitarian doctrine; or where negligence under the humanitarian doctrine
is asserted as a defense to a claim under the humanitarian doctrine.
Most of the authorities and current discussions of the problem can be
found in Dean McCleary's "The Bases of The Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined," 5 Mo. Law Review 56; the annotation in 92 A.L.R. 47; Restatement of Torts, §§ 479-480, and Mo. Annotations, §§ 479-480.
In 1948 the decisions involving last clear chance or humanitarian rule
cases were relatively numerous. They indicate a definite trend toward restricting the operation of the humanitarian doctrine. In one case3 the court
en bane indirectly, but expressly, overruled a former holding that the humanitarian doctrine would permit recovery when a vehicle at rest moves
forward a short distance and strikes the plaintiff. In other cases, the rule
was not applied with its usual liberality. Upon one point or another, case
after case submitted in the trial court under the humanitarian doctrine was
found to be wanting in some element necessary for recovery. In following
1. 341 Mo. 1090, 111 S.W. 2d 54, loc. cit. 58 (1937).
2.
3.

Smith v. Siedhoff, 209 S.W. 2d 233, loc. cit. 236 (Mo. 1948).
Smith v. Siedhoff, 209 S.W. 2d 233 (Mo. 1948).
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this trend, the court did not distinguish between conventional last clear
chance cases and the humanitarian cases.
Many observers believe it would be better to have a restatement of the
scope of the humanitarian doctrine than to have a case to case change.
It is generally conceded that there is a strong feeling against the harsh
common law rule of contributory negligence. And to the limits that logic,
reason, and judicial craftsmanship will permit, Missouri will welcome any
sound formula or doctrine which will ameliorate the operation of this common law doctrine where the plaintiff's injury was avoidable by the defendant
notwithstanding the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Perhaps the simplest
solution of the problem would be legislative enactment of the doctrine of
comparative negligence, proportional fault, or by a statute making contributory negligence considerable only in mitigation of damages. In any event,
some workable logical solution must be found.
En Banc
Smit. v. Siedhoff4 involved a situation wherein plaintiff was injured
when defendant's truck struck some steel beams plaintiff was engaged in
unloading from a coal car standing on a switch track at Front and Jefferson
Streets in Washington, Missouri. The case was submitted under the humanitarian doctrine on four alternatives of humanitarian negligence disjunctively; namely, failure to (1) stop, (2) reduce speed, (3) swerve, and
(4) warn by use of automobile horn. In addition the case was submitted
on primary negligence. The fact situation is decidedly uncommon if not
unique.
The two motor vehicles involved were moving on courses intersecting
at a right angle. Plaintiff was a pedestrian walking behind one vehicle
steadying a bundle of long steel beams, being suspended and towed slowly behind the vehicle which was moving laterally across the street on which defendants vehicle was traveling. Plaintiff as he followed the towing truck, behind
and to the side with a hand on one end of the suspended bundle of beams, was
oblivious to his danger though able to avoid it. The defendant was fully
aware of the relative position and speed of the plaintiff and the vehicles.
Defendant misjudged the situation first, then drove forward and struck the
bundle of beams thereby injuring the plaintiff. The court held the case to
be submissible, upon primary negligence. But because defendant's driver
4. Ibid.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1
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stopped a few feet from the point of impact and then moved forward a few
feet, the court held that no humanitarian or last clear chance case was
made upon any ground.
This was not really a humanitarian case. The defendant driver was not
oblivious to plaintiff's situation and, if anything, a last clear chance case (of
Case 3 above) was presented. Nevertheless the case is significant in the
administration of the humanitarian rule, (1) for its oblique holding that last
clear chance or humanitarian negligence does not arise when a vehicle at
rest moves forward a short distance and strikes a plaintiff (Took v. Wells5
was, on the point, overruled); and (2) for its significant statement that:
"Even so much as a birds-eye view of the personal injury litigation in the state for the past three or four decades would demonstrate how widely the humanitarian rule has been sought to be invoked and applied to varying states of fact. The case made law of
Missouri has widely extended the rule, far beyond its original concept. But not every state of facts resulting in injuries from moving
objects gives rise to such a cause of action."
This is not the first time the court has recently called attention to the
fact that the humanitarian rule is "case made law" or "judge made" law. The
implication seems to be clear that what law is made by cases may be unmade or revised by them.
In the case of Smit. v. Siedhoif, under discussion, the lesson is clear to
the practitioner. It indicates the folly of invoking the humanitarian or last
clear chance rule in a case clearly submissible upon substantial grounds of
primary negligence, not affected by contributory negligence as a matter of
law.
Blaser v. Coleman6 involved a unique fact situation wherein the plaintiff
who had been riding in the bed of a heavily loaded truck leaped from the
truck and injured himself when the truck was abandoned by the driver on
a steep incline. The truck was traveling up an incline, when the -axle broke.
After the breaking of the axle, the truck coasted upward and forward about
ten feet, stopped momentarily, and then started rolling back down the grade.
The truck could have been stopped by application of the foot brakes which
operated independently of the axle. By use of the hand brake the speed of
the truck could have been slackened and the truck brought under control
and to a stop safely at the foot of the grade. The case was submitted on
5. 331 Mo. 249, 53 S.W. 2d 389 (1932).
6. 213 S.W. 2d 420 (Mo. 1948).
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the humanitarian or last clear chance doctrine. In an opinion by Judge
Douglas, the court en banc reach'd a result surprising to some, that the
plaintiff was not in imminent peril until the driver had left his post and
jumped from the cab; that thereafter, being out of the cab, the driver could
do nothing to avoid plaintiff's injury. Some, including the defendant truck
driver, felt that the imminent peril arose before the driver abandoned the
truck. It seems that a last clear chance case was clearly made. The case
does not really involve the humanitarian doctrine. It is a case where the
plaintiff was physically helpless. The question decided by the court was
when the peril arose. The facts showed, to the satisfaction of the driver at
least, that there was considerable peril at the time he made up his mind to
abandon the truck with the plaintiff standing helplessly in the bed thereof.
In the view of some, this case is in conflict with the holding of the court in
Bobos v. Krey Packing Co.7 However, the Bobos case was not overruled and
may still have some validity. Having been of counsel the author of this article may be prejudicial in this appraisal of the case.
Yeaman v. Storms8 involved a collision of two motor vehicles at the
intersection of a major and a minor street on a clear day. As plaintiff drove
his motor vehicle within ten feet of the intersection, he saw the defendant's
automobile approaching the intersection about two hundred feet away at a
speed of thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff, moving not over ten
miles per hour, could have stopped his vehicle within ten feet but never did
apply his brakes. He stepped on the accelerator and attempted to get across
ahead of the defendant, thinking he had plenty of time to get out of the
way and that defendant would slow down to permit him to pass. The plaintiff was not oblivious to the approach of the defendant's automobile and of
his peril. The case was submitted solely under the humanitarian doctrine.
The question of failure to warn was not involved, because the plaintiff was
admittedly not oblivious to the approach of defendant's automobile. In an
opinion written by Judge Conkling and concurred in by all of the sitting
haembers of the court, it was held that no submissible case was made; that
the plaintiff (not being oblivious) was not in a situation of imminent peril
until he was so close to the path of the defendant's car he could not stop
short of that path. By calculations based upon relative speeds of the motor
vehicles involved, the court found that the situation of imminent peril existed
7. 317 Mo. 108, 296 S.W. 157 (1927),
8. 217 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. 1949).
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only one second or less before the impact. Upon that showing and taking
into consideration reaction time of the defendant, it was held that no case
was made.
This case is a true last clear chance case and not a humanitarian case.
The plaintiff was not inattentive or oblivious. In determining the soundness
of the opinion, the only question to be decided is the question of soundness of
the court's appraisal of the time and distance situation.
This case has been the subject of recent comment. The decision seems
to be sound and not out of line with the earlier cases. The same conclusion
has been reached in a current comment."
Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service Co.10 was a suit by an automobile guest arising out of an automobile-streetcar collision. After coming off
a private right of way onto a public highway while the automobile and the
streetcar were moving in the same direction, the streetcar struck the automobile in the rear. The highway consisted of four traffic lanes with the car
tracks running in the north lane after entering the highway. The automobile
could have been driven in a clear lane south of the car tracks on the highway. In passing on the submissibility of the case, the court concentrated on
the question of when "imminent peril" arose and whether the evidence
showed ability of the defendant to avoid the collision after "imminent peril"
arose.
This is an unusual case of one moving vehicle overtaking and striking
another vehicle, complicated by the fact that the overtaking vehicle moved
on a fixed curved path into the path of the vehicle overtaken. The court
ruled that (1) no submissible case was made; (2) the peril arose only when it
appeared that the automobile was going to be driven upon the tracks in the
highway in front of the approaching streetcar at a slower speed than that of
the streetcar; and (3) "there is absolutely no evidence of the time- that must
be allowed for the motorman to have comprehended the danger, for his
muscles to have responded to his will, for the brakes to have taken hold and
for the speed of the streetcar to have been reduced to such a degree as would
have prevented it from overtaking the automobile moving ahead of it at a
speed of 18 or 20 miles per hour." The case is a humanitarian case similar
to Case 4 above. In the alternative it was considered a last clear chance case
similar to Case 3 above.
9. 17 KAN. CIY L. REv. 152 (1949).
10. 357 Mo. 904, 211 S.W. 2d 696 (1948).
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The case is notable on recognition of the question of reaction time and
time factor in muscular response. It excepts from its ruling "almost escaping" cases like Gann v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
The very interesting, perplexing, and much litigated case of Knorp v.
ThompsonA2 involved a train-automobile collision at a grade crossing. The
plaintiff's intestate, killed in the collision, was probably contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The case was submitted upon humanitarian negligence in failing to warn. Specifically, the plaintiff based the case upon
failure of the trainmen to sound "emergency or short blasts" of the whistle
after notice of the deceased's peril. The statutory crossing warning was
timely commenced and was continued and was being sounded up to the time
the train passed over the crossing.
While the case could have been resolved against the plaintiff for other
reasons, 8 the court chose to reexamine and overrule the old cases requiring
the trainmen to give short emergency blasts, as distinguished from the
statutory whistle crossing signal (Section 5213, Mo. Rev. Stat., 1939), upon
discovery of deceased's peril. Judge Ellison dissented in an opinion which
seems convincing of its logical and practical soundness on the question of
acoustics involved.
This case of an apparently oblivious injured party and an aware defendant is not a true humanitarian case. It is a true last clear chance case,
similar to Case 3 above.
Graham v. Thompson 4 was a case brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. A switchman standing between two tracks was run down
and killed by a train, to the approach of which he was apparently oblivious.
The plaintiff submitted her case upon the failure to warn after deceased's
"discovered and not his discoverable peril." While the case is interesting
and produced a divided court upon the several questions of master-servant
law, it is a plain last clear chance case (Case 3) and really does not involve
the humanitarian doctrine though the terminology is used.
Division Number One

In Taylor v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 15 the plaintiff's intestate was an
elderly pedestrian who was killed as he walked into the path of a locomotive
11.
12.
13.
14.

319 Mo. 214, 6 S.W. 2d 39 (1928).
357 Mo. 1062, 212 S.W. 2d 584 (1948).
See Comment, 11 Mo. L. Rxv. 362 (1946).
357 Mo. 1133, 212 S.W. 2d 770 (1948).
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and train of cars at a grade crossing at a public street in Boonville. The only
surviving eyewitnesses were the fireman and engineer. The evidence most
favorable to plaintiff indicated that the fireman and engineer acted promptly
first to sound emergency warning blasts (deceased was deaf though this was
not known at the time) and thereafter to stop and slacken by use of the
emergency brake. The plaintiff relied for submissibility of his case upon
a fragment of testimony of the engineer that he could have slackened the
speed of the train "very little" upon being told by the fireman that a man
was coming on the track. The court held that this was not sufficient and
was basing a case upon conjecture, in the absence of evidence of reaction
time and opinion evidence showing that the train could have been slackened
sufficiently to have permitted the deceased to escape.
The deceased was not visible to the engineer as he moved toward the
track. The fireman (being unaware of deceased's deafness), upon sighting
deceased, told the engineer to sound emergency blasts which the engineer
did; then, when the deceased did not heed the warning, on signal from the
fireman, the engineer applied the emergency brakes. Plaintiff submitted that
the trainmen should have first and promptly applied the brakes. Because of
the short distance (104-154 feet) between the engine and the deceased when
deceased was first seen and the undisputed fact that the emergency blasts
were promptly sounded, and the lack of opinion evidence showing that the
injury could be avoided the court held the case to be free of submissible
proof of negligence.
This was a case of an oblivious injured person and conscious defendant.
If anything it was a true last clear chance case similar to Case 3 above.
Kirkpatrick v. Wabash Ry1 6 involved a daytime train-truck collision
at a grade crossing in Kirksville. The case was submitted only upon humanitarian negligence in failing to warn by sounding the locomotive whistle. The
only question presented upon appeal was whether the plaintiff made a submissible case of the obliviousness of the deceased truck driver to the approach
of the train.
The only two eyewitnesses, both called by plaintiff, agreed that the
truck driver approached the tracks, on the side opposite the engineer, at a
slow speed of 8 to 10 m.p.h. and at all times able to stop in 3 to 4 feet. The
truck slowed down until "within a few feet of the crossing" then started
15. 357 Mo. 1086, 212 S.W. 2d 412 (1948).
16. 357 Mo. 1246, 212 S.W. 2d 764 (1948).
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forward at an accelerated speed to the almost instantaneous collision. The
near side of the locomotive struck the front of the truck. Only "a second or
two, possibly less" elapsed from the commencement of apparent imminent
peril until the collision. The whistle and brake controls were on the opposite
side.
Under these facts, determined to be the most favorable to the plaintiff,
the court found that no submissible case was made.
The opinion is sound upon the facts recited and is clearly written by
Judge Conkling. It holds that the position of "imminent peril" arose only
when it became apparent that plaintiff was inattentive and going to drive
into the train's path without stopping; that because of the slow speed of the
truck in approaching the tracks, the slowing down of the truck followed by
acceleration immediately before the collision, the deceased "did not enter
a position of peril until his truck reached a point so near the west rail that
it could not be stopped before coming within the overhang of the locomotive.
It was not until he reached his lowest speed and then thereafter accelerated
his speed to go on across that there was any indication to any one that he
was in fact oblivious to the danger of the oncoming train. It was at that
instant that the duty to warn arose."
The Kirkpatrick case is another instance of retreat from the extreme
position taken in the earlier warning cases where once a second or fraction
of a second between the commencement of the peril and collision was held
to be sufficient time to warn and avoid injury.11 This case is based on realities saying "To make a submissible jury case.., the evidence must disclose
that a reasonably sufficient time was afforded, after peril was discoverable,
during which time it was reasonably possible for the whistle to have been
sounded, for Kirkpatrick to have heeded the blast of the whistle and to
have stopped short of the collision." If anything, this is a last clear chance
case similar to Case 3 above.
This reasoning could have produced the same result in the case of Knorp
v. Thompson,' decided en banc and mentioned above, without precipitating
the disagreement among the court on the question whether alarm blasts of
the whistle were required.
In only one place does the opinion in the Kirkpatrick case offer dictum
which might provoke the least doubt. Here it is said: "... . of course, the pro-

17. Chawkley v. Wabash Ry., 317 Mo. 782, 297 S.W. 20 (1927).
18. 357 Mo. 1062, 212 S.W. 2d 584 (1948).
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tection of the humanitarian rule is not extended to one who with knowledge
of danger willfully or wantonly rushes into it."
Suppose a person apparently and actually intent on self destruction lies
on a railroad track in plain view of the trainmen of an approaching train
who realize that the person will be killed if the train is, as it might be,
stopped? 19
Steffen v. Ritter" involved the striking and killing by a truck of a pedestrian near the center of a right angle street intersection in the early hours
of the morning. The pedestrian was killed and there was no eyewitness except the defendant. The defendant testified that the pedestrian moved from
a place of safety and into the rear of defendant's truck after the front of the
truck had passed safely.
Apparently assuming (but casting doubt) that a humanitarian case was
made, the court passed on and held good a "sole cause" instruction of defendant, noting that the instruction submitted the facts negating negligence
of the defendant, and also required a finding that the defendant was not
guilty of the negligence submitted.
The defendant's "sole cause" or "sole negligence" instruction is set forth
in full and seems to be an approved form for use in cases where there is a
defense of sudden movement by the injured party from a place of safety
into a place of danger.
This seems to be a combination Type 3 or Type 4 case. It could have
been submitted as a Type 3 last clear chance case.
Bucks v. Hamil2 involved the striking at night of plaintiff while standing near the rear of a disabled vehicle on or near the open highway, by a
passing automobile. The facts were complicated and the case was submitted
on primary negligence and the humanitarian doctrine, but the issues passed
upon were not of general interest. This was a Type 3 or 4 case involving the
humanitarian doctrine. A verdict and judgment for defendant was affirmed
upon long settled principles.

19. See comment of Judge Ellison in State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service
Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 868, 191 S.W. 2d 660, loc. cit. 662 (1946), stating that the
supreme court has never directly ruled that a claimant cannot recover under the
humanitarian doctrine for self sought injury or suicide. The problem, however, more
properly involves the last clear chance rule.
20. 214 S.W. 2d 28 (Mo. 1948).
21. 216 S.W. 2d 423 (Mo. 1949).
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Division Number Two
Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co. 22 involved a motor truckstreetcar collision at a right angle street intersection. The question decided
was whether a case was made under the humanitarian doctrine of failure to
slacken speed of the defendant's streetcar after the alleged imminent peril of
the plaintiff's truck driver occurred.
Plaintiff's evidence tended to prove that plaintiff stopped before entering the intersection wherein the collision occurred; that seeing the approaching streetcar plaintiff moved forward at about two miles per hour expecting
to cross in front of the streetcar traveling at a speed estimated to be from
fifteen to thirty-five miles per hour. The truck driven by plaintiff was struck
and damaged in the rear four and a half to five feet of the truck. The court
held that no peril arose or was apparent, until the slow moving truck was
actually in the path of defendant's vehicle or so close thereto that it was
apparent (at the rate of speed and manner of moving) that plaintiff would
not stop before reaching the path of defendant's vehicle. So it was held that
no case was made by the plaintiff. This is a simple last clear chance rule
problem. The case was, if anything, a case similar to Case 1 above.
In this case plaintiff was conscious. The defendant was conscious but
did not appreciate the peril until too late to avoid collision.
Roeslein v. Chicago & E. L R. R. 23 involved the striking of an automobile by a train at a public street crossing in St. Louis in the early morning.
Four railroad tracks lay in the street intersection across plaintiff's path.
The automobile had stopped at a watchman's signal to permit a train
on the nearest of a series of four tracks to pass. When train one had passed
the switchman waved the plaintiff motorist to cross the four tracks. When the
plaintiff was crossing the third of the four tracks in the intersection, the plaintiff's car was struck in the middle by train two. Plaintiff's automobile would
have cleared had it traveled eight feet farther. The case was submitted on the
humanitarian doctrine as to the defendant train operator. The court approved instructions (1) on the converse of the humanitarian doctrine and
(2) defining imminent peril.
This case, a combination of Cases 3 and 4 above, involves the true humanitarian doctrine. It is notable for the approved instructions given at the
instance of the defendant.
22. 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).
23. 214 S.W. 2d 13 (Mo. 1948).
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Hall v. Pkhiips Petroleum Co. 24 involved

a collision between two meeting
tractor trailer combinations being operated on the open highway. The defendant driver was the only eyewitness and survivor of the casualty. Plain-

tiff attempted to make a humanitarian case with the defendant's driver's
admissions and the circumstantial evidence. The collision occurred on the
defendant's right side of the highway. The tractors did not collide head on.
Defendant's driver stated that the vehicles were traveling on courses which
would have permitted clearance until the deceased, when thirty to thirtyfive feet away, suddenly pulled into the side of defendant's vehicle striking
it behind the cab.
The case under the evidence as viewed by the court most favorably to
plaintiff did not make a case for the jury. It was a possible last clear chance
case (Case 3) if anything, for the defendant admittedly was actually unaware of the movements of the other vehicle at all times.
Holdman v. Thompson2 5 involved a grade crossing collision between a
passenger train and a motor vehicle. The motor vehicle operator was killed
as a result of the collision. The deceased motor vehicle operator drove on
to the railroad tracks without stopping. The testimony of the defendant's
fireman showed that he'was aware of the peril of the deceased in ample time
to have sounded a warning, which, if heeded, would have avoided the injury. The evidence was conflicting on the question of whether the warning
was actually given. This was not a humanitarian case, but a last clear
chance case similar to Case 3 stated above. Upon the facts stated the opinion appears to be sound.

INSURANCE
Ro3ERT E. SEILER*

In 1948, the supreme court decided five cases dealing primarily with
insurance questions: One case involved an effort to sue the insurance company directly on an automobile liability insurance policy, one involved subrogation rights under collision insurance policies, one involved the right to
jury trial in an equity case under the statute requiring jury trials on the
issue of whether the matter claimed to be misrepresented actually contrib24. 214 S.W. 2d 438 (Mo. 1948).
25. 216 S.W. 2d 72 (Mo. 1949).
*Attorney, Joplin, Missouri. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
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uted to the death, one involved the standard union mortgage clause and one
involved a "loan receipt" between a bonding company and the insured.
The action against the insurance company directly was Haines v. Harrison,'- where the plaintiff, injured in 1946 in an automobile collision wherein
the driver died before plaintiff could file suit, brought his suit for damages
against the administrator and the liability insurance company covering the
automobile, on the theory that liability under the insurance policy attached
immediately upon the occurrence of the injury and since it was impossible
for the plaintiff to file an action and obtain judgment against the deceased
such action on his part was not a prerequisite to relief. The court affirmed
the action of the trial court in sustaining a motion to dismiss the petition
because no cause of action was stated. The action in tort did not survive
against the administrator.2 Nor could the action be maintained against
the insurance company because the death of the tort-feasor made it impossible to establish liability by judgment against the tort-feasor, and also
ended any liability for the tort. Despite the 1947 amendment to Section
3670, it seems doubtful if the court even today would permit such an action directly against the insurance company because the court referred
to the "no-action" clause of the policy and declared it-was valid and enforceable.
The subrogation case is General Exchange Insurance Corporation V.
Young,' where a Mrs. Swisher had a $25 deductible collision insurance
policy with General Exchange Insurance Corporation. Her car was damaged in a collision on October 26, 1941. Thereafter General Exchange
paid Mrs. Swisher $342.00, being the cost of repair less $25.00. Mrs.
Swisher made a written assignment to General Exchange of all rights
and causes of action she might have against any person for causing such
damage. The other party to the collision was Young, and in November,
1941, General Exchange notified Young and his insurance carrier that it
had paid $342.00 on Mrs. Swisher's repairs, had been subrogated to her
rights to collect damages to her car and claimed reimbursement therefor.
General Exchange filed suit against Young on December 5, 1942, for the
entire $367.00 and recovered a judgment for $342.00. Young set up as
one defense to this action that in May, 1942, Mrs. Swisher sued Young for
1. 357 Mo. 956, 211 S.W. 2d 489 (1948).
2. Mo. Rtv. STAT. § 3670 (1939).
3. 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W. 2d 396 (1948).
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$5,000.00 for personal injuries and doctor bills; that in July, 1943, she
dismissed her suit with prejudice and executed a release of all claims for
damages to person or property for a payment of $500.00. The court rejected this contention, pointing out that Mrs. Swisher filed suit after
General Exchange had been subrogated to her entire property damage
claim and after Young had been notified thereof. The court did not pass
on the question of whether both Mrs. Swisher and General Exchange
could have sued for property damage had she made only a partial assignment, but stated that where the insurer pays the entire loss, or if paying
less than the entire loss nevertheless receives an assignment for the whole
claim, then the insured had no further interest in property damages and
the insurance company may sue in its own name. The court overrules
Subscribers at Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,4 which had for many years permitted tort-feasors to settle with
a party carrying collision insurance for the amount of the deductible portion of the collision policy and then safely ignore the subrogation demands
of the collision carrier.
The case involving the right to a jury trial on alleged misrepresentations was New York Insurance Company v. Feinberg,5 an action in equity
to cancel two life insurance policies for alleged misrepresentations (concerning prior health and consultation with a physician since the medical
examination). The trial court empaneled a jury, which answered all interrogatories in favor of the beneficiaries, but the court heard further
testimony without a jury and thereupon rendered a decree rejecting the
answers of the jury and cancelling the policies. The supreme court held
that under the terms of Sec. 5843, Mo. Rev. Stat, (1939), the question of
whether the matter claimed to be misrepresented actually contributed to the
death is a jury question in any case, whether law or equity, and remanded the
cause for a new trial.
The case concerning the "loan receipt" was Newco Land Co. v. Mar6
tin, an action had for money had and received, where the land company
was attempting to recover $7000.00 of its money which one of its officers
(who was also an agent of the defendants) had deposited to the credit of
the defendants to cover his prior embezzlement from the defendants. One
question before the court was the validity and effect of a certain loan
4. 230 Mo. App. 468, 91 S.W. 2d 227 (1936).
5. 357 Mo. 1044, 212 S.W. 2d 574 (1948).
6. 213 S.W. 2d 504 (Mo. 1948).
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made by the bonding company to the land company. The loan of $7500.00
was made under a "Loan Receipt" reciting that the loan was repayable
only to the extent of any net recovery by the land company on account
of the loss occasioned by the dishonest acts of the agent, and that the land
company would prosecute suit for such loss, the suit to be at the expense
of and under control of the bonding company, with any recovery pledged
as security for repayment. The court refused to hold that the loan agreement amounted to payment or satisfaction of the land company, and said
the parties had the right to make such an agreement, that it was not
against public policy and that like agreements had been approved in other
jurisdictions as meeting the needs of commerce and promoting justice.
The case with the standard union mortgage clause was Zeiger v.
Farmers' & Laborers' Cooperative Ins. Ass'n. 7 The plaintiffs had a five
year $2,000.00 fire policy on their dwelling with the defendant, which was
a farmers' mutual fire insurance company organized under the Missouri
statutes. The trial court found that plaintiffs failed to pay the last two
assessments prior to the fire, although notices of the assessments were
mailed to the plaintiffs and another notice was mailed to the plaintiffs
notifying them that the insurance had been suspended. There was a
$2500.00 mortgage on the property in favor of Federal Land Bank, which
mortgage was foreclosed about two years after the fire and the property
sold for $1610.00, which was less than the amount due on the loan at the
date of the fire. The insurance policy contained a mortgage clause providing that any loss or damage under the policy was payable to the Federal Land Bank "as interest (s) may appear." The insurance company
failed to notify the bank of the default in the payment of the assessments
by the plaintiffs, thus failing to give the bank the opportunity to continue as provided by the terms of the policy. On demand of the bank, the
insurance company eventually paid the bank the full $2000.00. After the
foreclosure proceedings, the bank applied a sufficient amount of the
$2000.00 to plaintiffs' debt to pay same in full. The plaintiffs claimed that
the bank should have credited the $2000.00 on the note on the date it
received the money and that, therefore, plaintiffs were not in default on
the payments at the time of the foreclosure and that the foreclosure sale
was void. However, the court held that under the terms of the policy
the plaintiffs did not have a dwelling covered by insurance at the date of
7. 214 S.W. 2d 426 (Mo. 1948).
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the fire, nor did the plaintiffs have any rights under the policy at the time
of the fire. The liability of the insurance company to the bank did not
arise under the terms of the policy, but under the standard union mortgagee clause, which was a separate and distinct contract for the benefit of
the mortgagee, and plaintiffs had no interest therein.

PROPERTY

WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*
In the original opinion in Kraemer v. Shelley, the Missouri Supreme
Court reaffirmed the validity of covenants restricting property from transfer to or occupancy by Negroes. The court held such restrictions did not
contravene guarantees of civil rights in the Constitution of the United States,
and that the enforcement of such a restriction by a Missouri court was
not action by the State in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which
relates only to state action. A writ of certiorari was sued out in the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the judgment of the Missouri Supreme
Court was reversed in Shelley v. Kraemer.2 In the opinion by Vinson, C. J.,
the Court said:
"We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing
alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the purposes
of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their
terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the
State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated."S
"Upon full consideration, we have concluded that in these cases the
States have acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Having so decided, we find it unnecessary to consider whether petitioners have
also been deprived of property without due process of law or denied
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." 4
Upon resubmission, the Missouri Supreme Court stated in Kraemer v.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of Illinois,
193$5, LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W. 2d 679 (1946). See Note by Betz, 12 Mo. L. REv.
221 (1947); Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1946-Property, 12
Mo. L. REv. 405, 413 (1947).
2. 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 23.
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Shelley: "Our previous cases holding to the contrary are hereby overruled."
In Woytws v. Winkler" the court applied the same rule.
Various techniques are being and will be devised to try to accomplish the
same end-result as was accomplished by a direct racial restriction on ownership or occupancy enforceable by injunction or forfeiture. One such possible
device was considered in Lux v. Lewis, 7 a suit for specific performance of
the following covenant: "No sale of said lot shall be consummated without
giving at least 15 days' written notice to ... the owners of the two lots adjoining said lot on the sides, of the terms thereof; and any of them shall
have the right to buy said lot on such terms." The court held that the
adjoining lot owner had not accepted the offer, but had made a counter
offer, which was a rejection of the original offer. The court assumed, but
expressly did not decide, that the option was valid and enforceable. Such
an option is not drawn along racial or color lines. The option might be an
invalid restraint on alienation, or might violate the rule against perpetuities.
To be an effective racial restriction such an option would have to cover use
and occupancy as well as ownership. These and related problems will be
fully considered in a student Comment soon to be published in the Missouri
Law Review.
Whether an adopted child is included in the terms "children," "issue,"
or "heirs of body," has long caused trouble. The question may arise where
there is a limitation to children, issue, et cetera. Or the question may arise
where there is a gift over in the event of death without children, issue, et
cetera. It would seem that in all cases the problem of construction and consequent litigation could be avoided by expressly defining the term used
either to include adopted children or to exclude adopted children.
The problem was to some extent resolved in the proviso to the adoptioi
statute in 1917:8 "Said [adopted] child shall thereafter [after adoption]
be deemed and held to be for every purpose, the child of its parent or parents
by adoption, as fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock.... Provided,
however, that neither said adopted child nor said parents by adoption shall
be capable of inheriting from or taking through each other property ex.
pressly limited to heirs of the body of such child or parent by adoption."
5. 214 S.W. 2d 525 (Mo. 1948).
6. 357 Mo. 1082, 212 S.W. 2d 411 (1948).
7. 213 S.W. 2d 315 (Mo. 1948).

8. Mo. Laws 1917, p. 194, now Mo.
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By an amendment effective May 21, 1948,' the above proviso was repealed and the following diametrically opposed provision substituted therefor: "Said adopted child shall be capable of inheriting from and taking
through his parent or parents by adoption property limited expressly to
heirs of the body of such parent or parents by adoption." This section uses
only the term "heirs of the body," and that term is not synonymous with
"children" or "issue." Nevertheless the legislative policy expressed should
be very important in similar problems of construction where the gift is to
"children" or "issue."
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 3499 is basically directed toward the problem
whether death without heirs of the body, or issue, means an indefinite failure
of issue (at any time in the future after any number of generations), or a
definite failure of issue (at the death of a designated ancestor). It provides
as follows:
"Where a remainder in lands or tenements, goods or chattels, shall
be limited, by deed or otherwise, to take effect on the death of any
person without heirs, or heirs of his body, or without issue, or on
failure of issue, the words 'heirs' or 'issue' shall be construed to
mean heirs or issue living at the death of the person named as
ancestor."
Here there is the same problem of construction, whether a person who is
survived by an adopted child is survived by an heir of the body or by issue.
The 1948 amendment to the adoption statute should be very important in
resolving this problem.
Kindred v. Anderso 10 presented two difficult problems of construction.
The testatrix died in 1900, and by a will executed in 1898 made the following devise: "5. I give and devise to my son William H. Timberlake, his
heirs and assigns all my real estate .... 9. In the event that William H.
shall die without issue then the whole of my said property shall be divided
equally among all the above children." William H. Timberlake was a bachelor, 39 years of age at the time of his mother's death. In 1925 when he was
64 years of age he married a widow who had a daughter by a previous marriage. In 1934 he adopted his step daughter. He died in 1946 at the age of
85, never having had a child of his own blood. The plaintiffs claim that
William had a defeasible fee simple, that "issue" meant blood issue, and
that inasmuch as William never had blood issue and left only an adopted
9. Mo. Laws 1947, p. 217; Mo. REv. STAT.
10. 357 Mo. 564, 209 S.W. 2d 912 (1948).

ANN.

§ 9614.
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daughter, the plaintiffs are now entitled under a shifting executory interest.
On the other hand, the argument (a point raised by the court) in favor of
the defendants, claiming through William, was that the adopted daughter
was "issue" as the word was used in this will, and therefore what initially
was a defeasible fee simple became a fee simple absolute. The plaintiffs
relied on Graves v. Graves." Ellison, J., in an able opinion, analyzed the
Graves case and related cases and came to the conclusion that while "issue"
prima facie means blood issue, in this case it included an adopted child, considering the will as a whole and the surrounding circumstances. The resolution of similar problems should be much easier in such future cases as are
governed by Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9614, discussed above.
A second issue in the case was the defendant's contention that the death
of William without issue applied only if he predeceased the testatrix, and
that having survived the testatrix he took a fee simple absolute at her death,
not subject to a shifting executory interest. The leading case is Owens v.
Men and Millions Movement.12 The court found that there was sufficient
intent in this will to change the general rule of the Owens case, and that
William took only a defeasible fee simple. However this point would seem
to be moot in view of the court's construction of the word "issue."
3
Grannemann v. Grannemann%
involved the construction of a residuary
clause in a will:
"6th. I give and bequeath all of the balance of my estate, both personal and real, to my beloved wife Lydia Grannemann, and after her
death and the payment of the above legacies, the balance of the
estate both personal and real shall be divided equally between Oscar
Grannemann and Guy Grannemann or their heirs" (emphasis
added).
Oscar survived the testator but predeceased the widow, the life tenant. After
the death of the life tenant, Oscar's creditors attempted to satisfy their
claims out of his interest, on the theory he had a vested remainder in fee
simple absolute. His heirs claimed that his interest was a contingent remainder, subject to the condition precedent of surviving the life tenant. The
court held that Oscar had a vested remainder in fee simple absolute.
The orthodox method of creating a present or future estate in fee
simple is to limit the estate to "B and his heirs." If the draftsman of the
11. 349 Mo. 722, 163 S.W. 2d 544 (1942).
12. 296 Mo. 110, 246 S.W. 172 (1922).
13. 210 S.W. 2d 105 (Mo. 1948).
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clause in question had used "and" instead of "or" the problem would not
have arisen. Where a present estate is granted or devised to "B or his heirs,"
Cor" is read as "and" and the words are treated as words of limitation giving
B a fee simple absolute, and not as words of purchase in favor of the heirs.
Where a future estate is granted or devised to "B or his heirs," there are
several possible constructions. One is to read "or" as "and" and treat the
words as words of limitation giving B a future estate in fee simple absolute.
Alternative constructions are that B has a contingent remainder, subject
to a condition precedent of survival, and his heirs have an alternative contingent remainder as purchasers; or that B has a defeasible vested remainder,
subject to a condition subsequent of survival, and his heirs have a shifting
executory interest as purchasers. In the absence of contrary intent the words
are treated as words of limitation, giving B an estate in fee simple absolute,
and not as words of purchase.1 4 The court follows the orthodox rule in
the principal case, distinguishing Owen v. Eato1A5 and Riley v.Kirk' 6 where
from additional language the court found an intent that the heirs should
take as purchasers and consequently B's estate was subject to a condition of
survival.
In Harlow v. Benning'7 there was a devise to the widow "for and
during the term of her natural life and after her death the remainder I will
to all my children hereinafter named in equal parts" (emphasis added).
During the continuance of the life estate there was a suit to partition the remainders subject to the life estate. If the remainders were vested, the judgment in the partition suit was valid, but if the remainders were contingent
the judgment was void. The court held that the remainders were vested, the
words "after her death" simply relating to the time of enjoyment of possession (vesting in possession), and not to the time of vesting in interest which
was the death of the testator. The words did not designate any condition
precedent other than the termination of the life estate, a condition inherent
in any vested remainder.
Several other cases involved problems of construction. While "the
construction of A's ambiguity is no proper guide to the construction of B's
ambiguity,"' 8 the cases point out pitfalls to avoid.
14. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 27, comments d, e (1936).
15. 56 Mo. App. 563 (1894).
16. 213 Mo. App. 381, 253 S.W. 50 (1923).
17. 357 Mo. 266, 207 S.W. 2d 471 (1948).
18. LEACH, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 242, n. 8 (2d ed. 1940).
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In Coley v. Lowen 9 the court treated "children" as synonymous with
"issue" where both words were used in a limitation creating alternative contingent remainders.
In Adams v. Simpson" a testator drafted his own will and included
the following clauses: "Third-The balance of my Money and property
where so ever be-I wanted to be equal divided a mong my Friens and relation-Two Sisters-about Ten Neics and Nefues-I do not know where all
of them are. Some in St-Joseph.Mo. and Some In Blockton, Iowa. One In
Readding, Iowa. One in Chicago, ILL." The testator had in fact six nieces
and nephews. The court held that this was a gift to a class composed of
eight persons, his two sisters and six nieces and nephews. The words "friends
and relations" were simply descriptive of this class, and were not used in a
disposing sense of making a gift to "relatives" or "friends" or both.
In Smoot v. Harbur21 a testator in a residuary clause made the following
gift: "One fourth thereof, individually, one-eighth thereof to my niece, Burla
Booker" with two-eighths each to three other named persons. The court in
resolving the ambiguity held that Burla took one-fourth; this construction
avoided partial intestacy.
The problem of the jurisdiction of county courts in matters affecting
22
title to land was raised in two cases. In Duenke v. St. Louis County,
a suit to quiet title, the question was whether the county court's order
and judgment vacating a public but unopened street was legally rescinded by
the same county court. It was held that under Art. VI, § 36 of the Cbnstitution of 1875 the county court was a court of record with judicial powers,
and that in this case the county court was acting in its judicial rather
than in its ministerial or administrative capacity; consequently the county
court had judicial power to rescind its vacation order during the term.23
In Bradford v. Phelps County,2 a case involving the county court's
allowances for stenographic service to the prosecuting attorney, the supreme
court emphasized that under Art. VI, § 7 of the Constitution of 1945, the
county court is no longer a court in a judicial sense, but is a ministerial
body managing the county's business. The same point was made in State v.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

357 Mo. 762, 211 S.W. 2d 18 (1948).
213 S.W. 2d 908 (Mo. 1948).
357 Mo. 511, 209 S.W. 2d 249 (1948).
213 S.W. 2d 492 (Mo. 1948).
See SILVERS, MISSOURI TITLES § 117 (2d ed. 1923).
357 Mo. 830, 210 S.W. 2d 996 (1948).
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Arnold,21 a case involving an insanity inquisition of a poor person. Both
cases emphasize the changed status of the county court under the Constitution of 1945, and would seem to make it clear that the county court is no
longer a judicial court nor a court of record, in matters affecting title to
land.
Grose v. Holland-6 was a case of first impression in the supreme court.
Land was owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. The
husband murdered his wife. The question was whether the husband, as
survivor, became the sole owner of the land. The court held that the
surviving husband never acquired the whole property, and that the heirs of
his wife had an undivided one-half. The case was fully discussed in a note
in a recent number of the Missouri Law Review.2 7
2
Farr v. LinebergerB
reaffirms the doctrine that a husband and wife
may be tenants in common. In this case the conveyance ran to husband and
wife as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants or as tenants by the
29
entirety.
0
Kennedy v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri"
was an action to recover
damages for the flooding of the plaintiff's building. The evidence sustained
the finding that the flooding, near the head of the Lake of the Ozarks above
Bagnall Dam, was caused by silt deposits raising the beds of the Osage
River and its tributary streams in the upper part of the lake, so as to substantially affect their carrying capacity, and that this would raise the water
level in these streams, retard the velocity of the water, and cause it to spread
out and overflow. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Finck Realty Co. v. Lefler3 was concerned with the baffling problem as
to whether a person can acquire title by adverse possession in the case of a
mistaken boundary (fence). In this case the adverse claimant testified clearly that he intended to claim to the fence; he did not have the conditional
intent to claim to the fence only if it was the true line. The court held that
he had the requisite intent to acquire title by adverse possession. The court
quoted with approval from State ex rel. Edie v. Shain: 2
25. 356 Mo. 661, 204 S.W. 2d 254 (1947).
26. 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W. 2d 464 (1948).
27. See Note by Fitzgerald, 13 Mo. L. REv. 463 (1948).
28. 207 S.W. 2d 455 (Mo. 1948).
29. See Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1945-Property, 11
Mo. L. REv. 378, 380-383 (1946).
30. 216 S.W. 2d 756 (Mo. 1948).
31. 208 S.W. 2d 213 (Mo. 1948).
32. 348 Mo. 119, 152 S.W. 2d 174, 176 (1941).
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"The principle, as stated in all of our prior decisions, may be reduced to this: If the possessor occupies the land in question intending to occupy that particular piece as his own, his occupancy
is adverse. It is not necessary that he intend to take away from the
true owner something which he knows belongs to another, or even
that he be indifferent as to the facts of the legal title. It is the intent to possess, and not the intent to take irrespective of his right,
which governs."
G. V. Head has criticized the intention test: "The occupant's intention
should, it seems, be immaterial. The issue should be one as to whether the
occupant has, by words or actions, treated or dealt with the land as his own.
' 33
Objective acts, and not subjective intent, should be controlling.
Foxx v. Thompson3 4 was concerned with whether reciprocal easements
existed in a six-stall garage, concrete apron, and two driveways. Three
duplexes and the garage, apron, and driveways were built in 1925 by a common owner. At some unstated date the three lots were conveyed to three
different persons without any mention of easements. The facilities were
used by the respective owners and occupants for more than twenty years
before it was discovered as the consequence of a survey that there were
encroachments on the various lots. The weight of the evidence was that the
use of the apron and stalls with consequent encroachment was necessary in
order that the respective owners and occupants might reasonably enjoy their
properties. The court decreed reciprocal easements in the apron and stalls.
The theory of the court would seem to be that there were implied grants or
reservations of easements corresponding to preexisting quasi-easements; the
court states that this is not a case of prescription or adverse user. The court
quotes from Greisingerv. Klinhardt:85 "It is not a question of prescription,
but a question of the apparent attachment for the enjoyment of the property
granted. It must be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant
estate. It must be apparent at the time of the severance by the original
owner." It would seem further that at least in this type of case the court is
requiring no higher degree of necessity for an implied reservation of an
easement than for an implied grant of an easement. The principal case
should be compared with the leading case of Jacobs v. Brewster,0 a joint
33. Head, Work of Missouri Supreme Court fQr 1941-Property, 7 Mo. L. Rv.
408, 410 (1942).
34. 216 S.W. 2d 87 (Mo. 1948).
35. 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W. 2d 978 (1928).
36. 354 Mo. 729, 190 S.W. 2d 894 (1945).
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driveway case, where the court found reciprocal easements but applied an
adverse user theory.3 7
TAXATION
PAUL

G. OCHTERBECK*

The cases decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri during the year

1948 in the field of taxation are discussed under the following topics: IBonds issued by Public Corporations and Political Subdivisions; II-Exemption from Taxation; III-Fire Districts; IV-Income Taxes; V-Municipal
Taxes; VI-Road Taxes; VII-Sales Tax; VIII-Tax Sales and Titles.
I.

BONDS ISSUED BY PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

In State ex rel. City of Kirkwood v. Smitkl,1 the question presented for
determination was whether a special election authorizing $800,000.00 in bonds
for waterworks and sewerage purposes was subject to all of the provisions of
the permanent registration act applying to St. Louis County, wherein the City
of Kirkwood is located. It was held that such permanent registration act had
no application to such elections except as to registration.
In Kansas City v. Reed,2 the supreme court for the first time expressly
ruled that in determining whether a city's constitutional debt limit would be
exceeded, the sinking fund must be deducted from the total debt. The court
followed the majority rule in making this decision and expressly refused to
follow the minority rule as announced by certain Pennsylvania decisions.

McFaw Land Co. v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.3 was a suit involving
a title insurance policy. The court held that Drainage District bonds issued
in 1912 were not a lien on the real estate; that the defendant was under no
duty to report the amount of unpaid bonds; and that the assessments made in
1939 and 1940 to pay certain of these bonds were within the exceptions in the
policy.
II.

EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION
Missouri Goodwill Industriesv. Gruner,4 the

In
real estate of the Missouri
Goodwill Industries, a charitable corporation, was held exempt from taxation
37. See Eckhardt, Work of Missouri Supreme Court for 1945-Property, 11
Mo. L. REV. 378, 385 (1946), for a discussion of Jacobs v. Brewster, and of the
general problem of reciprocal easements.
*Attomey, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1931.

1. 357 Mo. 518, 210 S.W. 2d 46 (1948).
2. 216 S.W. 2d 514 (Mo. 1948).
3. 357 Mo. 797, 211 S.W. 2d 44 (1948).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

53

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1949], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

380

[Vol. 14

on the ground that the property was used for purposes purely charitable. The
court held that the primary purpose of this charity was to assist and train
handicapped men and women to become self-respecting and self-supporting
and that the selling of second-hand reworked goods and the making of any
profits were incidental to its primary purpose. Most persons will agree with
Judge Clark that this is "charity of a practical sort." A number of prior tax
exemption cases are briefly reviewed and discussed.
III. FIRE DismTICrs
In State ex rel. Normandy Fire Protection District v. Smith, the court
stated that the new act 6 providing for the incorporation of fire districts was
similar to the old act 7 and upheld the constitutionality of the new law. The
case of State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith,8 was followed.
IV. INcOME TAXES

In Clark v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.,9 it was held that where the testator provided for stipulated payments to a beneficiary, without making any
provision for payment of income taxes in addition to the stipulated payments,
the beneficiary should bear the burden of income taxes on such payments, the
taxes having been deducted and paid by the trustee.
V.

MUNICIPAL TAXES

In City of Brunswick v. Myers,'0 an ordinance providing for an election

to approve a 20-year franchise was upheld. The court further held that the
provision for a 5% license tax on gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes did
not prohibit the city from later changing this provision; that there was
nothing improper in the Kansas City Power and Light Company paying the
city for the cost of the election; and it was perfectly proper for the Power
and Light Company to wait until the voters had approved the granting of the
franchise until it accepted the offer of the franchise contained in the ordinance.
1
the city was held not to have been auIn Moots v. City of Trenton,"

thorized by the legislature to levy an annual license fee of $30.00 for each coinoperated musical instrument (juke box) operated within the City of Trenton.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

357 Mo. 647, 210 S.W. 2d 38 (1948).
216 S.W. 2d 440 (Mo. 1948).
Mo. Laws 1947, Vol. I, p. 432.
Mo. Laws 1941, p. 505.
353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W. 2d 593 (1945).
357 Mo. 785, 211 S.W. 2d 10 (1948).
357 Mo. 461, 209 S.W. 2d 134 (1948).
214 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. 1948).
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VI. RoAD TAxEs
In State ex rel. Moore v. Wabash, Railroad,2 the supreme court held
that since no appropriate action had been taken under the applicable statute
to constitute Jefferson Township of Nodaway County a general or special
road district, this township was neither a general nor a special road district
and the attempted levy of an additional road and bridge tax by this township through a special election was void and unenforceable. In other words,
such an additional levy must be by a general or special road district as such,
and a township without the prerequisite statutory action is neither a general
nor special road district.
VII. SALES TAX

In State ex rel. Otis Elevator Co. v. Smith, 13 the supreme court en banc
held that an elevator company which designs, constructs and installs a special
elevator for a particular building would not ordinarily be liable for sales tax
on the materials furnished because these materials are not sold to the owner
but are "used and consumed" in constructing the elevators, which automatically become a part of the building. However, where the contract for
the installation of the elevators contains a clause retaining title in the elevator company until the purchase price is paid, the elevator company is
liable for sales tax on the materials furnished.
VIII. TAX SALES AND TITLEs
In Davis v. Johnson,14 a plaintiff who had been in possession for many
years under a claim of right was held entitled to have a tax sale under the
Jones Munger Law set aside because the land which was worth $1,500.00
had been sold for taxes of $127.50 and to have the right to redeem the land
from the tax sale. A number of situations are discussed concerning persons
"having an interest" in the land sufficient to maintain a proceeding to redeem
from such a tax sale.
In Horton v. Gentry," it was held that a sheriff's tax deed under a
special execution passed no title because the owner of the fee was not a party
to the suit; that the three year statute of limitations on tax deeds had no
application to sheriff's tax deeds; and that plaintiff in a quiet title suit should
receive protection as to taxes paid although the statute literally gives such
protection only to a defendant.
12.
13.
14.
15.

357 Mo. 380, 208 S.W. 2d 223 (1948).
357 Mo. 1055, 212 S.W. 2d 580 (1948).
357 Mo. 417, 208 S.W. 2d 266 (1948).
357 Mo. 694, 210 S.W. 2d 72 (1948).
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In Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of Land,16 it was held that under the
Land Tax Collection Act applicable to Jackson County the landholder does
not have the right to redeem after the foreclosure sale although the court
may require the bid to be made adequate before the sale is confirmed; and
that when two lots are sold and the purchaser is only willing to make his bid
adequate as to one lot, the court has the discretion to confirm the sale of the
one lot and to refuse to confirm as to the other lot. The constitutionality of
this Act was reaffirmed.
In Martin v. McCabe,17 where reissued tax bills were dated back, it was
held that the "dated back" reissued tax bills and the judgment causing these
tax bills to be foreclosed were void. Because plaintiff's "alter ego" and agent
was an experienced real estate dealer, his knowledge of the facts was held
to prevent plaintiff from claiming that she was entitled to be reimbursed for
improvements upon the claim that she made improvements in good faith in
ignorance of the true state of the title. It was also held that proof of actual
notice may be made by showing knowledge of facts which if followed up
would have led to notice.
TORTS
GLENN A. MCCLEARY*

The further increase in the work of the court during the year is seen

in the large number of decisions involving liability for tort. There were
seventeen decisions in this field of the law by the court en banc, which to
the writer seemed to be a higher proportion of en banc cases in tort cases
than in previous years. For adequacy of treatment, the cases having to do
with the humanitarian doctrine are discussed elsewhere in this issue by Mr.
Becker.
I. NEGLIGENcE

A. Duties of persons in certainrelations
1. Possessors of land
as
a result of slipping and falling on substances on
Injuries to invitees
the floor of the defendant's business premises were before the court in two
cases. In State ex rel. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Bland,' after judgment for
16. 357 Mo. 1231, 212 S.W. 2d 746 (1948).
17. 213 S.W. 2d 497 (Mo. 1948).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
1. 357 Mo. 339, 208 S.W. 2d 263 (1948) (en banc.)
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plaintiff in the trial court, the supreme court granted certiorari on the
ground that the record failed to show that the dangerous condition of the
floor had existed for any length of time prior to the fall, so that the company
could not be charged with notice of the dangerous condition. The evidence
showed it was a wet, sloppy, February day, that customers had been tracking muck into the store all day, and to such extent that an antislip preparation was sprinkled on the floor to keep it from becoming slippery; that the
muck accumulated so rapidly as to make it necessary to mop the floor at
thirty minute intervals, which would remove the antislip preparation unless
it was applied anew; that the floor at the entrance where the accident occurred had been mopped about thirty minutes before the plaintiff entered
the store, sometime around after four-thirty o'clock in the afternoon; that
out of doors the ground had frozen over by that time of day and there were
patches of ice on the sidewalk; and that the plaintiff was a step or two inside the store when she slipped on the accumulation of dark, wet, muddy
substance on the floor. This evidence was held to show that the defendant's
employees were fully aware of the dangerous condition and the only question was whether ordinary care was used to remedy a condition known to
exist. On this issue the finding by the Kansas City Court of Appeals was
adopted which held that the plaintiff "made a submissible case in that the
jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the condition of the
floor when plaintiff fell had existed for a half hour or more; that defendants
did not mop it and apply non-skid material as claimed, or if they did, it was
done negligently and ineffectively; that defendants knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, of the condition existing when
plaintiff fell in time to have removed the accumulated muck and failing to
do so caused plaintiff to fall."
On the other hand, in Lance v. Van Winkle,2 plaintiff's evidence was not
sufficient to establish constructive notice to the defendant storekeeper of
the presence of an ice cream cone on the store entrance, on which the plaintiff slipped and fell, where the only evidence tending to prove the length of
time that the ice cream and cone were present was testimony that the ice
cream appeared to have dried, nor was the defendant charged with actual
notice of the cone because defendant's porter, whose duty it was to inspect
the vestibule, had passed through it only a few minutes before the accident,
where it was not shown that the cone was actually present and subject to
2.

213 S.W. 2d 401 (Mo. 1948).
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view. In this case the plaintiff had recovered a judgmint for $15,000 for
injuries received when she slipped and fell on the step of the entrance vestibule of a Kresge Store in St. Louis. The defendant Van Winkle was the
manager of that store. The plaintiff was leaving the store by an entrance
which had a vestibule several feet long leading to the sidewalk. The floor of
the vestibule was six inches above the level of the sidewalk. As the plaintiff walked through the vestibule she glanced in the show windows. She
slipped on the step leading down to the sidewalk and fell. When she raised
up she saw that she had stepped on the ice cream and cone which had
caused her to slip. After judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict and judgment, and for a
new judgment in their favor. The motion was sustained on the ground that
the evidence showed neither actual nor constructive notice of the presence of
the ice cream and cone on the step of the vestibule.
Injuries received by plaintiffs as a result of falling down elevator shafts
were before the court in two cases. In Happy v. Walz,3 the plaintiff, 72
years of age and a prospective customer, fell down an unguarded and unlighted elevator shaft in entering from the rear of the defendant's hardware
store. The elevator was for freight and not for passengers. The principal
issue as to the defendant's negligence turned on whether the plaintiff's
"intended" use of the "rear" door of the building, in approaching the store
from the alley and open area to the rear, was within the scope of the invitation to business invitees. There was no evidence that the defendant had
expressly invited customers to come into the hardware store through the
"rear" entrance, nor was there evidence that the defendant had expressly
invited customers to drive their automobiles into the alley and park when
approaching the store, as had the plaintiff on this occasion. While the main
entrance to the defendant store was on the public street, the evidence
showed that some of the residents of the neighborhood and others, who
knew about the "rear" door to the hardware store, used the door when as
customers they entered the store, and although the defendant knew of this
practice he had never told anyone not to walk in the back way. Some
customers would drive in the alley to pick up purchases. In affirming an
order granting plaintiff a new trial after a verdict for defendant, the court
held there was substantial evidence tending to show that prospective customers were impliedly invited to approach the defendant's store by way of
3. 213 S.W. 2d 410 (Mo. 1948).
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the rear entrance and, in so doing, to use the private alleyway for the parking of cars. Therefore, the defendant would owe a duty to the plaintiff to
exercise ordinary care to have the approach to the door in a reasonably safe
condition. The difficulty which the writer has with the case is that the facts
show that the plaintiff did not enter the "rear" door; instead he entered
through one of the double doors which separated the loading dock and the
elevator shaft and which was standing open "better than ninety degrees,"
as he passed from the loading dock into what he thought was the rear entrance to the store. It was 27 feet 9 inches from the elevator doors to the
rear-entrance door of the hardware store. The evidence as reported in the
decision, from which an invitation may be inferred to customers, pertains
to the use of the "rear" door and not to the elevator doors at this considerable distance away. The evidence showed that the plaintiff had used the
"rear" door in leaving the store but he had never before entered by way of
the alley, and that in the approach the "rear" door could not so readily be
seen as could the elevator-shaft doors, since the line of vision was almost
parallel with the wall containing the "rear" door and from such a point this
door would have been at best but imperfectly visible to him. The double
elevator-shaft doors were not like the rear-entrance door, but there was no
mark or sign on or near the elevator-shaft doors and nothing in their appearance indicating that they were not entrance doors to the rear of the
defendant's store. On these facts the court raised the question: "Should it
not have been anticipated, in the exercise of ordinary care, that an invitee
in so approaching the store (especially an invitee such as the plaintiff, who
was not familiar with the exterior of the rear-entrance door) might reasonably mistake the elevator-shaft doors for the rear door?" Since plaintiff
had no knowledge that an elevator shaft was in the store, and there were
no artificial lights in or about the shaft or its doors, and the shaft was "very
gloomy," it could not be said that the elevator-shaft was obvious to an
invitee who had a right to assume the approaches were reasonably safe.
Therefore, the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
The second elevator case was Pkegley v. Gratam,4 in which the plaintiff
recovered a judgment against the owner of a hotel for injuries sustained
when he lost his balance and fell down the passenger shaft at the hotel. The
hotel was occupied mostly by persons who were permanent residents and
the plaintiff had been a resident for approximately one year prior to the
4. 215 S.W. 2d 499 (Mo. 1948).
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accident. During this time he had used the elevator twice or oftener daily.
His apartment was on the 10th floor. The passenger elevator was of the
self-operating type and no operator was furnished by the hotel. The outer
door to the elevator shaft on the lobby floor, one of the doors involved, had
to be pulled back before one could open the mesh or lattice work door, called
the inner door, to the elevator. The space between the two doors was two
to three inches. The outer door was supposed to have an interlocking device
which would prevent it from being opened if the elevator car was not at that
floor level. On this occasion the plaintiff had left the lobby on the main floor
of the hotel, walked up four steps leading from the lobby to a balcony, or
aisle, to take the elevator which was about 15 to 20 feet from the steps on
the aisle. As he walked up the steps he saw a man come down the aisle who
had just stepped off the elevator. The plaintiff did not step into the shaft but
lost his balance while reaching for the inner door which he had reason to
believe to be there. In determining that the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent as a matter of law, the court distinguished this case from cases
where the elevator shaft doors could be opened whether or not the car was at
that level.
It is well settled law that it is the duty of the city to maintain its sidewalks in reasonable repair, and that the occupant of an abutting building is
not liable, in the absence of statute, for injuries to a pedestrian through failure to maintain the sidewalk in repair if the occupant did not cause the necessity for repair, nor from a defect in the walk which he did not cause; but
he is liable where his affirmative acts have created a dangerous condition
which result in harm to those properly using the walk. In Berry v. Emery,
Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co.,5 defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiff for injuries received by plaintiff as she was walking on the public sidewalk
in front of the defendant's store which abuts on the sidewalk, when a truck
came into contact with a street-light standard or pole set in the concrete of
the sidewalk as it was backing into a parking space along the curb in front
of the store. At or near its base, the'standard had for some time been cracked
throughout approximately 56% of its circumference. The standard was
broken off by the contact with the truck and, in falling, struck the plaintiff
causing severe injuries. The plaintiff alleged that the light standard and
fixtures thereon were owned, controlled and maintained by the defendant
store company; that it was negligent in maintaining this particular standard
5. 357 Mo. 808, 211 S.W. 2d 35 (1948).
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after it had been broken; and that it was negligent in failing to remove, remedy, abate or repair the standard or its unsafe condition, having knowledge of its unsafe and dangerous condition. The evidence showed that the
comtany had put the standards in for its own benefit primarily in providing
illumination of the sidewalk, and of the arcade and the display windows of
its store. There was no evidence that the City had accepted the standards
and was exercising exclusive control over them as a part of the exercise of its
power to light the streets of Kansas City, but on the contrary there was evidence tending to show that the company continued to exercise control of the
standards and to maintain them. The court held that "having the ownership,
or having assumed the responsibility of the ownership, control and maintenance of the standards so set in the sidewalk, Dry Goods Company had the
duty to exercise due care in maintaining them in a reasonably safe condition
for travelers." The backing of the truck into the standard was held not to be
such an extraordinary occurrence as to be held, as a matter of law, to interrupt the causal connection of the company's negligence. The question
whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause, concurring with
the negligence of the driver of the truck, was for the jury.
2. Railroads and other carriers
An interesting interpretation of the scope of injuries included within the
Boiler Inspection Act was before the court in Urie v. Thompson,6 where a
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the court en banc, the court holding that damage for silicosis, from the railroad company allegedly violating
the Act in permitting sand particles to penetrate the locomotive cab due to
faultily adjusted "sanders," was not within the purview of the Act. Considering the language of the Act itself, its preamble, its history, and its ancillary
regulations, the court found that the purpose of the Act was to impose an
absolute duty to so maintain a railroad locomotive and its appurtenances or
equipment in a safe and suitable condition, to the end that it may be employed in the active service of the carrier without unnecessary peril to life or
limb by accidental injury; that "there is a definite differentiation generally,
in the adjudicated cases between 'accidental injury' (accidental in the sense
that the injury is attended by force or violence), and pneumoconiosis (including silicosis), which is evidenced by pathological changes in lung structure
attributable to the effects of the inhalation of harmful dusts over a period
6. 357 Mo. 738, 210 S.W. 2d 98 (1948) (en banc).
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of time." On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, that Court in a
5 to 4 decision reversed the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court and remanded the cause with instructions to reinstate the verdict for the plaintiff,
on the reasoning that the Boiler Inspection Act and the Safety Appliance
Acts are substantially, if not in form, amendments to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act; that an injury for which recovery may be had for violation of
the Boiler Inspection Act is no narrower in scope than injury for which
recovery is authorized under the Federal Employers' Liability Act; that
"injury" in the Federal Employers' Liability Act is not confined to those
inflicted by external and accidental means; that silicosis which results from
the employer's negligence is an injury within the Federal Employers' Liability
Act; and, therefore, silicosis contracted by an employee, because of the employer's negligent failure properly to adjust sanding devices on steam locomotives used in interstate commerce, was compensable under the Boiler Inspection Act.7
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in speaking for the minority, concurred in that
part of the decision permitting a recovery for an occupational disease under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, but he agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court that occupational diseases cannot be fitted into the category of
"accidents" within the Boiler Inspection Act. He said: "I think I appreciate
the humane impulse which seeks to bring occupational diseases within such
a regime. But due regard for the limits of judicial interpretation precludes
such free-handed application of a statute to situations outside its language
and its purpose. To do so, moreover, is, I believe, a disservice to the humane
ends which are sought to be promoted. Legislation is needed which will effectively meet the social obligations which underlie the incidence of occupational disease.... The need for such legislation becomes obscured and the
drive for it retarded if encouragement is given to the thought that there
are now adequate remedies for occupational diseases in callings subject to
Congressional control. The result of the present decision is to secure for this
petitioner the judgment which the jury awarded him. It does not secure a
proper system for dealing with occupational diseases."
The case was originally brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. The Missouri Supreme Court, in the first appeal, 8 had affirmed the trial
court's ruling in sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, on the
7. Urie v. Thompson, 69 Sup. Ct. 1018 (1949).
8. Urie v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 211, 176 S.W. 2d 471 (1943), noted in 9 Mo.
L. REv. at 347 (1944).
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ground that the action could not be maintained by virtue of the Federal Employers' Liability Act alone, for the reason that the defendant could not have
anticipated plaintiff's injury, and therefore the petition did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act; that the claimed malfunctioning of the locomotives' sanders was
in substance an allegation of breach of Section 2 of the Boiler Inspection Act.
On remand, the petitioner amended his complaint to charge specific violations
of the Boiler Inspection Act. After judgment for the plaintiff in the trial
court, the case was again appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. The reversal of that judgment is the decision discussed above and which was taken
on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. In the United States Supreme Court the respondent contended that the sufficiency of the petitioner's
original claim for negligence involved in the first appeal was not properly
there, since it was neither raised nor considered on the second appeal to the
Missouri Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Rutledge pointed out that the Missouri Supreme Court on the first appeal had remanded the cause for trial,
not for dismissal, and the judgment, therefore, was not a final judgment and
precluded review by the United States Supreme Court at that time. Therefore, the petitioner did not waive that question by amending his complaint in
conformity with the court's mandate to state his claim more specifically under
the Boiler Inspection Act or by proceeding with trial on that theory, for
"as the case then stood, this was his only remaining chance for success unless
he was to waive it, ask for final judgment to be entered against him on the
general negligence issue, and rely solely upon securing review of that judgment and reversal by this Court." It was further said that "local rules of
practice cannot bar this Court's independent consideration of all substantial
federal questions actually determined in earlier stages of the litigation by the
court whose final adjudication is brought here for review. ... Accordingly,
even if it should be held that petitioner has stated no claim under the Boiler
Inspection Act, the judgment now in review cannot stand unless the Missouri
Supreme Court rightly. concluded, on the first appeal, that petitioner's original complaint stated no cause of action for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, considered apart from any effect of the Boiler Inspection Act."
An interesting application of well settled legal principles was made in
Hoops v. Thompson,9 in an action against a railroad for injuries sustained
9. 357 Mo. 1160, 212 S.W. 2d 730 (1948) (en banc), noted in 14 Mo. L REv.
209 (1949).
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when scalding steam was released by a locomotive as it was passing over a
railroad bridge. The plaintiffs were sitting on one of the piers of the bridge
about nine o'clock at night. The theory of the plaintiffs' case was that the
defendant owed a duty of lookout for persons using the bridge since it had
actual or constructive notice that people habitually used its track over the
bridge. The court found the evidence to be sufficient to require the railway
to keep a look-out for pedestrians crossing the bridge, but the proof of user
was not sufficient to require the employees of the railroad in operating trains
over the bridge to keep a look-out for persons sitting on the pier where the
plaintiff's were injured. To constitute constructive notice of such user, the
use must be open and constant over such period of time as to raise the
presumption that it is known to the employees of the railway. Only one
witness testified that he ever saw any one sitting on the pier. Others testified
that they had seen children on the pier, but how frequently they did not say.
The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed as no submissible case was
ihade because there -was no proof that the trainmen actually saw the respondents and there was no duty to look for trespassers sitting on the piers.10
*A: new question was raised in Graham v. Thompson?' as to whether
Section 5163 of the Missouri statutes, providing that a railroad lessor shall
remain liable for all acts and liabilities of lessee, enlarges the Federal Employers' Liability Act with respect to liability of a lessee railroad for injuries
to ali employee-of the lessor railroad. Under the federal Act a railroad common carrier while engaged in interstate commerce shall be liable in damages
to' any person suffering injury "while he is employed" by such carrier in such
commerce. The court held that the use of the quoted words is a full preemption by the federal government, and the federal Act does not apply to
oAe not the railroad's servant and employee; that an employee of a lessor railroad does not automatically become an "employee" of a lessee railroad under
th'e.f&deral Act, if and when injured by the lessee's sole and separate operatibns, notwithstanding the Missouri statute providing that a lessor railway
shall remain 'liable for all acts and liabilities of its lessee as if the lessor operated the road itself. The difficulty of the case is seen in the number of times
it was cnsidered"in the supreme court and also in the division of the members
of the court on its solution. Two dissenting judges entertained the views of
Division II where the case v~as first argued and submitted. After opinion in
10. A more complete analysis of the problem is found in 14 Mo. L. REv. 209
''
(1949)'
11. 357 Mo. 1133, 212 S.W. 2d 770 (1948) (en banc).
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that division, of the court's own motion, the case was transferred to the
court en banc. After reargument and resubmission there and after .opinion
in the court en banc a rehearing was granted. The case was again reargued
and resubmitted.12

12. Other cases involving the liability of railroads and other carriers. Piehler
v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 357 Mo. 866, 211 S.W. 2d 459 (1948), where the
issue was whether the 11 year old plaintiff was thrown out of the defendant's street
car in the manner claimed by him or whether he jumped out as claimed by the defendant. The plaintiff and two other boys who were 12 years of age were on: their
way to go horseback riding. As the street car approached the end of the line- the
three boys were the only passengers. At the end of the line the street car enters, a
loop which forms a perfect semicircle with a radius of 75 feet. It was a warm day
and the street car windows were open. As the street car approached the loop the
boys saw the station wagon which was to meet them going toward "the zoo." The
other two boys jumped out of the street car window and ran toward the station
wagon. The plaintiff went to the back of the car, got up on the long seat with his
right knee in the seat and his right hand on the window sill and began ringing-the
buzzer with his left hand. As the car went around the loop it picked up speed, threw
the rear end around, and the plaintiff was thrown head first out of the open window.
He caught and held onto a window sill until the car crossed a portion, of the loop
when he fell to the ground and the street car ran over his foot. Defendant claimed
that to be thrown by this movement of the car in the same direction the car was
moving was contrary to "natural law." The court said, in ruling on defendant's
appeal on the ground that the trial court should have sustained its motion for. a
directed verdict, that "notwithstanding the court's omniscience concerning 'natural
law,' it cannot be said that the described circumstances are so manifestly contrary
to some immutable law of physics that this court may summarily dispose of the
case upon this ground alone."
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Cave, 215 S.W. 2d 435 (Mo. 1948) (en bane), the
court held that a railroad was not negligent in blocking a public road crossing without providing warnings or signals, unless there were special circumstances which
made the crossing peculiarly hazardous and the burden was on the one seeking damages to prove such special circumstances. Here the plaintiff sustained injuries while
riding as a guest in an automobile when it collided with a boxcar standing on the
railroad crossing at night. The only evidence as to the especially hazardous circumstances was that the downward slope of the road toward the crossing naturally
caused the lights of the automobile to be deflected downward underneath the freight
car, and the dark color of the road and freight car made it difficult to discover the
obstruction. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the court distinguished the
facts of the case from one where the crossing was blocked by a flatcar with only
the narrow edge of the platform visible to persons coming along the street, where
the visibility was reduced by a light fog or mist, and where a boxcar on an adjoining
track obstructed the view. The court thought it incredible that the car lights would
shine under the freight car without also disclosing its presence on the crossing.
In Schonlau v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 357 Mo. 1108, 212 S.W. 2d 420
(1948), the action by a baggage handler in the union station was brought under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries allegedly caused in furnishing an unsafe
place to work due to the bumpy condition of the subbasement floor. The defendant
appealed from a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence of an unsafe place to work was not sufficient to support the verdict. Since the
evidence made a prima facie case of negligence, the, court held that under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in actions under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, an appellate may not weigh conflicting evidence and arrive at a
different conclusion.
Hill v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 216 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1948) (en bane),
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3. Automobiles
The automobile cases decided during the year under review, where liability'was predicated on primary negligence, did not raise questions of sufficient significance to be discussed at length. These cases are, however, noted
below ' s
was an action for injuries sustained by a switchman while attempting to board a
moving car from the bottom of a ditch adjacent to the track. Whether the switchman had a duty to enter the ditch area for the purpose of boarding a moving car, so
that the employer had a duty to exercise ordinary care to make the bottom of the,
ditch reasonably safe for such use, was under the evidence for the jury. The appellant-employer had contended that the master was not liable where the servant's use
of the instrumentality or place is for a purpose not intended or required by the
master. The switchman's attempt to board the moving car from the ditch was not
obviously so dangerous and foolhardy as a matter of law, so as to bar his recovery
on the theory that his action was the sole proximate cause of the injury, in view
of-the evidence with reference to the use of the ditch in this manner and the employer's knowledge of and acquiescence in such use.
13. In Ruby v. Clark, 357 Mo. 318, 208 S.W. 2d 251 (1948), the question
was whether a submissible case was made on circumstantial evidence where judgment was given for the defendant in the trial court on a motion for a directed
verdict. The action was for the death of plaintiff's son when struck by an automobile allegedly driven by the defendant as the deceased was walking along a highway
at night There were no witnesses present. The court found sufficient circumstantial evidence which would have supported a finding by a jury of liability to reverse
the judgment and remand the cause. Hamre v. Conger, 357 Mo. 497, 209 S.W. 2d
242 (1948), was an action to recover for injuries sustained in a collision between
an automobile driven by one of the defendants (son) and owned by the other
defendant (father) and a truck driven by plaintiff. The latter defendant counterclaimed for damage to the automobile and for loss of service and medical care for the
son, and the former defendant counterclaimed for injuries. Plaintiff's instructions
given by the trial court, requiring the defendant to use the highest degree of care
but requiring the plaintiff truck driver to exercise only ordinary care, were held to
be prejudicial to sustain the judgment of the trial court in granting the defendant
a new trial after verdict for the plaintiff, although in the defendant's instructions
on alleged contributory negligence and for counterclaim the highest degree of care
on the part of the plaintiff was required.. An instruction authorizing the jury to
consider circumstances of aggravation was held proper in Hertz v. McDowell, 214
S.W. 2d 546 (Mo. 1948) (en banw), where the mother-executrix, in suing for wrongful death of son resulting from being struck by defendant's motortruck at street
intersection, had alleged specific negligent acts of defendant performed recklessly
and with indifference to rights of deceased, and where the evidence indicated that
the truck approached the busy intersection at a speed of 20 to 30 miles an hour,
entered the intersection against a red traffic light, and that the driver did not sound
any warming or did not attempt to use the emergency brake. The decision also involves an effort by the defendant to instruct the jury to take into consideration the
life expectancy of the mother who was 90 years of age, and an effort to limit the
jury in computing damages to the amount of money which the deceased actually
contributed to the support and maintenance of the plaintiff during his life and the
amount he would have contributed to her support and maintenance had he lived.
In Prague v. Eddy, 214 S.W. 2d 521 (Mo. 1948) (en banc), in guest's action for
injuries sustained in an automobile collision when host attempted to turn automobile across highway in front of codefendant's approaching automobile, an instruction given for the plaintiff, after stating that if the jury found that the host's car
was turning across the highway while the codefendant's car was approaching, then
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4. Lessor-lessee relationship
In Roaclk v. Herz-Oakes Candy Co.,14 the action was for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's former husband, an experienced window washer, who
was killed as a result of falling from the fourth-story window of a building
belonging to the defendant Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co. The
defendant Candy Company was joined as party defendant as lessee of the
defendant Trust Company, on the theory that as lessee it was in occupancy
and control of the building. Motions for directed verdicts by both defendants
had been sustained by the trial court. The plaintiff had alleged in her petition that the window which the decedent was washing when he fell was in a
dangerous and defective condition; and that defendants were negligent in
permitting the window to become and be in such condition, in assuring

decedent the window was safe for washing, in suffering and permitting the
window washing when defendants knew or should have known the window
was in that condition, and in failing to warn. The decedent was the employee
of an independent contractor who had contracted to do the window cleaning
work for the candy company, and worked with materials supplied by his employer, the contractor. There was evidence by two carpenters, who worked
for a contractor (Morrison) employed by the lessor to remodel and improve

it was the duty of the codefendant "to exercise the highest degree of care to operate
his automobile in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed so as not to
endanger the life and limb of any person there, and particularly the plaintiff," was
misleading and unsupported by the evidence, in that the jury got the impression
that the codefendant was negligent if he was driving at a high rate of speed before
the host began to turn. Neither could an inference of high speed arise by.the extent
of damage to the two cars. In Browne v. Creek, 357 Mo. 976, 209 S.W. 2d 900
(1948), the evidence disclosed that the driver of a truck which had gone into a ditch
had induced a motorist to stop, and that the truck's lights blinded the driver of
an overtaking automobile which crashed into motorist's automobile parked on the
pavement and injured the occupant of the overtaking automobile. This sustained
the specific charge that the defendant had negligently parked the truck dose to the
highway with blinding lights and thereby proximately caused the collision. The fact
that there was no proof or submission of alleged negligent failure to warn or to
maintain a lookout, as also charged in the petition, becomes immaterial, since the
various specific charges of negligence were separately alleged and the pleading and
proof of one, the blinding lights, was sufficient. In Nichols v. Bresnahan, 357 Mo.
1126, 212 S.W. 2d 570 (1948), plaintiff's action was for personal injuries sustained
as a result of being struck by defendant's automobile. On appeal from a judgment
for the defendant, the plaintiff could not contend that there was gross negligence,
since the theory of her petition and of her case throughout the trial was not negligence but willful, wanton and reckless conduct. The trial court quite properly refused her instructions defining the highest degree of care, as such instructions would
have to apply to a theory of negligent conduct The court in its opinion sets forth
the difference between conduct which is negligent and conduct which is willful, wanton and reckless.
14. 357 Mo. 1236, 212 S.W. 2d 758 (1948), noted in 14 Mo. L. REv. 219 (1949).
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the building, that they were told by their employer to go to the fourth floor
"and fix a window that was loose up there ... one window, the top sash
of the window was hanging by the sash cord ... out of the frame." This contractor testified that his attention had been called to the fact by "a Mr. Herz."
The carpenters put the sash back in place and put some nails under it to
hold it in place. This was the window below which deceased's body was
found. The window had not been washed. One witness testified that the
window was not then nailed up and was just hanging there, but other witnesses testified that the window was then closed and that it had been nailed
up. The decedent was last seen alive washing windows on that floor. The
court held that there was no evidence tending to show the appearance of the
window prior to the casualty whereby it could be reasonably determined what
defect, if any existed, caused the window to come out of the frame. There
was no evidence that this window was latently rotten and it was not shown
there was a defect in the window which was not obvious to the decedent.
The only evidence tending to show that the window was in a defective condition was that after the casualty there were slivered-off portions of the sash
or of the side of the frame found on the window sill. No attempt was made
to further describe the apparent condition of the splinters or to otherwise describe the window, its frame and their condition. "The fact that pieces of the
sash or frame were slivered off after the casualty," said the court, "does not
have substantial probative force in tending to prove that the sash came out
of the frame because the sash or the frame was latently rotten and defective,
nor does it tend to prove in what respect, if any, the sash or frame was otherwise defective." Therefore, no knowledge of any defect in the window was
shown in the lessee. The court also held that there was no evidence that the
lessor had through its contractor negligently repaired the window or had done
any work in repairing the window from which the deceased fell, assuming
there was a hidden defect in the window at the time the lessee entered, nor,
that the lessor had notice or knowledge, actual or constructive, of the defect.15
Involved in the case was also the legal question, the proper solution of
which the courts in this country are not agreed, as to the duty owed by a contractee to an employee of an independent contractor to furnish reasonably
safe appliances and a reasonable safe place to work, analogous to that of an
employer. The court differentiated between instances where the contractee
15. For a more complete analysis of the liability of a lessor and of a lessee of
premises for injuries sustained by an invitee while on the premises, see note on the
prncipal case in 14 Mo, L. Rav. 219 (1949).
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had undertaken to furnish and has retained control of the place and of the
appliances in and with which the independent contractor is to perform his
contract. Under the circumstances of the instant case where the work was
executed by methods and in a manner of a special type of work, where the
appliances and materials were supplied by the contractor, and where the work
was not that in which the Candy Company (the contractee) was engaged or
in which its officers had any special knowledge or experience or supervisory
skill, the court did not think the contractee should have the full responsibility
of an employer. Under these circumstances the court held that the decedent
was an invitee to whom the Candy Company would be liable for injury
"'occasioned by any unsafe condition of the premises encountered in the
work, which was known to it but unknown to him; but was not liable for
injuries resulting from conditions obviously dangerous and known by the
deceased to be so.' ,,16
5. Municipal corporations
Dowell v. City of Hannibal7 was an action for the wrongful death of
plaintiff's husband when his truck went out of control, as he was driving east
on a block long city street with a 10 per cent downgrade, and he was unable
successfully to make the turn on to the north-south street at the dead end.
The truck went over the east side of the north-south street at a point about
15 or 20 feet south of the point where the street from the west joined, and
down a steep incline until the truck struck a tree where the deceased sustained fatal injuries. The negligence alleged by the plaintiff was the failure
of the city to erect a barrier along this north-south street and covering the
point where the truck went over the side. The city had erected a barrier on
the east side of the north-south street opposite to the dead-end street joining
from the west to protect vehicle traffic coming down the 10 per cent grade
on that street. The judgment for the plaintiff in the trial court, which was
affirmed by the St. Louis Court of 'Appeals but certified to the supreme court
on the dissent of one of the judges, was reversed on the ground that the city
was not negligent because it had erected a barrier on the east side of the
street only at a place opposite the point where the dead-end street with a 10
per cent incline entered, although the declivity extended both north and
south of the barrier. The duty of a city to exercise ordinary care to maintain
its streets in a reasonably safe condition did not extend to unusual and ex16. The court cited the annotation on the problem in 44 A.L.R. 932, at 938-944
(1926).
17. 357 Mo. 525, 210 S.W. 2d 4 (1948).
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traordinary occurrences such as that in the instant case. The court distinguished this case from those where the plaintiff receives injuries from declivities or other dangerous defects close to a street, because of failure to erect
barriers or to take other reasonable precautions, so as to render the street
itself unsafe to a traveler as a result of an accidental misstep. Here the deceased did not suffer from any casual or ordinary deviation from the roadway,
nor was there any danger of his doing so.
In Hinds v. City of Hannibal,"" the action against the city was for personal injuries predicated on an alleged assault by a policeman on the plaintiff
while the plaintiff was in jail. In addition to other allegations, the petition
alleged that the defendant had retained this officer in its employ in its police
department "with full knowledge of his many various, vicious, malicious,
willful, deadly and felonious assaults upon people in Hannibal"; that previous
specified assaults were known to the defendant "or by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care could and should have been known"; and that his acts
"were extremely dangerous to the safety of the life and limb of the people
of and in the City of Hannibal, and was such an open and notorious menace
to the public generally as to constitute a nuisance." It further alleged "that
the defendant, by its wrongful, reckless, careless and negligent failure, neglect
and refusal to prevent the vicious, malicious, willful, deadly and felonious
assaults upon the people of and in the City of Hannibal by its servant and
agent ... or to otherwise abate the nuisance created, did thereby ratify, encourage, condone and approve the vicious, malicious, willful, deadly and
felonious assaults upon the people in and of the City of Hannibal and encourage their commission by the said ...

defendant's agent and servant." The

plaintiff's theory was that his petition stated a cause of action for having
and maintaining a nuisance, and for failure to abate the nuisance. The court,
however, held that the plaintiff's case was based on negligence since tort liability under the incompetent servant rule was a part of the law of negligence.
Negligence and nuisance were distinguished in that " 'negligence' is the failure
to exercise the degree of care required by the circumstances," while "'nuisance' does not rest on the degree of care used, but on the degree of danger
existing with the best of care," and "that creating or maintaining a nuisance
is the violation of 'the absolute duty of refraining from the participating acts,
not merely the relative duty of exercising reasonable care, foresight, and
prudence in their performance.'" Here the duty of the city in its govern18. 212 S.W. 2d 401 (Mo. 1948).
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mental function of maintainihg a police force was a duty of care in the selection and retention of police officers, and "not 'the absolute duty of refraining
from participation' in their selection and retention." Thus the rule of immunity from tort liability for the acts of public officers in the exercise of
governmental functions was applicable in sustaining the trial court in dismissing the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff to any relief.
6. Employer-employee relationship
The borrowed servant problem was presented in Wills v. Belger,'9 in an
action by an injured employee of the borrowing employer against the general
employer of a borrowed truck driver for injuries sustained as the result of
alleged negligence of the driver while the plaintiff and the borrowed truck
driver were delivering groceries for the borrowing employer, the Morgan
Grocery Company. Under Missouri decisions, where one is in the general
service of another yet, with respect to particular work, may be the servant
of another, "to escape liability the original master must resign full control
of the servant for the time being, it not being sufficient that the servant is
partially under the control of a third person." It thus becomes "necessary
to distinguish between authoritative direction and control and mere suggestions as to details or the necessary co-operation where the work furnished is
part of a larger operation. A servant of one employer does not become the
servant of another for whom the work is performed merely because the latter
points out the work to the servant, or gives him signals calling the service
into activity." On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, the original employer
contended that the driver of the truck, at the time of the occurrence, was not
engaged in the defendant's business and subject to his direction and control,
but was under the direction and control of the borrowing employer, the Morgan Grocery Company, and engaged in the work of that company, and that
the trial court should have directed a verdict for the appellant. The evidence
showed that the general employer was engaged in the transfer, hauling and
cartage business; that he owned the trucks and hired, fired and paid the
drivers; that the driver involved in this accident was in his general employment as a truck driver; that this driver reported to the office of the general
employer each morning and each evening; that he checked in and checked
out and placed the truck in the general employer's garage each night; that
each morning the general employer told this driver where to go; that when
19. 357 Mo. 1177, 212 S.W. 2d 736 (1948).
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he had sent this driver to the Morgan Grocery Company on the day of the
accident the general employer knew the type and kind of work he would do
after he got there, to-wit, that groceries would be hauled and delivered to
Morgan's customers; that when the day was over or the work finished the
driver would report to the general employer's office; that the general employer at all times furnished gasoline, oil, repairs and road service; that the general employer was "subject to cargo loss" and carried "drivers insurance";
and that the general employer kept the time sheets and collected an agreed
hourly rate for the time "put in" at Morgan's. The court in this well considered case held the evidence sufficient for the jury to infer and find that
the driver was engaged in the discharge of the appellant's business in the
hauling and delivery of the merchandise for hire, that the driver was acting
within the scope and course of his employment as a truck driver for the
appellant, and that the appellant had not resigned and the Morgan Grocery
Company had not taken full and complete supervision and direction of the
driver in the driving and the operation of the truck at the time of the accident.
Whether the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant or whether he
was an independent contractor was the principal issue in Benham v. McCoy.20
The action was for injuries allegedly received while cutting a wire on the defendant's premises which was alleged to contain electric current. The defendant's evidence tended to show that he was not a carpenter but was in
the plumbing and heating business. Wanting to add two rooms to his house
and make other alterations, he got in touch with the plaintiff, who had been
the foreman in charge of the building of a warehouse for the defendant several years before, and told him what he wanted. They planned the changes
and proposed improvements together, and the plaintiff put into sketch form
and informed the defendant how the rooms would look when the work was
completed. There was evidence that the plaintiff employed two helpers, outlined and directed their work; that the plaintiff worked according to his own
choice of hours and days; that defendant was to buy and pay for the materials, pay plaintiff's helpers and pay plaintiff by the hour; that plaintiff
made up a list of the materials for the defendant to buy; and that the defendant was in other towns during the time most of the work was done, coming home weekends. The plaintiff's evidence was that he had been a carpenter
and cabinet maker for 46 years; that he did not have a contract with the
20. 213 S.W. 2d 914 (Mo. 1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1

72

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1948
1949]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1948

399

defendant; that it was just day work; that he was paid each weekend for the
number of hours worked during the week; that the defendant told him approximately what he wanted done; that defendant furnished the material and
the plaintiff made out the lumber bills; that he did the work according to what
defendant told him; that the defendant gave the instructions and plaintiff
tried to follow them; that plaintiff had done very little contracting; that as
long as he was not discharged, he was in charge of getting the house up the
way the defendant had told him; that he had picked up a man or two to help;
that defendant had a pencil sketch and had told him what he wanted done;
that defendant was gone practically all the time, but the plaintiff went ahead
and did it as nearly as he could; that he worked such hours as he saw fit;
and that he followed defendant's instructions on what he wanted accomplished. There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff outlined and
assigned the work to his helpers who worked under his supervision. In affirming a judgment for the defendant, this evidence was held by the court to
establish that the plaintiff was an independent contractor. The fact that
there was no evidence of any contract to do a fixed piece of work for a fixed
price was held not decisive of the question whether one was doing the work
as an employee or as an independent contractor.
B. Res ipsa loquitur
Whether in a res ipsa loquitur case the plaintiff has alleged general negligence or specific negligence was presented in two cases. In State ex rel. Spears
v. McCaUlen, 21 it was held that an allegation of the petition that plaintiff's
automobile was violently struck in the rear by the defendant's street car,
which was being operated by the defendant's employee in a negligent manner,
was not an allegation of general negligence, but was an allegation of specific
negligence. The court said that the specific thing charged is the negligent
operation of the street car by a specific person, in that the street car operator
was negligent in violently driving the front end of the street car into the rear
end of plaintiff's automobile. "The charge is specific in alleging who did it,
what was done, the manner in which it was done, the general situation and
where it was done." Therefore, an instruction submitting the case on this
theory was complete within itself and did not require submission on other
acts of specific negligence alleged. If this part of the plaintiff's petition had
charged general negligence only and allegations of specific negligence were

21.

357 Mo. 686, 210 S.W. 2d 68 (1948) (en bane).
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alleged in a subsequent paragraph of the petition, the plaintiff would have
had to recover, if at all, on the specific negligence alleged.
To be compared with this case is that of Welch v. Thompson.22 There
the petition alleged that a suitcase fell on the plaintiff from a baggage rack
while she was riding as passenger in defendant's railroad coach, and that the
injuries sued for were directly caused by the defendant's negligence in the
maintenance, management, control, and operations of the roadbed, track,
train, and rack. This was held sufficient to allege general negligence though
insufficiently stating ares ipsa loquitur case, but evidence of an extraordinarily violent lurch of the passenger coach almost coincidental with the falling
of the suitcase was sufficient to take the plaintiff's case to the jury under the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The defendant contended that evidence of the
violent movement of the coach was evidence of specific negligence and, consequently, the submission as a res ipsa loquitur case was erroneous. The
court said that "the extraordinarily violent lurch 'speaks' of some kind of
negligence, but does not 'spell out' the specific fault." (italics the court's.)
Where the plaintiff introduces evidence tending to show specifically the
cause of the accident, the benefits of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will not be
lost if by the plaintiff's evidence the cause is still left in doubt or is not clearly
shown. In Mueller v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,28 the plaintiff was injured
when alighting from the defendant's bus. The bus had been stopped at a
regular down town stop, and the exit door opened for the discharge of passengers. Plaintiff testified that as she placed her left foot on the sidewalk
and started to draw her right foot out of the exit door, the door closed
and caught her leg and foot; that the bus immediately thereafter started up,
and she swung around and grabbed hold of a window. She was carried on the
outside of the bus in this position for a considerable distance before the bus
was brought to a stop and her release effected. While she testified that the
bus driver closed the door and started the bus, it further appeared from her
testimony that she did not see, and was in no position to see, the bus driver
or the controls just prior to and at the time the door closed, nor to know
what, if anything, he did in connection with closing the door and starting up.
There were other passengers on the crowded bus who were standing in the
aisle between the plaintiff and the driver. The court said it was apparent
that her statement as to the acts of the bus driver constituted nothing more
22. 357 Mo. 703, 210 S.W. 2d 79 (1948).
23. 214 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1

74

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1948

19491

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1948

401

than her conclusions, and that there was no showing of the precise cause as
to deprive her of the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
To the same effect is the holding in Belding v. St. Louis Public Service
Co.,24 where plaintiff sought to recover under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
for injuries sustained when the bus on which she was riding suddenly jerked
and jolted in an unusual and extraordinary manner, causing her to be thrown
to the floor. At the time of the accident she was attempting to make her
way through the crowded aisle to the exit door, and was facing toward the
rear of the bus. In her testimony she stated that there was a sudden application of the brakes at the time of the "jarring and a jerking," that she heard
a "squeaky noise" from the brakes as when a driver of a car attempts to stop
quickly, and that "when they put on the brakes the jarring threw me to the
floor." Another witness who was standing immediately behind the bus driver
facing west (the bus was "northbound") testified that the bus was going
along at a fairly good speed and that she heard brakes and felt them. From
this evidence the defendant, on appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, contended that the plaintiff demonstrated specific cause of the happening by
clearly and definitely ascribing it to the application of the brakes, thus
waiving the right to have her case submitted upon the theory of res ipsa
loquitur. The court pointed out that in relying on that doctrine it is not
enough for the plaintiff merely to show "that she had been injured while a
passenger on the bus, but in order to establish a basis for an inference of
negligence on defendant's part, it was essential that she show what 'occasioned or legally caused the injury', and that such unusual occurrence, whatever it may have been, was something related to defendant and under its
management and control." Thus she sought to ascribe the occurrence to the
application of the brakes as generally explanatory of the jarring and jerking
of the bus which was the basis of the case of res ipsa loquitur. However, held
the court, she did not go so far as to show any specific act of negligence on
the part of the bus driver with respect to the function and application of the
brakes; "she did not attempt to show any mechanical defect in the brakes,
or an improper maintenance of air pressure, or an improperly applied pressure on the brakes," and thus the true cause was still left in doubt or was not
clearly shown. The court distinguished this from a similar type of accident
where the plaintiff's daughter testified that she was familiar with the feel of
the street car as brakes were being applied and that on the particular occa24. 215 S.W. 2d 506 (Mo. 1948) (en banc).
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sion "the brakes were suddenly jammed on." This was held in that case to
have made a case of specific negligence, but no one testified in the instant
case to any such familiarity with the "feel" of the brakes. Furthermore, the
stop in the earlier case was at a regular stopping point for the discharge of
passengers, the court pointing out that "it is obvious that a sudden, violent,
and unusual stop at a regular stopping point tends to a far greater degree
to show specific negligence of its own force than does proof of a similar stop
between regular stopping points, which might be explained as the product of
the exercise of care in an attempt to avoid collision with another vehicle."
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held applicable in Cruce v. Gulf,
Mobile & Okio R. R., 25 where the plaintiff, a foreman at a coal chute in the
defendant railway company's yard, brought the action for injuries sustained
when, as he pulled on a rope to lower the pan over the tender of an engine
preparatory to coaling, a cable on the chute broke, permitting the pan of the
chute to fall upon him. At plaintiff's request the court gave the following
instruction: "The Court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from
the evidence that it was not the duty of the plaintiff, Hugh Cruce, to inspect,
maintain, repair or replace the counter-weight cables mentioned in evidence
and that defendant had the exclusive management and control of said cables,
then you are further instructed that it was the duty of the defendant to
furnish and maintain said cables in a reasonably safe condition for plaintiff
to use, and if you also find and believe from the evidence that the breaking
of such cable usually and ordinarily occurs only as the result of negligence,
then your verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant." On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the court held that
this instruction was deficient so as to be prejudicially erroneous in that it did
not require a finding of negligence. It only required a finding of facts which
would justify an inference of negligence but would not necessarily compel
such an inference. The instruction should have required a finding that plaintiff was in fact injured as the result of negligence. The court contrasted this
instruction with one which requires a finding of facts which are equivalent
to a finding of negligence, in which situation a finding of negligence is not
necessary.
C. Defenses in newgligence cases
v.
Tlhompsoni0
was an action for wrongful death as the result of
Doyel
an automobile-train crossing collision. On the defendant's contention that
25. 216 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo. 1948).
26. 357 Mo. 963, 211 S.W. 2d 704 (1948).
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plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he failed
to have his automobile under control and to stop, look, and listen at a time
and place where he would have avoided the collision, it was held that the
deceased had discharged his duty by stopping, looking, and listening for an
approaching train at a reasonable place for that purpose. Obstructions to the
plaintiff's view along the track and in the direction of the approaching train,
beginning at a point approximately 24 feet from the crossing and consisting
of stock pens, oil storage tanks and railroad cars standing on a switch track,
made it so that no one could spe along the track until his line of vision had
cleared the nearest box car on the switch track. The car in which the deceased was riding had stopped 6 to 9 feet from the nearest rail of the switch
track, which was the first of three tracks, as he approached the crossing, and
a window in the car ;door was put down by the driver of the car that he
might listen. Having heard no bell or whistle and not having seen anything
that indicated a train was approaching, the driver rolled up the glass in the
door, put the car in low gear and started across the track. The court held
the fact that the plaintiff did not stop, look, and listen the second time, or
did not get out of his coupe and go forward to reconnoiter prior to his actual
discovery of the approaching train, did not constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, the plaintiff being entitled to assume that if a train
were approaching he would have heard the statutory warning. The evidence
showed that warning signals would have been effectually audible if given.
As to the contention by the defendant that the plaintiff was chargeable with
seeing the rays of the locomotive headlight as he approached this crossing,
the court found that the evidence did not establish that the locomotive headlight was on bright, dimmers being required as equipment on road locomotives by the Interstate Commerce Commission to diminish the light in yards,
at stations or when meeting trains.
In Mullis v. Tompson, 7 the evidence showed that defendant's train was
moving 45 to 55 miles per hour where the city ordinance limited speed to 35
miles per hour, that no whistle was sounded and no bell was ringing, one of
which was required by city ordinance, that the plaintiff motorist slowed to
five miles per hour, approached to 20 or 25 feet from the main line track,
looked both ways, heard no whistle or bell, looked at the "flasher" device
maintained by the railroad, which displayed no lights or warning flashes,
and that the plaintiff motorist without again looking proceeded to cross,
27. 213 S.W. 2d 941 (Mo. 1948).
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although not having a complete view down the main track in the direction of
the approaching train, and was struck by the train coming from his left. On
this evidence the contributory negligence of the motorist was held to have
been properly left to the jury as against the defendant's contention, on appeal
from a verdict for the plaintiff, that he was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. The court pointed out that the flasher signal device was there
and in part demanding and engaging the plaintiff's attention, and that while
"it is not to be said that one in approaching a crossing in the exercise of due
care (the highest degree of care in our case) should rely solely upon a signal
device-he should use his own senses-yet the flasher signal device, if unlit,
was implicit assurance that the crossing could be made in safety."
In the defense of contributory negligence it is only necessary that the
defendant show that the negligence of the injured person was one of the
concurring causes of the injury in order to defeat recovery, but where the
defense of sole cause is used the defendant's negligence must be totally excluded as one of the contributing factors producing the injury. It must show
as a matter of law that the accident and injury resulted solely from the
negligence of the plaintiff or third person, without any concurrence of
defendant's negligence directly contributing thereto. In Reynolds v. Thompson,2 8 parents brought the action for compensatory damages for the death of

their six year old child in a grade crossing collision between defendant's train
and an automobile being driven by the mother and in which the child was
riding. At the street crossing there was an unobstructed view for a distance
of more than 200 feet so that there was nothing to prevent the mother from
seeing the train. The automobile collided with the side of the train not any
further back than the second coach. There was evidence by several witnesses that the statutory crossing signals by whistle or bell were not given
and there was no evidence that the signals were given. The trial court gave
a sole cause instruction. The trial court's order, in setting aside the verdict
for the defendant and in granting a new trial for error in giving the sole cause
instruction, was affirmed since, under the evidence, it would have been
reasonable for the jury to have inferred that, had the statutory signals been
sounded as required, the mother would have heard and acted to prevent the
collision and, therefore, the failure to give the required signals was a direct
and contributing cause of the collision and death of the child. The court
applied again the Missouri rule that the negligence of one spouse is no bar
28. 215 S.W. 2d 452 (Mo. 1948).
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to a recovery by the husband and wife for the death of their minor child
against a negligent defendant, no joint enterprise or agency between husband
and wife having been shown. In the earlier Missouri decisions- establishing
this rule the cause of action was brought under the penalty section rather
than under the compensatory section as in the instant case, but the-court,
while observing this difference, held that "the cause, of action in the parents
in the present case is likewise joint and indivisible until merged- into judgment."29
29. In Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 357 Mo. 998, 211 S.W. 2d 931,
(1948), on evidence that the plaintiff motorist stopped, looked, and listened, but
did not hear or see the approach of the defendant's train, that he then started
forward, but on observing the train he immediately applied the brakes but the-automobile skidded because of ice and snow and was struck by the train, whether railroad's failure to give the statutory signals was the proximate- cause of the collision
and whether the motorist was contributorily negligent were for the jury. The defendant had contended that even though it admittedly played a part in causing
the injury in failing to give the statutory signals, its negligence was a remote proximate cause and that the ice and snow was a direct intervening proximate cause. A
more interesting legal problem in the case arose out of the action by the wife, for and
on behalf of their five minor children, brought under both the penal. and! the compensatory sections of the wrongful death statute. The trial court had instructed- the
jury that it could return a verdict for the plaintiff on both counts. The jury returned
a verdict for $5,000 on the count based on the penalty section and for $10,000 orr the
count based on the compensatory section. The court held, that a plaintiff must make
a choice before final submission and elect which of the two damages she would-have
the jury assess as there can be but a single recovery under but one sectior of. the,
wrongful death statute. Reeves v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 847, 211 S.W. 2d 23 (1948),
was an action by a pedestrian against a railroad for injuries sustained when he-was
struck at night on a public crossing by defendant's train. The appeali by,the defendant from a judgment for the plaintiff turned on whether plaintiff Was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in not seeing the train. There was conflicting
evidence as to whether or not he was negligent in failing to observe the presence,
of defendant's slowly moving train in the dark under conditions suggesting that no
headlights were burning, and it was held to have been properly left to -the jury,
In Rembusch v. Prebe, 215 S.W. 2d 433 (Mo. 1948), the case was submitted on
primary negligence. The trial court gave the defendant's requested'instruction which
required the jury to find sole cause on the part of the plaintiff. From a,judgment
for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the sole cause instruction omitted the "not due to any negligence on the part of the defendant" finding.
The court pointed out that since contributory negligence could have been. a.defense
to the action submitted on primary negligence alone, counsel for the defendant was
assuming an additional burden arising from giving a sole cause instruction, The
court distinguished this situation from a humanitarian submission, or. where the
plaintiff is a guest, or in any case where contributory negligence cannot be charged
against the plaintiff and therefore cannot be a defense. More is requiredz in- a,s1L-cause instruction in the latter. In those cases to avoid confusing the jury, it is required that a "not due to the negligence of the defendant" provision be embodied
in the sole cause instruction. Since contributory negligence (as welb as sole. cause.
negligence of some one other than the defendant) can be a, defense to an. action
based on primary negligence the court said that no sound reason exists. to require
a sole cause instruction in. terms to include a "not due to- the negligence of the- defendant" clause. Dennis v. Wood, 357 Mo. 886, 211 S.W. 2d 470 (1948); invoved
two questions: whether plaintiff was a fare-paying passenger in an automobife or
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II. TRESPASS

In Keready v. Uriom ElectricCo,

0

the action was for damages resulting

from the flooding of plaintiff's building. The action was in tort in the nature
of trespass, on the theory that impounding waters by the defendant's dam
at Bagnell across the Osage River, creating the Lake of the Ozarks, caused
great silt deposits in the Osage River and its tributaries at the head of the
lake, thus raising the beds of the streams, retarding their flow and resulting
in an overflow high enough to flood plaintiff's building. The particular flood
was eight feet higher at the place of the injury than any previous flood and,
befoie the dam was built, there had never been an overflow high enough to
touch any part of the plaintiff's building. The court found that the height
of the water, being so far above the highest previous floods, must have been
due entirely either to unprecedented rains or to the conditions created by
the defendant's dam and lake or to a combination of both, so as to make a
jury case at least on the latter theory. The evidence was found ample of
great enough deposits of silt to show a raising of the beds of the Osage and
its tributary streams in the upper part of the lake, and that this would raise
the ivater level in these streams, retard the velocity of the water, and cause
it to spread out and overflow, for the jury to infer that the excess over previous floods was due to the silting and other conditions caused by the plaintiff's dam and that plaintiff's damage would not have occurred except for
uch conditions created by the defendant.
One of the principal contentions of the defendant, in its appeal from
a .judgment for the plaintiff which had been affirmed by the Kansas City
•Cofirt of Appeals and transferred on defendant's motion to the supreme
court "because of the general interest in, and importance of, the issues involved," was that in any event it was only liable for the amount of damage
caused by its acts, and, if part of the damage was due to conditions caused
b 'its dam and part by an act of God, plaintiff must prove what proportion
was caused by it to recover anything. On rehearing, the court en banc
recognized that "where part of flood damage would have been caused by an
anticipatable overflow, without any obstruction, one who obstructed the
stream would not be liable for such part but only for the additional damages
a guest-under a Kansas statute which requires a showing of gross and wanton negligence to recover from the operator or owner of a motor vehicle for injuries received;
and whether plaintiff as a fare-paying passenger was contributorily negligent in that
she Was cognizant of developing danger under the evidence and failed to warn the
-driver thereof.
30. 216 S.W. 2d 756 .(Mo.1948) (en banc).
--.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1

80

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1948

1949]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1948

407

caused by his obstructions," but "in this case no anticipatable flood would
have touched plaintiff's building....

Therefore," held the court, "if de-

fendant's obstruction caused the excess, . . . then defendant's act caused
all the damage in this case," and the apportionment rule contended for. by
the defendants did not apply.s1
III. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The question in Snider v. Wimberly' 2 was whether one, who merely states
to a police officer what he knows of a supposed offense and expresses an opinion that the plaintiff was the one who had committed the offense, and an
arrest was made only after investigation by the officers, has made himself
a party to the arrest so as to be charged with false imprisonment. The defendant stopped at his place of business late at night and discovered a man
in his office who rushed at him, struck him and escaped by going down 6
elevator and out a basement window. The defendant called the Kansas City
police and his business associate. At the time the defendant discovered the
prowler, the only light in the office and vestibule was from street lights and
a neon sign which, he said, made it too dark for him to identify the man.
Officers of the burglary bureau took charge of the case. It seemed apparent
from the course taken by the prowler to escape that he was some one familiar
with the premises. There had been previous thefts which had been reported
to the police. The names of several employees or former employees were suggested who might answer defendant's description of the man he saw, as to
height, size and appearance. The name of the plaintiff, a former employee,
was one of those suggested. Later that night, at the request of the police
sergeant in charge of the case, a State Highway patrolman went to plaintiff's
apartment and made an investigation of the plaintiff. The next night the
patrolman went back and asked the plaintiff to accompany him to North
Kansas City where he was arrested by the Kansas City police and kept in
jail until late the next night, about 24 hours. Before being released, plaintiff
gave information about a former employee which resulted in the conviction
of that employee for the thefts. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant contended that this evidence did not show that he caused
or instigated the plaintiff's arrest. The court, in reversing the judgment, held
that "one who merely states to an officer what he knows of a supposed offense,
even though he expresses the opinion that there is ground for an arrest, 'but
31. For a further analysis of the problem see 4 Mo. L. Ruv. 83 (1939).

32. 357 Mo. 491, 209 S.W. 2d 239 (1948), noted in 14 Mo. L. REv. 217 (1949).
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-without making any charge, or requesting an arrest, does not thereby make
himself liable in an action for illegal arrest.'" One is liable for a false arrest,
cot made by him or in his .presence, if he directed, advised, countenanced,
encouraged, or instigated it, but this requires something more than only
furnishing wrong information. Here the defendant only said that he thought
the plaintiff was the prowler, and in so stating he did not actually make a
charge of any offense against the plaintiff or in any way tell the police what
to do in the matter. It was merely information calling for the investigation
by the police, and the decision to make the arrest by the police was the result
of their own investigation. 33

IV.

DEFAMATION

4

In -Childersv. -liesselroad,"one of the defendants had received an anonymous letter through the mail accusing the defendant, who was a deacon of a
church, and other deacons of being thieves and adulterers. The petition
alleged that at a church meeting the defendants published "of and concerning plaintiff a written statement containing the false and libelous language
that, due to certain statements attributed to Bro. Childers made by various
members of the church to the pastor and the board, and on account of disturbance caused by printing and circulating anonymous statements tending
to confusion among the membership, the Board of Deacons recommended
that a charge of uncooperativeness and promotion of factions be made against
the brother and member Ira Childers.... ." The plaintiff pleaded the innuendo-that plaintiff was the author of and responsible for the circulation of the
anonymous letter. The petition was held not to state a cause of action, for
nowhere in the petition did the plaintiff allege that any person who heard or
read the statement had any knowledge of the libelous, anonymous letter. He
did not plead that the anonymous letter had been circulated or its contents
made known at the meeting in connection with the circulation and publication of the statement. The statement made at the meeting did not charge
plaintiff with a crime, directly or indirectly, for it did not disclose the contents of the anonymous letter or, in fact, refer to any letter. The statement
made at the meeting in itself was not libelous. To make it so the persons
among. whom it was circulated must have had knowledge of the anonymous
letter and of the contents of that letter, under such circumstances that the
33. For other decisions decided during the year involving aspects of the tort of
false imprisonment, see Royal v. Thompson, 212 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. 1948), and Calloway v. Fogel, 213 S.W. 2d 405 (Mo. 1948).
34. 357 Mo. 1218, 212 S.W. 2d 727 (1948).
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readers would understand that the plaintiff was being accused of being the
author of the anonymous letter. Such extrinsic facts were necessary to make
the alleged statement libelous and the plaintiff should have stated them in
his petition.
The plaintiff, inJacobs v. Transcontinentaland Western Air, Inc.,"5 had
recovered both actual and punitive damages in an action for libel alleged to
have been contained in a letter of dismissal sent as interoffice correspondence
to two employees of T.W.A., a copy of which was also sent to an association
of airline mechanics which plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to join.
The reasons given in the letter of dismissal were stated as follows: "This
action was taken after considering and investigating reports of Maintenance
Department Supervisory Personnel to the effect that you have, during your
working hours, been neglecting your assigned duties and causing a loss of
efficiency on the part of the other employees by unnecessarily loitering in the
hallway and in the hangar. We regret that it has been necessary to take this
action but it is necessary that all T.W.A. employees attend to their assigned
duties in a spirit of willingness and cooperation." In charging him with
neglecting his duties, causing loss of efficiency by the other employees, and
failing to cooperate, plaintiff asserted as his ground for recovery the words in
this "letter were libelous and in defamation of plaintiff's skill, capacity and
fitness to perform and discharge his duties as polisher and that said language
directly tended to prejudice plaintiff in his trade, business and employment
by imputing to him a want of knowledge, skill, capacity and fitness to perform and discharge his duties of his job and were therefore actionable per se."
The court, in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff which had been affirmed
by the Kansas City Court of Appeals but was transferred to the supreme
court because its decision conflicted with a ruling by the Springfield Court
of Appeals, held that the words did not impute to him a want of knowledge,
skill, capacity, or fitness to perform or discharge the duties of an airplane
polisher or mechanic which he claimed as his trade. "The letter," said the
court, "did not touch on plaintiff's qualifications or ability to perform his
work. In fact it made no reference of any kind to the character or quality
of the work performed by him. The charge was that plaintiff had been
neglecting his duties which meant in this case that he was not devoting his
full time to them. This does not disparage plaintiff's ability and skill to perform his work when he devoted his time to it, particularly since the letter
35. 216 S.W. 2d 523 (Mo. 1948).
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goes on to explain the very way he was neglecting his duties." The court
also held that the constitutional provision, which states that "in suits and
prosecutions for libel the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts," did not in any way affect the power of the
court to decide as a matter of law that the statement claimed to be libelous
was not capable of a defamatory meaning. Therefore, the trial court should
have directed a verdict for the defendant.

V. FRAiU

AND DECEIT

The plaintiff's petition, in Messina v. Greubel,36 alleged in substance that
the defendants were officers and directors of an insolvent corporation; that
plaintiff was an employee of the company, but had no information of its
affairs except as furnished him by the defendants; that one of the defendants,
owner of nearly all of the stock of the company, with intent to deceive and
defraud the plaintiff represented to the plaintiff that the building occupied
by the company was free and clear of liens, that the company needed money
for working capital only, that the company had $10,000 due it from the United
States and that the company was in good financial condition. The petition
further alleged that the other defendant joining in misrepresenting the financial condition of the company; that plaintiff, relying upon the representations
so made, was induced to invest $18,000 in the capital stock and lend the
company $8,000 in the months of January, February and March, 1946; that
on March 29, 1946, the company filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
and plaintiff's investments became a total loss. The plaintiff had judgment
in the trial court. On appeal the defendants contended that the plaintiff had
no right to rely upon the representations, since the plaintiff by an investigation could have ascertained the true financial condition of the corporation.
The court held that the knowledge and means of knowledge of the affairs
of the company were vastly superior to that possessed by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was a mechanic and had never owned or operated a business. "He
was an employee of defendants and had a right to suspect them of some
degree of honesty." It was recognized that plaintiff could have learned something by an investigation, he could have employed an abstractor to search
the records to learn if there were liens on the real estate and part of the
equipment which defendants falsely represented to be unencumbered, he
could have employed an auditor to check the books and to discover that the
company owed bills amounting to many thousands of dollars and that, in36. 215 S.W. 2d 456 (Mo. 1948).
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stead of $10,000 being due from the United States, a balance of more than
half that amount was due by the company to the government. The plaintiff
was held to have had a right to rely upon these representations which were
not so palpably false as to be disbelieved by a person of ordinary intelli7

gence.1

VT. DuREss
In two decisions the tort of duress was considered. While the court did
not find duress to exist in either case, it recognizes the gradual expansion of
the doctrine over its original limitations, and that "as a general rule in this
country 'the payment of money or the making of a contract may be under
such circumstances of business necessity or compulsion as will render the
same involuntary and entitle the party so coerced to recover the money paid,
or excuse him from performing the contract."' However, threats do not
constitute actionable duress unless they are wrongful, even though they exert
such pressure as to preclude the exercise of free judgment. For a banker, in
an effort to collect an outstanding loan made to the plaintiff and a business
associate, the note being payable on demand and secured by collateral which
the bank was authorized to sell upon the maturity of the indebtedness, to
tell the plaintiff that if he did not bring the money to pay off the loan made
by the bank by a certain time they would sell the collateral for any price
they could get, and "if it is not in here you are going to be paying deficiencies
for the rest of your life on this deal," were held by way of dictum, in
Steinger v. SMitl,3 8 not to be such threats as to constitute duress.

In Weisert v.Bramman,89 a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed in
an action for damages for the value of bonds which the plaintiff alleged had
been obtained from her by the duress of a stepdaughter and her husband, by
inducing the plaintiff to surrender the bonds in compromising her claims under an ante-nuptial contract. The evidence for the plaintiff showed that
there was a reasonable basis for the threat of legal proceeding by the defendants on the ground that plaintiff's possession of the bonds were the result
of undue influence over her husband (and father of one of the defendants),
and that thereafter plaintiff consummated a compromise agreement with
advice of counsel, accepted benefits thereof, and did not claim duress for five
37. Other decisions during the year under review involving aspects of fraud and
deceit are Steinger v. Smith, 213 S.W. 2d 396 (Mo. 1948) (no misrepresentation of
law or fact), and Durham v. Bill Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 213 S.W. 2d 968 (Mo.
1948).
38. 213 S.W. 2d 396 (Mo. 1948).
39. 216 S.W. 2d 430 (Mo. 1948).
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years. The court held there was no basis for a reasonable inference that the
plaintiff was bereft of free -will and the power of voluntary action as to Constitute duress, particularly where she was represented by counsel who conducted negotiations for the compromise agreement with counsel for the other
parties extending over a period of several months.

WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS*

The Supreme Court of Missouri during 1948 decided an unusually large
number of cases involving this general subject. They are discussed under
the subdivisions: (1) Will Contests; (2) Probate Administration and Powers
and Duties of the Probate Court, (3) Contracts to Devise, (4) Construction
of Wills and Trusts, and (5) Duties of Trustees. No attempt has been made
to cover the cases involving constructive trusts or resulting trusts, since
these merely use the form of trusts to prevent unjust enrichment and involve
essentially different principles of law than those under discussion.
I. WILL

CONTESTS

In three cases wills were contested on the dual grounds of want of testamentary capacity and undue influence. In all three cases the contests were
unsuccessful. Like most of such cases the opinions are primarily discussions
of the particular fact situations involving elderly (aged 85, 81 and 78) and
somewhat infirm testators. In AhLnmw, v. ElmoreL it was held that a belief,
even if mistaken, founded upon reasoning is not an "insane delusion" which
will void a will based on such belief. In Baker v. Spears,2 the court ruled
that a will was not voided by undue influence in its procurement where
the only undue influence proved was the fact that the will was prepared by
a person having a confidential relationship to testatrix so as to reinstate
himself and another as executors, since this change could not prejudice the
heirs or legatees. The mere fact that an aged testator in his will written by
himself makes numerous mistakes in spelling and grammar and leaves a will
that requires court construction to determine his meaning does not show
want of testamentary capacity. 8
*Attorney, St. Louis. A.B., Harvard, 1930; J.D., Washington University, 1933.
1. 211 S.W. 2d 480 (Mo. 1948).
2. 357 Mo. 601, 210 S.W. 2d 13 (1948).
3. Adams v. Simpson, 213 S.W. 2d 908 (Mo. 1948).
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In ;re Gartside's Estate4 decides a case of first impression in Missouri,
although the fact situation out of which it arose frequently occurs. A will
contest had been settled by a compromise, giving excluded heirs and legatees
under a prior will something and reducing the amount otherwise going to the
residuary legatee. The court followed the minority rule and held that the
Missouri inheritance tax should be assessed according to the amounts actually
to be received under the compromise and not according to the amounts which
would have been received had the will been carried into effect according to
its terms.
II. PROBATE ADMINISTRATION AND POWERS AND DUTIES
OF THE PROBATE COURT

State ex rel. Lipic v. Flynn discusses the jurisdiction of the probate
court in proceedings to discover assets and holds that in such statutory proceedings the probate court has jurisdiction to grant a money judgment even
in cases where the alleged wrongful possessor of property had actual possession thereof at the time of the filing of the affidavit of concealment. Accordingly it ruled that the remedy is substantially the same as a suit for trover
and conversion in the circuit court. The court, therefore, granted a writ of
prohibition against the further prosecution of a suit for trover and conversion
in the circuit court where suit therein was filed after citation proceedings
had been commenced in the probate court. The court limits the dicta used
in Davis v. Johnson, where it had been stated that a suit for trover and
conversion was purely possessory and did not involve title, holding that in
both citation proceedings and such suits title may be- involved.
In a suit to set aside a conveyance by the deceased as a fraud on creditors, the court first ruled that in any case the plaintiff could not prevail
because there was an adequate consideration for the conveyance. It then
continued by way of dicta that in such suit a court of equity could determine
independently whether or not deceased was in fact indebted to plaintiff and
7
is not bound by the allowance of plaintiff's claim in the probate court.
In State ex inf. Kell vs. Buclnan,"suit was brought to obtain a declaration that certain real estate had escheated to the state because deceased
had died without heirs. The probate court had not ordered the administra4. 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W. 2d 273 (1948).
5. 215 S.W. 2d 446 (Mo. 1948).

6. 332 Mo. 417, 58 S.W. 2d 746 (1933).
7. Chrisman v. Zeysing, 209 S.W. 2d 144 (Mo. 1948).
8. 357 Mo. 750, 210 S.W. 2d 359 (1948).
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tor to take charge of the real estate. For this reason, the supreme court held
that an order determining heirship and directing distribution was not res
adjudicata. A similar ruling was made with respect to an order determining
heirship as a basis for determining that no Missouri Inheritance Tax was
due and no Missouri Inheritance Tax Appraiser should be appointed. The
court reiterates its ruling in earlier decisions9 that the probate court in connection with inheritance tax matters acts in an administrative and not a
judicial capacity.
The old ruling of Estate of Williams-° of the court of appeals was for
the first time judicially sanctioned by the supreme court in In re Phillips'
Estate,"- where it was held that the giving of bond, although required by
statute, was not jurisdictional in connection with appeals from the probate
court to the circuit court.
Where an insane ward died after the probate court had approved a particular sale of his real estate, but before the guardian had actually executed
the deed, it was ruled that a court of equity should direct the guardian to
convey the property to the purchaser. In this case of first impression in
Missouri, the court follows the established Missouri rule that equitable title
passes when, but not until, the probate court approves the sale. However,
it expressly leaves undecided the question of the right of the guardian to
execute such a deed after the ward's death unless directed so to do by a
court of equity.12
III. CoNrACrs To DvIsE

A husband and wife executed a joint will containing a provision allowing changes by mutual consent and providing that after the death of the
survivor all the property of either of them should pass to a trust created
under the will., After the death of the wife, the husband bought $30,000.00
Series G U. S. Government Bonds, naming his three children as beneficiaries.
As a result of a suit in equity, the court ruled that the three beneficiaries
must surrender the bonds to the U. S. Treasury for redemption, obtain their
cash value and pay it over to the executor of the husband's estate to become
part of the trust. The court recognizes that it cannot direct a transfer of
the bonds to the executor since this would be contrary to the regulations of
9.
285 U.S.
10.
11.
12.

De Pauw University v. Brunk, 53 F. 2d 647 (D.C. W.D. Mo. 1931), aff'd
527 (1931); In re Bernero's Estate, 271 Mo. 529, 197 S.W. 121 (1917).
62 Mo. App. 339 (1895).
357 Mo. 947, 211 S.W. 2d 728 (1948).
Capelli v. Bennett, 357 Mo. 421, 209 S.W. 2d 109 (1948).
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the Treasury Department but achieves a similar result by its judgment in
personam against the beneficiaries13
Hardy v. Dillon 4 reiterates the long established rules with respect to
covenants to devise and refuses specific performance because the services involved "were not exceptional and substantial, personal, filial, or arduous and
menial, and could readily and easily be measured and compensated in
money ....
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS

In Atlantic NationalBank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,"5 the court held
void ab initio as testamentary in character a trust created by an instrument
executed in 1898 and duly accepted by the trustees in the same year. Under
the indenture the grantor retained, not only the right to revoke, but also
the right to use, occupy and enjoy all of the trust property during his lifetime.
On his death it was provided that the trustees shall forthwith take, hold,
manage, and control the trust estate. Grantor prior to his death in 1900 had
treated the property substantially as his own. It was ruled that the wording of the instrument and conduct of the grantor showed that there was no
intent in 1898 to vest a then present title in the trustees. Estoppel could

not breathe life into a trust void ab initio since the surviving corporate trustee had not changed its position in any manner adverse to itself in its corporate capacity in reliance on the acts of the deceased who had been individual trustee since 1900 and would if the trust was void be entitled to all of
the property outright. Despite the long lapse of years, the Statute of Limitations did not bar the action since it would not apply in a suit against
the trustee of an express trust, even if the trust was in law void ad initio.
Altman v. McCutcken"l reiterates and applies the settled rule that a
will is valid if it fixes the general class of charities which are to receive a
bequest and leaves the executor power to select the particular charities.
Although the rule itself is clear, the case contains a valuable review of its
application to particular testamentary provisions.

Clark v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.1 holds that, where a will and
codicil as construed by the court granted a trustee discretion to encroach
upon the corpus of a trust estate to pay necessary medical expenses of the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Union National Bank v. Jessell, 215 S.W. 2d 474 (Mo. 1948).
207 S.W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948).
357 Mo. 770,211 S.W. 2d 2 (1948).
210 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. 1948).
357 Mo. 785, 211 S.W. 2d 10 (1948).
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beneficiary and where the beneficiary had in fact paid such expenses out of
his own pocket, such beneficiary could recover the amount thereof from the
trust estate. It follows the rule of St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbad1
that in cases where a plaintiff in a will construction suit is suing primarily for
his own benefit, he is not entitled to an allowance out of the corpus of the
trust estate to pay his attorney's fees.
The ever troublesome question whether particular language creates
vested or contingent remainders was before the court in three cases."0 In
two of these the remainders were held vested, 20 and one contingent.21 In two

cases the court was called to construe wills which the testator had obviously
drawn himself. 22 In one case the court considered the complicated provisions
of the will of a businessman disposing of his individually owned business and
making provisions for its management.23 All of these cases turned upon the
particular wording of the instruments in question and are of relatively little
value as precedents unless a subsequent will should contain substantially
similar language.
V. DUTIES

OF TRuSTEES

Bilton, v. Lindell Tower Apartments24 illustrates the lengths to which
the doctrine of full disclosure is carried when a trustee is dealing with trust
beneficiaries. In this case a plan for the extension of bonds was set aside
because of the failure of the voting trustees for stock of the corporation to
reveal the full amount of bonds which were owned by a syndicate which
owned all of the stock and to state that the stockholders were financing the
campaign to obtain an extension of the bonds and had promised to pay the
fees of the stock trustees. The result was doubtless influenced by the fact that
two of the three stock trustees were originally appointed to represent the
bondholders, while the third trustee had been originally appointed to represent the stockholders. The failure to reveal occurred in a series of letters
18. 353 Mo. 1114, 186 S.W. 2d 578 (1945).
19. Grannemann v. Grannemann, 210 S.W. 2d 105 (Mo. 1948); Harlow v.
Benning, 357 Mo. 266, 207 S.W. 2d 471 (1948); Coley v. Lowen, 357 Mo. 762, 211
S.W. 2d 18 (1948).
20. Grannemann v. Grannemann, Harlow v. Benning, supra n. 19.
21. Coley v. Lowen, 357 Mo. 762, 211 S.W. 2d 18 (1948).
22. Adams v. Simpson, 213 S.W. 2d 908 (Mo. 1948); Smoot v. Harbur, 357
Mo. 511, 209 S.W. 2d 249 (1948).
23. Cockrell v. First National Bank of Kansas City, 357 Mo. 894, 211 S.W.
2d 475 (1948).
24. 213 S.W. 2d 952 (Mo. 1948).
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from the stock trustees to the bondholders urging the bondholders to consent

to the extension.
On the other hand, although officers and directors of a corporation
ordinarily are fiduciaries for the corporation and cannot purchase assets for
themselves individually which it is their duty to buy for the corporation,
this doctrine did not prevent the vice president and owner of 50% of the
stock of a corporation, which corporation is the lessee of a motion picture
theatre under a lease about to expire, from buying for her individual account
the theatre when it had become apparent that the president and owner of the
25
other 50% of the stock was trying to buy the theatre for his own account.

25. Hyde Park Amusement Co. v. Mogler, 214 S.W. 2d 541 (Mo. 1948).
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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SUPREME COURT RULES INTERPRETED'
CARL C. WEATON*

OBJECTIVES OF CODE
The objectives of the code have been expressed in different forms. Thus
the Kansas City Court of Appeals has recently said that it was profoundly
conscious of the intent of the new Code of Civil Procedure to liberalize and
to simplify the method of procedure in our trial and appellate courts.2 On the
other hand, the supreme court has said that the purpose of the new code
and supreme court rules are to promote the orderly administration of justice
and to seek the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 8
It has also stated that, considering the code as a whole, it is clear that it was
intended to promote the orderly administration of justice and the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Notice and a hearing,
or an opportunity to be heard, have long been considered essential to due
process, to a decision on the merits of a cause and to the deprivation of rights
and property. The Code of Civil Procedure was not intended to conflict therewith.4
The spirit of the code and rules has led the supreme court to hold that
only in exceptional cases could an action be justly disposed of by dismissing
a meritorious appeal.5
CASES COVERED BY THE CODE

By the provisions of Section 2 of the civil code of which code Section
85 is a part, the procedure to be governed by said civil code is expressly and
specifically limited to that "in the supreme court, court of appeals, circuit
courts and common pleas courts." There is no mention whatsoever of Magistrate Court in said Section 2.
The reason that the legislature did not mention Magistrate Court in said
Section 2, supra, of the Civil Code is obvious. Said Magistrate Court was
not in existence when the code was enacted. It was not created until more
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. 1911, Leland Stanford University, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. These interpretations are based on Volume 209 through 219 of Southwestern Reporter, second series.
2. Bank of Thayer v. Kuebler, 219 S.W. 2d 297 (Mo. App. 1949).
3. Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).
4. Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 213 S.W. 2d 387 (Mo. 1948).
S. Baldwin v. Desgranges, 199 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. 1947).
(418)
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than a year after the Civil Code went into effect. The Civil Code according
to Section 3 thereof went into effect January 1, 1945. The Act creating the
Magistrate Court, Mo. Laws 1945, page 765 et seq., Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 2811.101 et seq., did not go into effect until March 11, 1946, as to certain
6
sections, and January 1, 1947, as to other sections.
DIsTINcTIoN BETWEEN ACTIoNs IN LAW AND

EguIrY

Sections of the new code providing that it shall be construed to secure
just, speedy, and inexpensive termination of every action and that there shall
be but one form of action to be known as "civil action" does not eliminate
7
all distinctions between an action in equity and an action at law.
NoTicE

Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure
to prosecute require notice where the party against whom they are directed
is not in default for failure to appear."
EXTENDING THE TIE FOR DOING SPECIFIED AcTs

A court may not enlarge the period for filing a motion for or granting
a new trial, or for commencing an action or for taking an appeal. 9 However,
in a case in which a transcript was filed with the Kansas City Court of Appeals after the period of the last permissible extension of time for filing it and
more than six months from the date of the filing of the notice of appeal,
where the delay in filing was claimed to be caused by inability of the appellant to obtain necessary exhibits from the respondent, the court said,
"Supreme Court Rule 3.26 prohibits the trial court from extending the time
for filing of transcripts beyond six months from the date the notice of
appeal was filed.... Under Supreme Court Rule 1.05, appellants could have
sought a stipulation permitting the omission of the exhibits referred to
from the transcript and the filing of the same separately in this court on
or before the setting of the case for hearing. If he had failed to obtain such
stipulation he could then under Rule 1.30, have applied to this court for an
extension of time for the filing of the transcript, after the expiration of the
six months' period below, and upon proper notice to his adversary.
"As the record now stands, the appeal is not invalid, but this court,
under Rule 1.30, is authorized, in its discretion, to dismiss the appeal. The
6.
7.
8.
9.

State v. Sestric, 216 S.W. 2d 152 (Mo. App. 1948).
Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo. 1949).
Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 4.
Bank of Thayer v. Kuebler, 218 S.W. 2d 297 (Mo. App. 1949).
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question remains whether, under all the circumstances shown, we should
decline to consider the merits of the appeal and to rule that the appeal
has been forfeited, or permit the appeal to stand and consider the transcript as if timely filed. Rule 1.15 authorizing suspension of certain rules of
procedure pertaining to appeals does not appear to relate to the requirements
fixing the periods within which the transcript shall be filed in the trial court
or appellate court. Rule 1.28, however, requires all the rules to be 'liberally
construed to promote justice, to minimize the number of cases disposed of
on procedural questions and to facilitate and increase the disposition of
cases on their merits.' We take it that under that rule we may, if circumstances warrant, and justice under the conditions would thereby be promoted, and under the further provision of Rule 1.30, decline to dismiss
the appeal and proceed to hear the cause on its merits.
"While the evidence before us on the motion to dismiss the appeal
shows positively that the appellants did not comply with the code provisions in regard to the time within which the transcript must be filed, and
did not avail themselves of the remedies afforded them in such cases by the
code and the rules, it, however, does appear that they made an honest effort
to obtain the necessary exhibits for the transcript and did consult the
code and rules of court, although erroneously construing them and overlooking some of their vital provisions. On the other hand, the evidence
clearly indicates that during the period when the transcript must have been
in preparation the counsel for respondent had possession of some of the exhibits desired to be shown therein and left the city without making them
available to the appellants for such purpose. The perfection of an appeal
may thus be seriously retarded, and the appellants and the courts thereby
may be unnecessarily burdened with consequent proceedings arising out of
such delay in the transcript. The delay was, in part, due to circumstances
under the control of the party now objecting, and she was not misled or
harmed in anywise by the irregularity. Upon serious consideration of all
the peculiar facts in the matter before us we are unwilling to rule that the
appellants' benefits of appeal has thus been forfeited, and will consider the
transcript as if timely filed." 10
The Springfield Court of Appeals, in following the spirit of this decision,
stated, "This rule [Supreme Court Rule 3.26] is supplemental to Section
138 of the Civil Code of Missouri... The transcript was filed in this court...
10. Costello v. Goodwin, 210 S.W. 2d 375 (Mo. App. 1948). •
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1

94

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1948

1949]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1948

421

considerably more than six months after the date of the filing of the notice of
appeal. No application was made to this court, as could and should have
been done under the provisions of Sec. 6, par. (b) of the Civil Code of
Missouri.
"However, the case has been briefed and submitted by all parties'and no
question has been raised as to the timely filing of the transcript. While under
this state of the record, we would be justified in dismissing the appeals under
Sec. 129, Civil Code of Missouri, Mo. R.S.A. § 847.129, Supreme Court
Rule 1.30, we have decided, notwithstanding, to determine the case upon
its merits.""1

The court term is no longer considered in computation of time in such
matters under Sec. 6 (c) of the new code.12
TERms OF COURT

Under our civil code terms of court are continuous, there being no
interval or vacation period between terms, as provided by Section 9 thereof."
SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO HARMONIZE PROCEDURAL STATUTES

The new civil code vested the supreme court with "power to promulgate
rules necessary to harmonize" the provisions of said code and also other
statutes relating to Civil Procedure.' 4 This authority has been exercised
in Supreme Court Rule 3.
PARTIES

a. Joinder of
Where two persons were claimed to have been killed by the same negligent act of the defendant, it has been held that their administrator might,
under Sections 16 and 37 of the General Code for Civil Procedure, join causes
of action for their deaths in a single law suit. The defendant argued that.
since the suit was for the death of two persons, and since there is no cause
of action at common law for the death of a person but that such cause exist&
only by statute, the death is the occurrence which gives rise to the cause,
of action for death and not the defendant's negligence. He claimed, therefore;,
that the two deaths could not arise out of the same occurrence and that thetwo claims for the deaths could not be joined. The court rejected this argu11.
12.
13.
14.

Morris Plan Co. of Kansas v. Jenkins, 216 S.W. 2d 160 (Mo. App. 1948).
Bank of Thayer v. Kuebler, supra note 9.
State ex rel. Grace v. Connor, 219 S.W. 2d 867 (Mo. App. 1949).
Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).
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ment and held that the defendant's negligence was the occurrence involved.
5
The court held further that Section 16 was merely permissive.2
b. Interpleader
Section 18 of the General Code for Civil Procedure extends the scope of
interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader1 6
The office of the equitable interplea is not to protect a party against
a double liability, but against double vexation in respect to one liability.',
If the right to maintain interplea turns on a dispute of fact, the court may
ascertain whether such dispute is real and substantial or merely feigned and
colorable. Where the asserted claim of the third person is frivolous or invalid, the interplea should be denied.'8
Where a real estate agent had $300 which had been paid to him by the
purchaser pursuant to a contract for the sale of certain property, and the
money was thereafter claimed by both purchaser and vendor upon the sale
falling through, the agent had the right to file an interpleader to have the
court say who was entitled to receive such fund.19 Where a fund is paid
into court and claimed by different parties, each of these parties, by his interplea, is in effect a plaintiff, he must recover upon the strength of his own
title and not upon the weakness of that of his adversarys, and, if he is not
entitled to the award himself, he is in no position to complain that it was
awarded to some one else.20
c. Third-PartyPractice
It has been said that the general purpose of Section 20 of the General
Code for Civil Procedure is "to avoid two actions" and "to accomplish
ultimate justice for all concerned with economy of litigation and without
prejudice to the rights of another."'21
There is no limitation on the types of actions to which the third-party
22
practice statute applies.
Where the motion for leave to file a third-party petition is made after
the filing by the defendant of his answer, notice of the motion must be
2
given to the plaintiff. 3
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Fair v. Thompson, 212 S.W. 2d 923 (Mo. App. 1948).
Barr v. Snyder, 219 S.W. 2d 305 (Mo. 1949).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Roberts v. Griggs, 210 S.W. 2d 753 (Mo. App. 1948).
Denton Gin Co. v. Gathings, 216 S.W. 2d 959 (Mo. App. 1949).
State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 213 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1948).
Ibid..
Dennis v. Creek, 211 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. App. 1948).
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The granting of a motion of the original defendant to implead a new
third-party defendant is within the court's discretion.24 However, the court
has the duty to exercise that discretion when a proper motion is made for
25
leave to bring in a third-party defendant.
When a third-party defendant is brought into a case, it is optional
2
with the plaintiff whether or not he will make the new party a defendant.
But the plaintiff cannot have a judgment against the third-party defendant
unless he amends his petition and asserts a claim against such defendant 2 7
If the third-party defendant is thus accepted by the plaintiff as a
defendant, he may assert all his defenses to the claims against him and he
is bound by all adjudications of liability which may be made in the judgment.

28

The third-party practice statute does not change the substantive law
respecting contribution between joint tort feasor judgment debtors. There
can be no contribution under this practice unless the plaintiff accepts the
third-party defendant as his own defendant and obtains a joint judgment
against him and the original defendant. 29
d. Intervention
The trial court, after allowing an appeal in a named case had no jurisdiction to make an order sustaining an application to intervene, and there
could be no error predicated upon its action in refusing to make it.30
SERVICE OF SUMMONS

Service of minors by delivering a copy of the summons on their legal
guardian is good service. Section 27 (b) of the civil code says: "If the
infant ... has a legally appointed guardian

. . .

by serving a copy of the

summons and of the petition on said guardian... ." Supreme Court Rule
3.09 says: "A summons containing only the names of the defendant or defendants or other parties to be personally served

. . .

together with a copy

thereof and a copy of the petition for each defendant or person to be servd,
24. Browne v. Creek, 209 S.W. 2d 900 (Mo. 1948); State ex ,el. McClure v.
Dinwiddie, supra note 21; Dennis v. Creek, 211 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. App. 1948).
25. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, spranote 21.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid,
29. State ex rd. McClure v. Dinwiddie, supra note 21; Phegley v. Graham,
215 S.W. 2d 499 (Mo. 1948).
30. City of St. Louis v. Silk, 199 S.W. 2d 23 (Mo. App. 1947).
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shall be delivered to the officer or other person who is to make the service."
Under Sectioi 27 (b), if the infant has a legally appointed guardian, the
guardian is the person to be served and to whom the summons and petition
must be delivered. Section 27 (a) provides the manner of service on an
infant who has no legal guardian, but the law does not require delivery of
copies to an infant who does have a legal guardian nor multiple copies to a
guardian who represents more than one infant."'
An element of good faith underlies service on an unknown party. The
ignorance of his name must be real, and not willful, ignorance, or such as
might be removed by mere inquiry, or by a resort to means of information.
The'very basis of the statutory procedure against unknown parties is that
parties so proceeded against are in fact unknown. If the reason they are
unknown is merely because the plaintiff does not take the trouble to inquire
into the question of their identity, the.failure to make the inquiry defeats the
right to invoke the statute.32
-The special appearance of a defendant does not' confer on the court
jurisdiction of his person or waive jurisdictional defects. 3
A court is not authorized to enter a personal judgment against a defendant who is served by publication and who does not appear."'
PLEADINGS

a. Technical Forms not Required
Where A is the administrator of the estates of B and C, a title to a
petition describing the plaintiff as "A, Administrator of the estate of A, deceased, and B, deceased, for and on behalf of . . ." (here were inserted the

names of the heirs of A and B) was held sufficient.33 It was held, further,
that an instruction defining the form of the verdict for a singular plaintiff
instead of in the plural was not improper where the form of the action otherwise. complied with the statutory requirements prescribing forms of plead8
ings. 8
Though a petition did not use the word "converted" in alleging a conversion, it was sufficient if it alleged facts which, in law, amounted to a conversion.37

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 212 S.W. 2d 574 (Mo. 1948).
Martin v. McCabe, 213 S.W. 2d 497 (Mo. 1948).
Beckmann v. Beckmann, 218 S.W. 2d 566 (Mo. 1949).
Ibid.
Fair v. Thompson, 212 S.W. 2d 923 (Mo. App. 1948).
Ibid.
Hussey v. Ellerman, 215 S.W. 2d 38 (Mo. App. 1948).
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b. Setting Forth Claims for Relief
The code requires a statement of the constitutive facts, not the conclusions of the pleader, showing claimant entitled to relief, as well as a
demand for judgment for the relief desired.3 8
Where a complaint in unlawful detainer action sets out specific facts
showing the defendant tenant to be holding over wrongfully after termination of a lease, the words "illegally" or "unlawfully," if inserted in the
complaint, would merely state a conclusion and were unnecessary.3 9
In an action to recover for negligent injury, a petition which charged
"negligence and carelessness," together with an allegation that the plaintiffs injury was the direct and proximate cause of such negligence and
carelessness, was held, in connection with the other circumstances set forth,
to be good after verdict in the absence of any attack thereon. The allegation of negligence and carelessness was said to be an allegation of fact rather
than a mere legal conclusion.4'
c. Replies
Where a circuit court permitted a wife to file a cross-bill for divorce
out of time and ruled against the contention of her husband that the court
had lost jurisdiction because of the circuit clerk's void order dismissing the
husband's divorce action on motion of the husband without an order of
court, the circuit court should then have first ordered the husband to file
a reply to the cross-bill before foreclosing the husband's right to defend
4
against the cross-bill by entering a default judgment. 1
d. Joinder of Claims
One may in either a petition or counterclaim, join actions at law and
42
in equity.
In counterclaims, whether in the defendant's answer or in the plaintiff's reply, one may plead independent or alternate claims, and may join
43
as many claims as he has.
However, Section 61 (g) of the code recognizes that some actions can
4
not be joined. "
38. Foster v. Pettijohn, 213 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1948).
39. Folger v. Lowery, 210 S.W. 2d 1011 (Mo. App. 1948).
40. Holtz v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 209 S.W. 2d 883 (Mo. 19.48).
41. State ex rel. Grace v. Connor, 219 S.W. 2d 867 (Mo. App. 1949).
42. Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo.
1949); State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 210 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. 1948).
43. State ex Tel. Fawkes v. Bland, supra note 42.
44. Ibid.
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e. Affirmative Defenses
4
45
The defenses of contributory negligence, of failure of consideration, 0

and of the statute of limitations4 7 are affirmative.
f. Multiple Statements of Claim
The plaintiff in different paragraphs of her petition alleged general and
specific negligence of the defendant. She claimed that Section 42 of the
General Code for Civil Procedure permitted her to do this and still to recover under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court, in rejecting this
claim, said, "The provisions of Section 42, supra, were not, as we view
them, ever intended to authorize a party to combine in one petition a charge
of general negligence with one of specific negligence, and then have the
court ignore the charge of specific negligence by submitting the case to
the jury on general negligence.. . . When plaintiff went so far as to include
in her petition allegations which definitely pointed out a particular servant
of defendant and specified the particular acts which he committed as the
negligence which caused her injuries, her right to rely on general negligence
went out of the case." 48
g. InconsistentPleadings
Where the plaintiff's petition alleged that the contract sued on was
an oral contract, an answer including general and special denials and stating
that the oral contract "as alleged" or "as set out" would be ineffective
because not in writing and unfair and unconscionable did not necessarily
admit that the alleged contract existed as a fact; and there was no such
absolute incompatibility within the law of pleadings between the denials and
the affirmative defenses as would cause the latter to destroy the former.49
Nor was it inconsistent for the appellant to deny that she had violated the
ordinance and also assert that the ordinance is invalid. "°
A motion to strike or to elect is the proper remedy for inconsistent
defenses, and, in the absence of such motion, the objection is deemed
waived.Y'
h. Allegation of Fraud
Though, in a petition to set aside a deed, there was no express statement that the defendant acted fraudulently, as the facts therein pleaded
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Pulse v. Jones, 218 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. 1949).
Minto v. Minto, 217 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. App. 1949).
Hauber v. Gentry, 215 S.W. 2d 754 (Mo. 1948).
Hoeller v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 199 S.W. 2d 7 (Mo. App. 1947).
Feiden v. Gibson, 218 S.W. 2d 105 (Mo. 1949).
City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W. 2d 475 (Mo. 1949).
Feiden v. Gibson, supra note 49.
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tended to show want of consideration for the deed and an abuse of the confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, fraud was
52
sufficiently pleaded.
i. Construction
Since pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice, it is
not at all material where in a petition an allegation of negligence appears.
Whether it may appear, for instance, in the third paragraph or in a subdivision of the fifth, or in any other paragraph, is of no consequence. The
petition as a whole must be considered and none of its charging parts can be
ignored.6A pleading should be construed on appeal with reasonable liberality to
prevent entrapment unless it wholly fails to state a cause of action. " Where a husband, in an action for malpractice, alleged that his wife
died as a direct result of the defendant doctor's omissions and misconduct,
it does him substantial justice to interpret his petition as admitting that
his only claim for recovery is based upon the wrongful death statute and
not upon the personal wrong of malpractice. Hence, it was proper to dismiss
his action since it was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to
the statute. 55
j. Demurrers Abolished
Demurrers in civil practice have been abolished.56 Motions take their
57
place.
k. Amendments to Pleadings
A trial court may now permit a plaintiff to file any number of amendments which, in the opinion of the court, justice requires.58 However, under
the new code a party does not have the right, as a matter of law, to file an
amended petition after a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action has been sustained. This is true since Section 101 of the
code provides that a dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication
upon the merits, and any involuntary dismissal other than one for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue shall be with prejudice unless the court in
52. Frey v. Onstott, 210 S.W. 2d 87 (Mo. 1948).
53. State ex rel. Spears v. McCullen, 210 S.W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1948).
54. Rogers v. Poteet, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. 1947).
55. Baysinger v. Hanser, 199 S.W. 2d 644 (Mo. 1947).
56. Baysinger v. Hanser, supra note 55; Jones v. Williams, 209 S.W. 2d 907
(Mo. 1948); State ex rel. Uthoff v. Russell, 210 S.W. 2d 1017 (Mo. App. 1948).
57. Baysinger v. Hanser, supra note 55; State ex rel. Uthoff v. Russell, spra
note 56.
58. Jones v. Williams, supra note 56.
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its order for dismissal shall otherwise specify. Therefore, if a plaintiff desires
to file an amended petition, it is up to him to ask leave to do so.59
If an amended petition is filed, the original petition is deemed to have
been abandoned.6 0
1. Counterclaims
Section 73 of the General Code for Civil Procedure is only a procedural
statute and it does not change the substantive law as to what constitutes
a cause of action or when it accrues."'
Though Section 1516 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri permits the
defendant in a divorce suit to file an answer charging the plaintiff with
conduct which would entitle the defendant to a divorce and further provides
the defendant in the answer "my" pray for a divorce, this is only permissive,

not mandatory. But Section 1515 contains the provision so often heretofore
referred to, that "the like process and proceedings shall be had in such
causes as are had in other civil suits." This clause is general, and means
that the process and proceedings shall conform to the civil code as it
exists from time to time. It therefore includes the new Code of 1943.
Under authority of Section 10 of the new code the supreme court
adopted in 1944 supplementing and harmonizing Rule 3.02 (a), which provides, in part, that if "any special procedural statute refers to or adopts the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also refers to a particular
method of procedure which has been changed by the Civil Code, then and
in that event, the substitute procedure prescribed by the revised Civil Code
shall be employed." This rule refers to two statutes in pari materia, as well
as to a single statute. In other words, Section 1515 adopts the general and
new code of procedure, therefore the particular provision in Section 1516,
giving the defendant an option as to filing a cross-action for divorce, must
yield to the mandatory provision of Section 73 in the new code-unless this
provision of Section 1516 is protected by the exceptive phrase "unless otherwise provided by law," appearing in Section 2 of the new code.
Section 2 does continue Section 1516 in force as to divorce, and the defendant still retains the optional right granted by Section 1516 to file a
cross-bill for divorce, or not, notwithstanding the compulsory provision of
Section 73 of the new code. That right is more substantive than procedural;
59. Jones v. Williams, supra note 56; Husser v. Markham, 210 S.W. 2d 405
(Mo. App. 1948); Mansfield v. Veach, 212 S.W. 2d 90 (Mo. App. 1948).
60. Standley v. City of Van Buren, 217 S.W. 2d 711 (Mo. App. 1949).
61. Zickel v. Knell, 210 S.W. 2d 59 (Mo. 1948).
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and it can hardly be thought the new code intended to compel the innocent
and injured defendant in such a suit to file a cross-action for divorce and
seek to sever the marital relation, or else waive the right altogether.

But the same conclusion does not follow by analogy with respect to separate maintenance. It is true Sections 3376 and 3382 conferring that right
are permissive. But they are very general, and wholly unlike Section 1516 in
the divorce law. Section 3382 merely adopts the general practice in civil
suits. There is nothing to the contrary anywhere in the chapter. The claim
seeks only a money judgment, not a severance of the marital relationthereby coming partly but not wholly within the scope of a divorce case.
Where a husband has instituted the divorce litigation and the wife merely
files a defensive answer, if he prevails she will be entitled to nothing, whereas if she prevails the marriage relation will still exist and he will be legally
bound to provide maintenance for her. She chooses the battle ground. If she
elects merely to contest his divorce and preserve the marital status, undoubtedly her right to separate maintenance is within the subject matter of the
divorce suit. It clearly comes under the requirement of Section 73 of the
new code, the objective of which is to discourage separate litigations covering
the same subject matter, and to require their adjudication in the same
62
action.
JuDIcIAL

NOTICE

Where it appeared in the plaintiff's pleadings that the collision which

gave rise to his cause of action occurred in Kansas, judicial notice of the
applicable Kansas laws should be taken, though neither party specifically
pleaded Kansas law.63
MOTIONs

a. Motions to Dismiss Petitions
A motion to dismiss a petition for failure to state a claim
relief can be granted when that objection appears upon the
petition.64 For example, such is proper where the defense of
of limitations, 5 or that of the statute of frauds " appears on

upon which
face of the
the statute
the face of

the petition.
62. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, supra note 42.
63. Hall Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 212 S.W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948).
64. State ex rel. Uthoff v. Russell, supra note 56; City of St. Louis v. Butler
Co., 219 S.W. 2d 372 (Mo. 1949).
65. Baysinger v. Hanser, supra note 55.
66. State ex rel. Uthoff v. Russell, supra note 56.
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b. Waiver of Objections Available by Motion
A party waives objections available to him by motion by failure to
assert the same by motion with the exceptions noted in Section 66 of the
General Code for Civil Procedure. This has been held in connection with
inconsistency in pleadings s and with lack of particularity in allegations."
However, under Section 66, entering into trial does not waive an objection
70
properly raised by motion.
c. Motion for Judgment on tlhe Pleadings
No evidence is heard on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Such
a motion, for the purpose of the motion, admits the truth of all facts well
pleaded by the opposite party. If an issue of fact is presented by the
1
pleadings the motion should be denied.7
TRIAL oF ISSUES NOT RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS

Even when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
72
they had been raised in the pleadings.
The statute providing that, when issues not raised by pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of parties they shall be treated as if
raised in pleadings and amendment may be made in pleadings to conform to
evidence, is sufficiently broad to authorize amendment to the petition by
73
pen interlineation.
Even though no amendment is made to conform the pleadings to the
evidence, the judgment is nevertheless valid, for it is to be noted that Section
82 provides that "failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
'
these issues. 74

67. Hartvedt v. Harpst, 216 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. App. 1949).

68. Feiden v. Gibson, supra note 49.
69. Empire Storage &Ice Co. v. Giboney, 210 S.W. 2d 55 (Mo. 1948).
70. Carter v. Decker, 199 S.W. 2d 48 (Mo. App. 1947).
71. Ralph D'Oench Co. v. St. Louis County Cleaning &Dyeing Co., 218 S.W.
2d 609 (Mo. 1949).
72. Rogers v. Poteet, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. 1947); Stark v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 211 S.W. 2d 500 (Mo. App. 1948); Allaben v. Shelbourne, 212 S.W. 2d
719 (Mo. 1948); Union National Bank v. Jessell, 215 S.W. 2d 474 (Mo. 1948);
Snodgrass v. Potter, 215 S.W. 2d 497 (Mo. 1948); Abbott v. Seamon, 217 S.W.
2d 580 (Mo. App. 1949); Polich v. Hermann, 219 S.W. 2d 849 (Mo. App. 1949).
73. Standley v. City of Van Buren, 217 S.W. 2d 711 (Mo. App. 1949).
74. Polich v. Hermann, supra note 72.
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INTERROGATORIES

Interrogatories can not be used in a proceeding in a magistrate court,
since Section 2 of the General Code for Civil Procedure does not provide
75
for application of the code to such proceedings.
DIscoVERY UNDER SECTION 86
The party invoking this section should not be held to too strict a showing
as to the contents of records which he has never seen, nor to too strict a requirement of materiality.
However, this law should not be used as a dragnet on a fishing expedition.
A motion requesting "all" documents coming to a party within a particular
time is too general. One has no right to inspect a document which is immaterial to a case. 76
DOCKETING CASES
A judgment in a case which was brought to collect money damages and
which was improperly placed on the "Jury Waived Docket" was set aside
when material damage was shown to have been caused to the defendant by
77
the error.
CONTINUANCES

a. By Appellate Court
An appellate court may, under Section 92, continue proceedings in an

appeal before

it.78

b. Counsel Member of General Assembly
Section 96 provides that a continuance may be had by an attorney who
is a member of and in attendance upon the General Assembly, and no trial is
to be had until an adjournment or recess of the General Assembly for twenty
days or more, nor for ten days thereafter. Judicial notice is taken of records
79
of the General Assembly in connection with this law.
When an application for a continuance is filed under Section 96, the
trial court has the right to determine whether the legislator's presence is
necessary to a fair and proper trial. In other words, the filing of such application in proper form does not instanter divest the trial court of jurisdiction and thus prohibit any further proceedings therein "until the adjournment or recess for twenty days or more of the general assembly [and] ten
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

State v. Sestric, 216 S.W. 2d 152 (Mo. App. 1948).
State v. Witthaus, 219 S.W. 2d 383 (Mo. 1949).
Wagner v. Shelly, 210 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App. 1948).
Anderson v. Kuhs, 213 S.W. 2d 238 (Mo. App. 1948).
State v. Massey, 219 S.W. 2d 326 (Mo. 1949).
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days thereafter" regardless of the necessity of the legislator's presence to a
fair trial and regardless of the fact that the legislator attorney is given
a reasonable opportunity to be present and is actually present and participates in the further proceedings after the application is filed, and without
mentioning his application for a continuance.
Of course, the litigants and lawyers who are members of the general
assembly should be given every reasonable consideration and their rights
carefully protected by the courts.A'
c. Application for Continvmnce
Application for a continuance on account of the absence of witnesses
or their evidence requires first, that the application for continuance must
state facts showing the materiality of the evidence sought to be obtained from
the witness, secondly, that the name and residence of such witness, if known,
be stated and that the witness is not absent by the connivance, consent, or
procurement of the applicant and that such application is not made for
vexation or delay but in good faith.8
CONSOLIDATION OF SuITS

Courts in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, or of any separate issue or of any
82
number of claims, cross-claims, or issues.
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JuRY

Where a petition stated an equitable cause of action so that the defendant was not entitled to demand a jury trial, the failure of the defendant
to make such a demand did not constitute a waiver of his right of jury trial
on the legal issues involved.8
DISMISSALS

Where, from the facts appearing from the evidence in a case, the plaintiff shows no right to relief, the trial court is correct when it dismisses the
action.8 4 Filing a statement that a case is dismissed is not of itself a dismissal. A dismissal is a judgment, and requires an order of court.8 0
80. Todd v. Stokes, 215 S.W. 2d 464 (Mo. 1948).
81. Houston v. Ball, 214 S.W. 2d 723 (Mo. App. 1948).
82. Barr v. Snyder, 219 S.W. 2d 305 (Mo. 1949).
83. Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., 217 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo. 1949).
84. Cottonseed Delinting Corp. v. Roberts Brothers, Inc., 218 S.W. 2d 592
(Mo. 1949).
85. State ex rel. Grace v. Connor, 219 S.W. 2d 867 (Mo. App. 1949).
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Although a trial court does not expressly rule on an appellant's motion to
dismiss, yet it is to be assumed the motion is overruled, when the court resolves the issues and renders judgment on the merits for the respondent,
Where a defendant files a motion to dismiss which is based upon lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, it was held that the dismissal was on the ground of failure
to state a claim. This was so since the dismissal was expressly recited to
be with prejudice, which operated as an adjudication on the merits. Had the
court intended to sustain the motion upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction
or improper venue, it would not have entered an order which purported to
operate as an adjudication on the merits, since in a situation where both its
jurisdiction and venue were attacked, an adjudication on the merits not only
implied that the court had jurisdiction of the cause but also that the venue
was proper. In fact the very code section which provides that a dismissal
with prejudice shall operate as an adjudication on the merits at the same
time denies such effect to an involuntary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
or improper venue.
It was enough to warrant the court's action in sustaining the motion that
it should have found any one of the grounds to be well taken, and the fact
that it specified no single ground raises no presumption that it sustained
the motion on all three grounds.87
Where the defendant, at the end of the plaintiff's case, moved to strike
all of the plaintiff's evidence from the record on the ground that the petition
failed to show a cause of action, he did not move for a dismissal or for a
directed verdict. Hence, he had no right under Section 100 to offer further
evidence after a ruling on his motion.18
Where the dismissal in a case was the first and only voluntary dismissal
of the action and the plaintiffs did dismiss their action "before the same was
finally submitted to the jury," they were entitled to a dismissal "without
prejudice." Under such circumstances neither the plaintiffs nor the court
need to specify that such a voluntary dismissal so made is "without prejudice." It was required only that it be the first voluntary dismissal of the
action and taken at the stage of the trial designated by Code Section 99.
Such a dismissal is expressly eliminated in Code Section 101 from dismissals
86. Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W. 2d 595 (Mo. 1949).
87. Dee v. Stahl, 219 S.W. 2d 883 (Mo. App. 1949).
88. Munday v. Austin, 218 S.W. 2d 624 (Mo. 1949).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949

107

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1949], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

there defined which shall constitute dismissals wit& prejudice if not otherwise
specified by the court.
A judgment entry in such a case which shows the facts suggested above
enters a judgment of dismissal without prejudice.8 9
Where there was no showing of a final judgment in a separate maintenance action in Illinois, but only a temporary award of support money to
a wife, the order making the award did not bar the husband's subsequent
divorce action in Missouri.
Further, an order dismissing the husband's Illinois divorce action did
not bar a subsequent divorce action in Missouri, where the record did not
show that the Illinois action was dismissed on the wife's motion and both the
Illinois and Missouri law permitted dismissal by a plaintiff without prejudice.90
INSTRUCTIONS

The function of instructions is to inform the jury of the law as it is
applicable to the facts of the case. Abstract statements of law, even though
correctly stating the principles involved, fail as instructions when they
permit speculation as to their application.9 '
It is never safe, and seldom proper, for an instruction merely to follow
the broad language of an appellate court whick is announcing only a general
Principleof law. An instruction must be confined to the issues made by the
92
pleadings and supported by the evidence in each case.
Where parties stipulated that the only points to be raised by the plaintiff on the plaintiff's appeal were whether the court erred on refusing to give,
as originally offered by plaintiff, certain instructions, and whether the court
erred in giving one of the defendant's instructions, the supreme court was
not required to consider the plaintiff's suggestion that instructions, as
modified, imposed an undue burden on the plaintiff.98
An instruction that is broader than the pleadings and the evidence and
which grants to the jury a roving commission to find for plaintiff on a
different basis than that pleaded and shown by the evidence, or which gives
no guidance to the jury, but permits them to find for plaintiff on any theory
of negligence they can construct is erroneous. 9'
89. Potter v. McLin, 214 S.W. 2d 751 (Mo. App. 1948).
90. Elliston v. Elliston, 215 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. App. 1948).
91. Landman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 211 S.W. 2d 530 (Mo.
App. 1948).
92. Winter v. Haan, 211 S.W. 2d 544 (Mo. App. 1948).
93. Benham v. McCoy, 213 S.W. 2d 914 (Mo. 1948).
94. Ibid.
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An instruction which purports to cover the whole case and fails to require
the jury to find a causal connection between the injury suffered and the

negligence charged is erroneous.95
An instruction undertaking to cover the whole case and authorizing
recovery upon hypothetical facts must limit the hypothetical facts stated
therein to such as are within the allegations of the petition and are, also,
within the facts proven.98 A requested instruction must be correct or the
court may refuse it without committing reversible error; and when erroneous
instructions are requested the trial court is under no duty to correct or modify
them in any way.97 If a defendant considers an instruction misleading she
should object to it on that ground at the trial and where she does not then
object to it, objection on that ground is not properly before the appellate
98
court for review.
FUNCTION OF JURY

It is the function of a jury to decide fact issues and it should not
be asked to pass upon questions of law."
The supreme court on an appeal will not invade the province of the
jury by determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value
of their testimony' 00
FORM AND CONSTRUCTION OF VERDICT

The general rule is that the verdict must be clear and unambiguous so
that a judgment may be written upon it without resorting to inference or to
construction. It is also the rule that if from a consideration of the whole
record the meaning of the jury can be made clear and the judgment is based
upon what the jury actually found, the judgment will be upheld. Verdicts
should be construed to give them effect if it can reasonably be done.1l "
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

Code Section 112 provides for "a motion for a directed verdict" to re102
place our former demurrer to the evidence.
Where no motion for a directed verdict grounded on insufficiency of
evidence was filed at the close of the whole case, and no assignment on that
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Hertz v. McDowell, 214 S.W. 2d 546 (Mo. 1948).
Goggin v. Schoening, 199 S.W. 2d 87 (Mo. App. 1947).
Benham v. McCoy, 213 S.W. 2d 914 (Mo. 1948).
Mullis v. Thompson, 213 S.W. 2d 941 (Mo. 1948).
Mcllvain v. Kavorinos, 212 S.W. 2d 85 (Mo. App. 1948).
Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).
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ground was incorporated in a motion for a new trial, the defendants were
precluded from maintaining that the evidence did not sustain the charge of
the petition.'3
CASEs TRED WITHOUT A JuRY

a. Findings of Fact
Where a party fails to request a finding on an issue involved in a
case tried by a court, he can not on appeal complain of the court's failure to
make a finding on that issue.104
b. Duties of Appellate Court
Where a trial is to the court, the review is de novo on the whole record
as in suits of an equitable nature and it is the duty of the appellate court to
weigh conflicting evidence. 0 5
In such a case, however, due deference is given to the findings of
fact of the trial court because of that court's better opportunity to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses, 1°6 and the judgment of the trial court
should not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.107 On the other
hand, the findings by a court trying a case without a jury lose their weight
when competent evidence is excluded.1' s In such a case, the, appellate court
103. Rogers v. Poteet, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (Mo. 1947); Hauber v. Gentry, 215
S.W. 2d 754 (Mo. 1948).
104. Messina v. Greubel, 215 S.W. 2d 456 (Mo. 1948).
105. Schell v. City of Jefferson, 212 S.W. 2d 430 (Mo. 1948); Dolan v. Truck
Equipment Co., 212 S.W. 2d 438 (Mo. 1948); State ex rel. Taday v. Sloan's
Moving & Storage Co., 212 S.W. 2d 566 (Mo. 1948); House v.. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 217 S.W. 2d 382 (Mo. 1949); Cottonseed Delinting Corp. v. Roberts
Brothers,'Inc., 218 S.W. 2d 592 (Mo. 1949); Gershon v. Ashkanazie, 199 S.W. 2d
38 (Mo. App. 1947); Folger v. Lowery, 210 S.W. 2d 1011 (Mo. App. 1948);
Avellone v. John Weisert Tobacco Co., 213 S.W. 2d 222 (Mo. App. 1948); Bussinges
v. Ginnever, 213 S.W. 2d 230 (Mo. App. 1948); Fitzgerald v. Schaefer, 216 S.W.
2d 939 (Mo. App. 1949); Eldridge v. Logan (State Department of Public Health and
Welfare, Third Party Defendant), 217 S.W. 2d 588 (Mo. App. 1949); Boeving v.
Vandover, 218 S.W. 2d 175 (Mo. App. 1949).
106. McFaw Land Co. v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 211 S.W. 2d 44
(Mo. 1948); Costello v. Moore, 211 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. 1948); Dolan v. Truck
Equipment Co., supra note 105; Powell v. Huffman, 213 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo. 1948);
Herzog v. Ross, 213 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. 1948); Folger v. Lowery, supra note 105;
Avellone v. John Weisert Tobacco Co., supra-note 105; Bussinger v. Ginnever, supra
note 105; Fitzgerald v. Schaefer, supra note 105; Middleton v. American States Ins
Co,. 217 S.W. 2d 386 (Mo. App. 1949); Eldridge v. Logan (State Department o1
Public Health and Welfare, Third Party Defendant) supra note 105; Boeving v.
Vandover, spra note 105.
107. Costello v. Moore, supra note 106; Dolan v. Truck Equipment Co., supra
note 105; Gershon v. Ashkanazie, supra note 105; Folger v. Lowery, supra note 105;
Avellone v. John Weisert Tobacco Co., supra note 105. Compare Durham v. Bill
Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 213 S.W. 2d 968 (Mo. 1948).
108. Williams v. Patterson, 218 S.W. 2d 156 (Mo. App. 1949).
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should consider competent excluded evidence which is preserved for appeal.'9
Section 114 of the General Code for Civil Procedure has been applied
in the case of a conviction of the violation of a city ordinance. 110 It has
also been held that this section prevails over Section 1159 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri, 1939, which provides that, if the report of a referee
is confirmed by the court, judgment shall be rendered thereon in the same
manner and with like effect as upon a special verdict.,1
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

a. Purposes of Motion for New Trial and of Section
115 and of Supreme Court Rule 3.22
The functions of a motion for a new trial are to obtain relief in the
trial court and on appeal.112 The purpose of the section and rule referred
to above is to clothe the trial judge, who enjoys the advantage of meeting
the parties and witness face to face, with a wide discretion to be exercised
in furtherance of substantial justice.11 3 But the court should not act
arbitrarily.11 4 In determining whether the trial court acted in exercise of
judicial discretion in granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, the supreme court will endeavor to
ascertain whether there was sufficient substantial evidence to sustain the
verdict.115
b. Grounds for
The trial court may now grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for
which new trials have heretofore been granted"1 8 Recent cases have held,
specifically, that a new trial may be granted on the grounds of false testimony,' 7 improper argument, 11 and because the verdict was against the

109. Cottonseed Delinting Corp. v. Roberts Brothers, Inc., supra note 105;
Williams v. Patterson, supra note 108.
110. City of Springfield v. Stevens, 216 S.W. 2d 450 (Mo. 1949).
111. Baerveldt & Honig Const. Co. v. Dye Candy Co., 212 S.W. 2d 65 (Mo1948). Compare Crawford v. A.J. Sheahan Granite Co., 211 S.W. 2d 52 (Mo. App.
1948).
112. Donati v. Gualdoni, 216 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1949).
113. Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112; Bulkley v. Thompson, 211 S.W. 2d'
83 (Mo. App. 1948).
114. Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112; Happy v. Walz, 213 S.W. 2d 410,
(Mo.. 1948).
115. Happy v. Walz, supra note 114.
116. Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112.
117. Ibid.
118. Bulkley v. Thompson, supra note 113.
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weight of the evidence."19 In reviewing the action of a trial court in
sustaining a motion for a new trial, the appellate court will give the specified grounds for the motion a broad. and liberal construction 12 0
c. Form of
Supreme Court Rule 3.23 relates to the sufficiency of motions for new
trials in connection with appeals and has nothing to do with a trial court's
12
right to pass upon its own errors. 1
d. Time Within Which to Make Motion
Motions for new trials must be filed within ten (10) days after entry
of judgment.122 But it should not be filed prematurely before final disposi1
tion of all of the issues in the cause to which the motion could be addressed. 2
e. When J dgment Entered
In jury trials, in connection with the time within which new trials
may be'requested, the judgment shall be entered as of the day of the
124
verdict.
f. Finality of Judgment
By the timely filing of a motion for a new trial, the finality of the
judgment involved is suspended. 25
g. Proof of Grounds of New Trial
Affidavits are not necessary to prove the grounds of a new trial, if
the court can determine the facts essential to the proof of said grounds
126
from the evidence presented at the trial
h. When Motion for New Trial Deemed Denied
A motion for a new trial is deemed denied if not passed on within
27
ninety (90) days after it is filed.1
119. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Binger, 212 S.W. 2d 445 (Mo. App.

1948).

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112.
White v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 218 S.W. 2d 795 (Mo. App. 1949).
Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 214 S.W. 2d 5 (Mo. 1948).
Stone v. Boston, 218 S.W. 2d 783 (Mo. App. 1949).
Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112.
Bank of Thayer v. Kuebler, 219 S.W. 2d 297 (Mo. App. 1949).
Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112.
Gockel v. Jenkins, 210 S.W. 2d 691 (Mo. App. 1948); Beahan v. St. Louis

Public Service Co., 213 S.W. 2d 253 (Mo. App. 1948); Tuttle v. Brayton, 215
S.W. 2d 46 (Mo. App. 1948). Rosbrugh v. Motley, 216 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. App.
1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1

112

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1948

1949]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1948

439

CONTROL OF COURT OVER JUDGMENT

A trial court may, within thirty (30) days after entry of its original

judgment, set that judgment aside, regardless of whether or not a motion
for a new trial has been filed.228 On the other hand, when that thirty

'(30) day period has elapsed, the court can not, after passing on a motion
12
for a new trial, exercise further control over its judgment.

EFFECT OF SECTION

120

The effect of Code Section 120 was to abolish motions in arrest of judgment and to substitute therefor a nameless motion by which relief thereto-

fore granted by motion in arrest could be secured. Where a verdict against
a surety on a bond was greater than that against his principal, under
that section, a motion to correct the verdict and judgment by reducing the
same to the amount found against the principal was correct. 30
EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS OF A COURT

Under Section 122 of the General Code for Civil Procedure, objections
to rulings of a court must be made at the time of those rulings, if they
are to be considered in later proceedings.-3 1 However, exceptions need not
be taken to rulings.32 Section 122, as amended by 1 Laws of Missouri,
1947, page 227, no longer requires that specific objections to instructions
be made at a trial.1 33 It has been held, it seems erroneously, that it is,
even now, insufficient to object to an instruction at a trial by saying, "We
object to the instruction."8 4

Section 122 further provides that, if a party has no opportunity to
object to an action of a court at the time thereof, the absence of an objection
thereto does not thereafter prejudice the party. This was recently illustrated
128. Jones v. Williams, suptra note 56.
129. Rosbrugh v. Motley, supra note 127; Bank of Thayer v. Kuebler, supra
note 125.
130. State v. Earley, 219 S.W. 2d 879 (Mo. App. 1949).
131. Holdman v. Thompson, 216 S.W. 2d 72 (Mo. 1948); Bulkley v. Thompson,
supra note 113; Rosebrough v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 215 S.W. 2d 295 (Mo.
App. 1948); Booten v. Sutter, 216 S.W. 2d 129 (Mo. App. 1949); Martin v.
Martinous, 219 S.W. 2d 667 (Mo. App. 1949). The Holdman and Booten cases are
in accord with this, even in connection with instructions.
132. Holdman v. Thompson, supra note 131; Welty v. Niswonger's Estate, 217
S.W. 2d 736 (Mo. App. 1949).
133. Holdman v. Thompson, supra note 131; Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio
R.R., 216 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo. 1948); Welty v. Niswonger's Estate, supra note 132;
White v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supr note 121.
134. Bulkley v. Thompson, supra note 113.
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by a case in which the court improperly, and without knowledge of the
parties, discussed a case in chambers with the foreman of the jury. 8 ,
WRITS OF ERROR ABOLISHED

Section 125 of the General Code for Civil Procedure abolishing writs
of error was constitutional and their use has not been authorized by the
1945 Constitution or by later statutes.1 86
APPEAL

a. Grounds for Appeal
1. Aggrieved Party
Defendants were not "aggrieved parties" and could not appeal from an
order granting them a new trial upon. their alternative motion for a new
17
trial or for judgment non obstante veredicto 3
An administrator of the estate of a deceased person has no right of
appeal from a judgment unless the record shows that he is an aggrieved
party in his capacity as administrator. 8
2. Judgments and Orders Appealable
An appeal may be taken from a final judgment1 89
A judgment, to be final, must dispose of all the parties and of all
40
the issues in the case
The mere ruling, decision, or opinion of the court, no judgment or
final order being entered in accordance therewith, does not have the effect
of a judgment, and is not reviewable by appeal 1 '
Where the right to intervene is by statute made absolute, or where
the claim can be established, preserved, or enforced in no other way than
by intervention, an order refusing intervention may be reviewed by
appeal.1 42
13,5. Hartgrove v. Chicago, B &Q. R.R., 218 S.W. 2d 557 (Mo. 1949).
136. State v. Hughes, 199 S.W. 2d 405 (Mo. 1947),
137. Vendt v. Duenke, 210 S.W. 2d 692 (Mo. App. 1948).
138. Clark v. Beasley, 213 S.W. 2d 645 (Mo. App. 1948).
139. Jones v. Williams, supra note 56; Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., supra note 102.
140. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 215 S.W. 2d
444 (Mo. 1948); Thompson v. Dye, 211 S.W. 2d 939 (Mo. App. 1948); Stone v.
Boston, supra note 123.
141. Stone v. Boston, svrpra note 123.
142. City of St. Louis v. Silk, 199 S. W. 2d 23 (Mo. App. 1947).
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If a court's order amending a petition relates to parties and has the
force and effect of finally disposing of the cause, or of its merits in some
3
material respect, as to one or more of the parties, the order is appealable.14
An order of a trial court sustaining a motion to dismiss on the ground
4
ihat no cause of action is stated is a final adjudication upon the merits. 4
Generally an order dismissing a supplemental petition is a final, appealable judgment. Certainly this is so when the effect of the order is to
completely and finally dispose of the case on its merits in some material
respect. An appeal from an order denying leave to file a supplemental petition is fairly comparable to the dismissal of an intervening petition. In
these instances the rulings have the force of an order sustaining a demurrer
to a petition.

1

45

Also, when a court renders judgment on a motion to modify an inter'ocutory judgment, the judgment becomes final.146
Further, a court order either approving or disapproving exceptions to
the final report of trustees under a mortgage deed of trust is an appealable
final judgment.

1 7

On the other hand, an order sustaining the defendant's motion to
quash a service was not a final judgment. 48
Where intervention is not indispensable to the preservation, or enforcement of a right claimed by the petitioner, the petition to intervene is purely
discretionary and an order refusing it is not a final judgment. '9
Further, if an order adding or denying the addition of parties does not
have the effect of discharging some of the parties or of creating or enlarging liability, the order is not appealable. 0
Where suit on one cause of action was brought against two defendants
and the motion of one defendant to dismiss was granted, the original cause
was pending and undisposed of as to the other defendant who had filed an
answer, so the appeal by the plaintiff from the order granting the motion
was premature and would be dismissed for lack of a final appealable
143. Bruun v. Katz Drug Co., 211 S.W. 2d 918 (Mo. 1948).
144. Jones v. Williams, supra note 56; Husser v. Markham, 210 S.W. 2d 405
(Mo. App. 1948).
145. Koplar v. Rosset, 214 S.W. 2d 417 (Mo. 1948).
146. Abbott v. Seamon, 217 S.W. 2d 580 (Mo. App. 1949).
147. Koplar v. Rosset, supra note 145,
148. Tobin Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Henwood, 199 S.W. 2d 415 (Mo.. App.
1947).
149. City of St. Louis v. Silk, supra note 142.
150. Bruun v. Katz Drug Co.,'supra note 143.
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judgment.1
The same result has been reached where the defendant's
motion for a new trial was sustained, as to one defendant and was dismissed as
to the other. The latter's appeal was held to be premature. 1 2
In an action to enjoin trespasses, an order simply continuing a temporary injunction for 30 days to permit the defendants to establish their title
to disputed premises and providing that, if the defendants failed to comply
therewith, the injunction should be made permanent was not an appealable

final order.152
Where judgment for the removal of trustees under a mortgage deed was
affirmed, and a final report asking discharge was filed, to which the plaintiffs filed timely exceptions charging misconduct since the rendition of the

judgment and set forth the substance of a proposed supplemental petition
seeking recovery for such acts of misconduct, an order denying leave to
file the petition was not a final appealable order since it was made during
pendency of the exceptions, notwithstanding the order recited it was a final
decree by agreement of the parties.1T
Finally, it has recently been held that where a party seeking to appeal
from an interlocutory decree in partition ordering the sale of realty admitted
that he was not claiming a greater or lesser interest in property than was
awarded him by decree, no right of appeal existed.' "
But an interlocutory order dismissing parties from a case may be properly considered on an appeal from a final judgment in that case. 1 0
b. How Taken

1. Notice of Appeal
No appeal is effective without a notice of appeal, filed either within
ten days after the judgment becomes final or within six months after the
judgment has become final, under special order of the appellate court on
application. Without timely notice of appeal under one or the other of
such sections the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction.' 7
151. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., supra note 140.
152. Thompson v. Dye, supra note 140.

153. Stone v. Boston, supra note 123.
154. Koplar v. Rosset, supra note 145.
155. Brouk v. Nahlik, 216 S.W. 2d 550 (Mo App. 1948).
156. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Shanlcman, 212 S.W. 2d 794 (Mo. App. 1948).
157. Goekel v. Jenkins, supra note 127; Johnson v. Kansas City Pqblic Service
Co., supranote 122; Bank of Thayer v. Kuebler, supra note 125.
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Defendants filed the following instrument as a notice of appeal:
"Circuit Court for the County of Clay State of Missouri
Mrs. John A. Krall, Robert S.
Withers, Mrs. A. E. Perkins,
Mrs. Cecil C. Way
and Mrs. F. R. Hulse
Plaintiff..
V.

Charles C. Light and Helene
C. Light

No. 17702
Defendant..

Notice of Appeal
Notice is hereby given that Charles C. Light and Helen C. Light defendants above-named, hereby appeal-to the Kansas City Court of Appeals
from the final judgment entered in this action on the 16th day of October,
1946, defendants' amended motion for a new trial having been filed on the
22nd day of October, 1946 and overruled November 10, 1946.

Dated November 19, 1946

Ward Dorsey
George Aylward
Attorney for defendants
Address 1215 Commerce
Building, Kansas City,
Missouri."

It was held that as it indicated an attempt, in good faith, to appeal from
a final judgment rendered in this case, and did not appear to mislead the
plaintiffs to their irreparable harm, by reason of its irregularity, it would be
deemed sufficient." "8

Under code provisions and court rules fixing the time within which
a notice of appeal must be filed the limitation is the allowable maximum
time therefor and there is no restriction on filing the notice within the
maximum period.115
The general provision as to the time within which an appeal must be
taken applies to divorce cases.16 0
Where a judgment was rendered assessing damages as against the plaintiff and her surety as obligors in an injunction bond, and the plaintiff and
her surety gave separate notices of appeal, there was still a single case in
158. Krall v. Light, 210 S.W. 2d 739 (Mo. App. 1948).
159. Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., suspra note 122.
160. State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, supranote 42.
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the Court of Appeals on appeal, though each notice of appeal when received
by clerk of Court of Appeals was filed under a separate docket number.Y"1
2. Transcript of the Record
(a) Time within which to File
Where the appellant's attorney was advised by the court reporter that
he would not be able to get appellant's transcript out in 90 days from
September 17th, the date when notice of appeal was filed, and the attorney,
who inadvertently made a notation of October 27th as the date of appeal,
moved in open court on January 11th for an extension of time, without
objection by respondents' attorneys, and the court granted an extension of 90
days, and the transcript was filed March 12th, the extension order was
valid. because of excusable neglect, precluding dismissal of an appeal1o2
The supreme court has also held that where failure to file, a transcript
in time was due to the necessity of paying for it in installments, out of a $35
weekly salary which was also required to provide for four children and to
satisfy the landlord, the supreme court had power to extend the time for
filing and reasonably exercised it.63

(b) Correction of Transcript
Absent consent of the parties, a motion to correct a transcript of the
record which is not made until after service of the respondent's brief is, by
the terms of Supreme Court Rule 1.03, too late.16 4
(c) Transcript Binding on Appellate Court, When
The appellate court is bound by the transcript when it is approved by
both sides. 65
3. Briefs
(a) Content
Section 139(a) ofi the Civil Code of Missouri provides that all briefs
shallbe prepared as provided by rule of the appellate court. 1 8
Rule 1.08 adopted by the supreme court and applicable to appellate
practice and procedure provides that the brief for appellant shall contain
161. Waterman v. Waterman, 210 S.W. 2d 723 (Mo. App. 1948).
162. Baldwin v. Desgranges, 199 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. 1947).
163. Leaman v. Campbell 66 Express Truck Lines, Inc., 199 S.W. 2d 359 (Mo.
*1947). For a case in which the illness of the court reporter has'held to justify a
delay in filing the transcript, see Bock v. Eilen, 211 S.W. 2d 92 (Mo. App. 1948).
164. Donati v. Gualdoni, supra note 112.
165. Schubert v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 214 S.W. 2d 420 (Mo. 1948);
Prague v. Eddy, 214 S.W. 2d 521 (Mo. 1948).
166. Feltenberger v. Evers, 210 S.W. 2d 404 (Mo. App. 1948); McHenry v.
Wabash R.R., 216 S.W. 2d 538 (Mo. App. 1.948).
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(1) a concise statement of the grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the
review court is invoked; (2) a fair and concise statement of the facts without
.argument; (3) the points relied on, which shall specify the allegations of
error. "(b) The fair and concise statement of the facts shall be in the
form of a statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for
-determination.... (c) The statement of the facts and the arguments shall
16 7
have specific page references to the transcript on appeal."
Where the appellants' statement on appeal from judgment for the city
plaintiff in suit to enjoin the violation of a zoning ordinance was not preceded
by a jurisdictional statement, as required by the supreme court's rules, but
certain pages of the statement of facts set forth that the ordinance was
-unconstitutional in three respects and the whole of the appellants' brief and
the argument therein were devoted to the constitutionality of the ordinance,
and the amended answer of the appellants pleaded that the ordinance was.
unconstitutional in certain specified respects, and the cause was transferred
to the supreme court by the court of appeals on the specified ground that the
controversy involved constitutional questions, the supreme court had jurisdiction of the appeal.168
Where the statement of the facts in the appellant's brief, while not a
model, is sufficient to inform the court of the facts in the case and of the
169
issues presented by the appeal, it is adequate.
Where the appellants' brief was deficient in certain respects, but the
respondent in his brief presented a complete statement of all the evidence
together with reference to pleadings, with numerous citations to pages of
transcript where information might be found, the appeal would be considered,
but. the court warned that its consideration of the appeal was not to be
construed as a waiver by the court of substantial compliance with the court
°
rules applicable to appellate procedure1'
(b) Dismissal for Lack of Insufficiency of Brief
The penalty for a substantial violation of the supreme court's rule requiring certain matters to be contained in briefs is either dismissal of the
appeal or affirmance of the judgment.' 71
167. McHenry v. Wabash R.R., supra note 166. In accord as to the. necessity

of stating points and authorities, see Folger v. Lowery, supra note 105, and Royal
v. Thompson, 212 S.W. 2d 921 (Mo. 1948).
168. City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Memorial Post Benevolent
Ass'n, 213 S.W. 2d 479 (Mo. 1948).
169. Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., supra note 133.
170. Marquis v. Pettyjohn, 212 S.W. 2d 100 (Mo. App. 1948).
171. Royal v. Thompson, supra note 167; Feltenberger v. Evers, supra note 166;
McHenry v. Wabash R.R., supra note 166.
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The language of Rule 1.15 of the supreme court, authorizing the appellate court to dismiss an appeal "when the cause is called for hearing," has
no application to a situation where an appellant has not only failed to comply
with the rules and is, without good cause, knowingly in default before the
date of the hearing, but has also disregarded the order and admonition of the
court with respect to a continuance of the cause to a fixed date made by
the court in accordance with Section 92 of the General Code for Civil Procedure. The language of the rule does not mean that the court is compelled
to wait until the cause is called for hearing before it can exercise the power
of dismissal. It merely means that when a cause is set on the docket in the
usual way for hearing on a particular date and no action is taken by the
court thereon up to the time the cause is called for such 'hearing, then,
if an appellant has failed to comply with the rules mentioned, the court will
dismiss the appeal "unless good cause is shown or the interests of justice
1 72
otherwise require."
(c) Time for Filing
Where appellants counsel had been ill and confined to his home under
the care of a physician, and had been unable to prepare his appeal brief
and file it within time required by supreme court rule, the requirement as
to time within which a brief must be filed would be suspended under the
rule authorizing suspension or modification of rules upon a showing that
justice so requires.1 3
(d) By Whom Filed
Where the trial court sustained a motion for a new trial without specifying of record the reasons therefor, under supreme court rule 1.10, the
presumption was that the motion was erroneously granted and it became
the duty of the respondent, after the appellant had served a proper statement
on time, to file the first brief in the appellate court and to uphold the action
of the trial court in sustaining the motion 7 4

c. Matters Consideredon Appeal
1. In General
The scope of review in an action at law tried on facts with a jury
is generally governed by the provisions of the Civil Code prohibiting consideration of allegations of error not presented to or decided by the trial
court and prohibiting a review except for material error against the appel172. Anderson v. Kuhs, 213 S.W. 2d 238 (Mo. App. 1948).
173. Frank v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 211 S.W. 2d 940 (Mo. App. 1948).
174. Ragsdale v. Young, 215 S.W. 2d 514 (Mo. App. 1948).
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lant and by the supreme court rule relating to the contents of briefs. However, effect must be given to the supreme court rule relating to the consi17 5
deration of plain errors

2. Insufficiency of Pleading
Substantial insufficiency of pleadings may be considered though made
17
initially on appeal. 6
But this is not true of defects in pleadings which do not result in a
177
total failure thereof to state a claim or defense.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence
Although an appeal normally does not lie from an order overruling a
motion for judgment for the defendant, and although the trial court acted
within its discretion in granting the defendant a new trial, the questions
raised by the defendant as to whether the plaintiff made out a cause were
basic, and the supreme court would examine evidence to determine whether
the plaintiff made out a case for the jury so that the parties would be saved
the expense of another trial if it appeared that the plaintiff could not
71
recover
Where the appellants filed no motion for a new trial, but the trial
court considered the sufficiency of the appellants' evidence on the respondent's motion after trial for judgment as on a directed verdict as well
as upon the respondent's motions for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence and again at the close of all of the evidence, the supreme
court could consider the sufficiency of the evidence to make a submissible
179
case for the appellants.
4. Errors not Assigned-Plain Error
Usually points not urged on appeal either by assignment of error or
by points and authorities are deemed abandoned and will not be considered.1 80
However an appellate court may, by Supreme Court Rule 3.27, consider
plain errors affecting substantial rights, though they are not raised in
175. Urie v. Thompson, 210 S.W. 2d 98 (Mo. 1948); Hauber v. Gentry, 215
S.W. 2d 754 (Mo. 1948); Wright v. Ickenroth, 215 S.W. 2d 43 (Mo. App. 1948).

176. Rogers v. Poteet, supra note 54; Holtz v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 209

S.W. 2d 883 (Mo. 1948); Powell v. Huffman, supra note 106.
177. Ebeling v. Fred J. Swaine Mfg. Co., 209 S.W. 2d 892 (Mo. 1948).
178. Bailey v. Interstate Airmotive, 219 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo. 1949).
179. Johnson v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra note 102.
180. Folger v. Lowery, supra note 105.
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the trial court or preserved for review or are defectively raised or preserved.""'
d. udgment on Appeal
1. In General
Section 140 of the General Code for Civil Procedure provides that an
appellate court may award a new trial or a partial new trial, reverse or
affirm a judgment or order the trial court to give such judgment as such
court ought to have given as it shall decide, and that "unless justice requires
otherwise the court shall dispose finally of the case on appeal and no new
trial shall be ordered as to issues in which no error appears.' 6 2
2. Favorable Error
Where an error is in the appellant's favor, under Section 123 and 140(b)
of the Code of Civil Procedure 1943, an appellate court is precluded from
reversing a judgment. If the respondents do not appeal from the judgment,
they are not entitled to any affirmative relief, for the error committed against
them, by a modification in any manner of the judgment in their favor. 85
3. Error not Prejudicial
Section 140(b) of the General Code for Civil Procedure commands that
no appellate court shall reverse any judgment, unless it believes that error
was committed by the trial court against the appellant materially affecting
84
the merits of the action.
Hence, where the judgment of the trial court produced a correct result,
the supreme court would affirm it notwithstanding the reasons assigned
85
therefor were erroneous.2
In an action for injuries sustained at the plaintiff's place of employment,
where the plaintiff's fellow employees and bosses were equally available
to both parties as witnesses and the plaintiff called as witness one fellow

employee, who had personal knowledge of the occurrence and testified concerning the plaintiff's ability to work since his injury, his failure to call
other employees as witnesses on the question whether he was injured or able
to work did not necessarily permit the unfavorable inference argued to jury
'181. Leaman v. Campbell 66 Express Truck Lines, supra note 163; Kindred v.
Anderson, 209 S.W. 2d 912 (Mo. 1948); Rosebrough v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
supra note 131; Welty v. Niswonger's Estate, supra note 132; Martin v. Martinous,
supra note 131.
182. Barnes v. 'Chism, 215 S.W. 2d 775 (Mo. App. 1948).
183. Lynn v. Stricker, .213 S.W. 2d 672 (Mo. App. 1948).
184. Booten v. Sutter, supra note 131.
185. Kraemer v. Shelley, 214 S.W. 2d 525 (Mo. 1948).
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by defendant's counsel. The plaintiff was not prejudicially injured by the
argument."8
In an action for injuries to a pedestrian struck by the defendant's
automobile, where the plaintiff's instructions hypothesized a finding of the
defendant's reckless, wanton, and wilful misconduct, the defendant's given
instructions that, to find him guilty of wilful or intentional wrongdoing,
the jury must find that he consciously intended. to injure the plaintiff or was
guilty of wanton or reckless conduct, and that the burden was on the
plaintiff to prove the defendant guilty -of such conduct, were not prejudicially
18 7
erroneous.
Where the defendant's counsel read from a book to his expert witness
on redirect examination, after the plaintiff's counsel had brought that book
into the case and cross-examined the witness on it, the text used by the
defendant in the original direct examination having been another text, the
U. S. Bureau of Standards table, it being clear that both parties treated
the first text as authoritative, and the questions asked by the defendant's
counsel on redirect examination being pertinent in view of the cross-examination, the mere fact that they were asked on redirect examination did
not constitute error, or at least not reversible error. 8 8
There was no prejudicial error when the court failed in its judgment
in the plaintiff's favor to rule on the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the plaintiff's petition and evidence failed to make a case
against the defendant, where the record clearly indicates that the defendant
intended to rest his case on the plaintiff's evidence without regard to the
court's ruling on the motion submitted.1s9
In a property owners' action against a city for damages resulting from
blasting during the construction of a sewer, a charge permitting the assessment of damages if the jury found that the city created any condition which
caused the plaintiff's property to be damaged by the construction of a
sewer and blast was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial on the
ground that the jury was misled or allowed recovery for some cause not

pleaded or proved.190
An instruction, though erroneously drawn by the use of the word
"expenditures," of which there was no evidence, rather than by the use of
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Holtz v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., supra note 176.
Nichols v. Bresnahan, 212 S.W. 2d 570 (Mo. 1948).
Hemminghaus v. Ferguson, 215 S.W. 2d 481 (Mo. 1948).
Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 212 S.W. 2d 480 (Mo. App. 1948).
Cook v. Kansas City, 214 S.W. 2d 430 (Mo. 1948).
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the word "indebtedness," was not prejudicial, since the evidence showed
191
that the reference was to indebtedness.
4. Final Disposition of Case
Where all interested parties were heard in an action for the construction
of a trust indenture and all material evidence was in the record before
the supreme court, that court, upon determining that the indenture was
void in law, made final disposition of the case on the appeal, though the
trial court had granted a new trial after rendition of a decree holding the
indenture valid, since nothing remained in the case to retry.19 2
5. Judgment Which Trial Court Should Have Given
Where the trial court erroneously rendered a judgment for the defendant, but all of the material facts had been presented and the law in relation
to them ruled upon, there was no reason for a new trial; and the appellate
court gave such judgment for the plaintiff as the trial court ought to have
given, and remanded the cause with directions.193
Where the result reached by the appellate court has the same effect
as that of the trial court, but for different reasons, it is the duty of the
appellate court to give the judgment which the trial court should have
given, as to the appellate court seems agreeable to law.1 9'
6. Judgment Permitting a Remittitur
Where the trial court awarded a new trial on the ground of excessiveness
of the verdict unless the plaintiff remitted. $2,000, which the plaintiff refused to do, and it appeared that the case had been fully developed and
there was substantial evidence in support of the trial court's holding, the
order granting a new trial was affirmed, but the plaintiff was afforded an
opportunity to remit $2,000 within a reasonable time. 9 5
The
found in
mandate
omitted,
191.
192.
S.W. 2d
193.
194.
195.

7. Omission of Implied Words
words "for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion"
the judgment of an appellate court add nothing to the appellate
which would not have been necessarily implied had they been
and every case which is remanded is remanded for further pro-

Wright v. Ickenroth, suwjra note 175.
Atlantic Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, Fla. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 211
2 (Mo. 1948).
Spaeth v. Washington University, 213 S.W. 2d 276 (Mo. App. 1948).
Brinkop v. Brinkop, 215 S.W. 2d 70 (Mo. App. 1948).
Barnes v. Chism, supra note 182.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss4/1

124

1949]

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1948
WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1948

451

ceedings which are expected to be "in accordance with" the opinion
rendered2 9a
TRANSFER FROM COURT OF APPEALs

In 1948 the supreme court explained the new rule relating to transfer.
In Fizette v. Phillips'9 7 the court said:
"Preliminary to a consideration of the merits, it may be noted that
the case has been erroneously styled in this court as 'State ex rel. Mutual
Casualty Company, relator, v. Bland, et al., Judges of the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, respondents,' under which erroneous caption appellant
filed its 'Application for order to transfer.' An application made to \his
court to transfer a cause from a court of appeals is but a further step in
the same cause, in consequence of which no change is worked in the title.
At the conference at which the application to transfer was passed on, the
judge to whom the matter had been assigned entered the following on the
back of the folder containing the files in the case, 'Transfer ordered, returnable 30 days to banc.' It appears, however, that the order entered was not
in conformity with this minute, and that a writ of certiorari was, in fact,
issued, although it had not been prayed, thus further complicating the
record. The case will be docketed and reported under caption and style it
bore in the Court of Appeals, and in the trial court, as hereinabove shown,
and it is so ordered.
"In this connection we take occasion to say that there has been some
lack of understanding as to the purpose and effect of rule 2.06 relating
to transfers from the Courts of Appeals, which was adopted subsequent to
the effective date of the Constitution of 1945. When present rule 2.06-was
adopted (July 1945) former rules 2.06 (in relation to certiorari for conflict
of decision) and 2.061 (in relation to transfers on the ground of general
interest or importance of the question involved, or re-examination of the
existing law) were repealed, and the two sections were merged (with certain
changes) and promulgated as rule 2.06. It was thereby intended to provide
one uniform method of procedure for the review by this court of cases
decided by the Courts of Appeals, namely by transfer, whether the ground
be conflict of decision, general interest or importance of the question involved
in the case, or for the purpose of re-examining the existing law, as authorized
by § 10, Art. V of the Constitution. There has been some persistence in
196. Abrams v. Scott, 211 S.W. 2d 718 (Mo. 1948).
197. 211 S.W. 2d 728 (Mo. 1948). See also State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, snpra
note 42.
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applying for certiorari on the ground of conflict, rather than for transfer
as contemplated by rule 2.06. Likewise in making applications for transfer,
the sort of confusion encountered in this case in the matter of caption has
been somewhat widespread These considerations have prompted the court
to attempt clarification of the rule by adding this provision: 'A petition
for certiorari will be considered as an application to transfer, and must comply with the provisions of this rule.' Such amendment has this day been
adopted. This will obviate the necessity of making any change in the
style of the case in the instances governed by the rule. Instead of making
it appear that the judges of the Courts of Appeals are the parties in interest,
the case will bear the same caption in this court as it did in the Court of
Appeals, irrespective of which ground for transfer is invoked."
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